Introduction
So far, we have been occupied with different kinds of legal sentences. The purpose was to clarify what kinds of pieces the machinery of the law consists of. In this chapter, our aim is rather to examine that machinery as a whole.
As is commonly known, in the legal theory of the positivist tradition, the unity of the legal system has been seen as a correlate of the possibility to refer each and every one of its provisions to a single 'master norm' — to use the expression coined by Dworkin (1978) — located above the norms issued by the system's authorities. That 'master norm' is understood in different ways, and it has also been given different names, of which those of 'basic norm' (Grundnorm) (Kel- sen) and 'rule of recognition' (Hart) are the most famous. As is also well known, for Kelsen, this norm which is presupposed by legal theorists, states "In short: One ought to behave as the constitution prescribes" and is "the condition under which the subjective meaning of the constitution-creating act, and the subjective meaning of the acts performed in accordance with the constitution, are interpreted as their objective meaning, as valid norms " (Kelsen 1967, 201 and 204). In Hart's version, in turn, it is the norm providing the ultimate criteria of legal validity and which exists "as a complex, but normally concordant, practice of the courts, officials, and private persons in identifying the law by reference to certain criteria" (Hart 1994, 110).[66]2.
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