Table of Contents

Preface ix

Introduction 1

PART A — A CASE FOR MORAL SCEPTICISM 7

Chapter One: The Deflation of Reason 9

a) The Ambit of Reason According to Hume (p.9)

b) Reason Alone Cannot Move Action (p.

c) Hume's Position Considered for the First Time (p. 18)

d) A Transcendental Reply Considered

(that yes, reason alone can move action) (p.25)

e) A Summary (p.32)

Chapter Two: Reason and Morality 3 7

a) Hume's Position Considered for the Second Time (p.39)

b) An Enriched, Moral Reason? A Different Reality (p.44)

c) Reason and Utilitarianism (p.50)

d) A Summary (p.53)

Chapter Three: Defending the View that Moral Distinctions are

Projected, Subjective Sentiments 5 5

a) Hume's Position Considered for the Third Time (p.55)

b) Moral Scepticism and the Meaning of Moral Statements (p.61)

c) Whence Duty? (p.78)

d) The Secondary Qualities Analogy (p.80)

e) A Summary (p.84)

Chapter Four: A Sceptic's View of Sympathy and Virtue 8 7

a) Hume's Position Considered for the Fourth Time (p.88)

b) Sympathy (p.91)

c) Virtue (p.95)

Chapter Five: The Making of an Interpersonal System of Constraints on Action 97

a) Justice (p.97)

b) How and Why Might the Passage to Justice Take Place? (p.101)

c) Why Approve of Just Acts? (p. 109)

d) Hume's Position Considered for the Fifth Time (p. 111)

e) The Search for a Disinterested Perspective (p. 120)

f) A Summary (p. 130)

Chapter Six: Ramifications and Reckonings

a) The Good Life v. the Moral Life (p. 133)

b) The Free-Rider Problem (p. 13 8)

c) The Need for Standards (p. 143)

d) Hume's Position Considered for the Final Time (p. 145)

PART B — LEGAL THEORY FROM THE SCEPTIC'S VANTAGE

Chapter Seven: Insider Interpreting

a) Do Judges have Discretion? Is there a Right Answer? (p. 153)

b) Dworkin's Reply to the Sceptic Considered (p. 160)

c) The Consequences of a Dworkinian Judiciary (p.167)

Chapter Eight: A Sceptic's Observations about Interpretation and Legal Systems

a) Describing a Legal System (p. 171)

b) My Preferred Approach (p. 174)

c) Overview and Implications (p. 181)

Chapter Nine: Non-Legal Rights: Human or Humean?

a) Do Non-Legal Rights Really Exist? (p. 190)

b) Do Non-Legal Rights Contingently Emerge? (p. 191)

c) The'Ought'from the'Is'(p. 193)

d) How Much is Enough? (p.201)

e) The Sceptic as Natural Law Adherent (p.205)

f) Bills of Rights (p.206)

g) Recommending Rights — Should they be Emphasised? (p.211)

Concluding Remarks

Notes

Bibliography