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Atienza Manuel, Manero Juan Ruiz. A Theory of Legal Sentences. Springer Netherlands,1998. — 205 p.. 1998

This book is not a general theory of law, but it is intended to be the first part of one. It was written in the larger context of a rather comprehensive project we have been working on for a number of years and which we hope to finish some day. Our experience in working together makes us optimistic — maybe naively so — about our first results, presented here, as well as those we hope to obtain in the future, but not about the time this will take us. Let's say that, in this re­spect, the writing of the present book — this first chapter of a theory of law — has made us rather realistically pessimistic.

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Table of Contents
Preface
Chapter I Mandatory Norms: Principles and Rules
1. Introduction: Types of principles
The discussion about principles in contemporary legal theory: How it all started
Different meanings of 'legal principle'
A proposal of classification
2. Principles and rules
Besides these internal distinctions, principles must also be distinguished, so to speak, externally, from other standards of behaviour that can be part of a legal system.
A structural approach to the distinction
Principles and rules as reasons for action
Principles, rules, powers, and interests
3. The explanatory, the justificatory and the legitimatory dimension of principles
The last point to be treated here will be to show the most important functions principles fulfil in law.
Principles in legal explanations
Principles in legal reasoning
Principles, control and legitimation of power
Appendix to Chapter I Reply to Our Critics
Previous versions of our paper on legal principles have been subjected to a number of criticisms, most of them expressed orally in several seminars where we had the chance to discuss our ideas.1
Mandatory rules as peremptory reasons and principles as non- peremptory reasons; the 'closed' or 'open' configuration of the conditions of application
2. Principles and full compliance
Chapter II Power-Conferring Rules
1. Introduction
2. What power-conferring rules are not
We will approach our topic by, first of all, excluding a few things, that is, we will begin by explaining what, in our view, power-conferring rules are not.
First exclusion: Power-conferring rules are not deontic or regulative norms
2.2. Second exclusion: Power-conferring rules cannot adequately be under­stood in terms of definitions, conceptual rules, or qualifying dispositions
3. What power-conferring rules are
Three approaches and some ontological assumptions
A structural approach
A functional approach: Power-conferring rules as reasons for action
3.4. Power-conferring rules, non-normative powers, and interests
Appendix to Chapter II Reply to Our Critics
Introduction
Critique of our critique of the deontic (or prescriptivist) conception
Are we treating the conceptualist thesis fairly?
Problems with our conception
Chapter III Permissive Sentences
After having treated, in the first two chapters, the problems of mandatory norms — rules and principles — and of power-conferring rules, purely con­stitutive rules and definitions, we will now set out to examine permissive sen­tences.
1. Permission in contemporary legal theory
The question of whether there is such a thing as permissive norms is one of the most hotly debated issues in legal theory.
1.1. The pragmatic irrelevance of permissive norms. The category of 'per­missive norms' is unnecessary. Echave-Urquijo-Guibourg (1980) and Ross (1968)
1.2. Von Wright's proposal: Permissive norms as promises
1.3. Weak and strong permission in Alchourron and Bulygin
2. Reformulating the problem
2.1. Permission and the regulation of 'natural' conduct
2.2. Permission and the exercise of normative powers
2.3. Permission and principles. Constitutional freedoms
3. Some conclusions
Chapter IV Values in the Law
1. Introduction
2. Two conceptions of criminal norms
3. The double-faced character of norms and value judgments
4. Types of norms and types of values
Chapter V The Rule of Recognition
Introduction
Jurists and the 'normative value' of the constitution
The rule of recognition as ultimate norm
Changing the rule of recognition without rupturing legal continuity?
A host of problems
Who shapes the rule of recognition?
The conceptual, directive and evaluative dimensions of the rule of recognition. The rule of recognition and the exclusionary claim of the law. Why accept the rule of recognition?
8. How many rules of recognition? Certainty and penumbra in the rule of recognition
Chapter VI Conclusions
Introduction
A classification of legal sentences
A comparative analysis of the different types of sentences
Bibliography
Index of Name
Law and Philosophy Library

Books and textbooks on the discipline Theory of law:

  1. Askey Simon, McLeod Ian. Studying Law. Macmillan Education,2014. — 239 p. - 2014 ãîä
  2. Alexy Robert. The Argument from Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism. Oxford University Press,2010. — 159 p. - 2010 ãîä
  3. Anderson Matthew (ed.). Toward a Critique of Guilt: Perspectives from Law and the Humanities. JAI Press,2005. — 168 p. - 2005 ãîä
  4. Allan James. A Sceptical Theory of Morality and Law. Peter Lang,1998. — 277 p. - 1998 ãîä
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