Table of Contents

Preface ix

Chapter I: Mandatory Norms: Principles and Rules 1

1. Introduction. Types of principles 1

1.1. The discussion about principles in contemporary legal theory: How it all started 1/1.2.

2. Principles and rules 6

2.1. A structural approach to the distinction 712.2. Principles and rules as reasons for action 12 / 2.3. Principles, rules, powers, and interests 15

3. The explanatory, the justificatory and the legitimatory

dimension of principles 19

3.1. Principles in legal explanations 20/3.2. Principles in legal reasoning 2113.3. Principles, control and legitimation of power 25

Appendix to Chapter I: Reply to Our Critics 26

1. Mandatory rules as peremptory reasons, and principles as non-peremptory reasons; the 'closed' or 'open' configuration

of the conditions of application 27

1.1. Prieto's critique 2711.2. Peczenik's critique 34

2. Principles and full compliance 36

2.1. Prieto's position 37 /2.2. Peczenik's position 41

Chapter II: Power-Conferring Rules 44

1. Introduction 44

2. What power-conferring rules are not 45

2.1. First exclusion: Power-conferring rules are not deontic or regulative norms 46

12.2. Second exclusion: Power-conferring rules cannot adequately be understood

in terms of definitions, conceptual rules, or qualifying dispositions 53

3. What power-conferring rules are 57

3.1. Three approaches and some ontological assumptions 5713.2. A structural approach 5813.3. A functional approach: Power-conferring rules as reasons for action 65 / 3.4. Power-conferring rules, non-normative powers, and interests 72

Appendix to Chapter II: Reply to Our Critics 76

1. Introduction 76

2. Critique of our critique of the deontic (or prescriptivist) conception 76

3. Are we treating the conceptualist thesis fairly? 84

4.

Chapter III: Permissive Sentences 90

1. Permission in contemporary legal theory 90

1.1. The pragmatic irrelevance of permissive norms. The category of 'permissive norms' is unnecessary. Echave-Urquijo-Guibourg (1980) and Ross (1968) 91 1

1.2. Von Wright's proposal: Permissive norms as promises 94 /1.3. Weak and strong permission in Alchourron and Bulygin 99

2. Reformulating the problem 103

2.1. Permission and the regulation of 'natural' conduct 10312.2. Permission and the exercise of normative powers 107 / 2.3. Permission and principles. Constitutional freedoms 112

3. Some conclusions 115

Appendix to Chapter III:

A Note on Constitutional Permission and Basic Rights 116

Chapter IV: Values in the Law 120

1. Introduction 120

2. Two conceptions of criminal norms 121

3. The double-faced character of norms and value judgments 127

4. Types of norms and types of values 135

Chapter V: The Rule of Recognition 141

1. Introduction 141

2. Jurists and the 'normative value' of the constitution 142

3. The rule of recognition as ultimate norm 145

4. Changing the rule of recognition without rupturing legal

continuity? 146

5. A host of problems 147

6. Who shapes the rule of recognition? 148

7. The conceptual, directive and evaluative dimensions of the rule

of recognition. The rule of recognition and the exclusionary

claim of the law. Why accept the rule of recognition? 152

8. How many rules of recognition? Certainty and penumbra in the

rule of recognition 158

Chapter VI: Conclusions 162

1. Introduction 162

2. A classification of legal sentences: Table 1 162

3. A comparative analysis of the different types of sentences:

Table 2 164

Table I. Classification of Sentences 175

Table II. Comparative Analysis of Different Types of Sentence 176 Bibliography 183

Index of names 191