Introduction
An earlier version of our ideas about power-conferring rules (Atienza/Ruiz Manero 1994a) has been critically assessed by several of our colleagues connected with Pompeu Fabra University of Barcelona: by Ricardo Caracciolo (1995) on the one hand, and Daniel Mendonca, Juan Moreso and Pablo Navarro (1995), on the other.
Since it is a privilege to have such strong theoretical adversaries, in the following pages we will do our very best to deepen even more this relationship of opposition, which, in any case, will never become as strong as our friendship with all of them on the personal level. There may be some truth in the saying that only in adversity you will really know your friends.The main part of the contribution by Mendonga/Moreso/Navarro reproduces the structure of our paper — which has now become ch. II of this book — and thus is divided into three parts: In the first two, they criticize the pars destruens of our article, that is, the way we present what we consider the to be the explicatory deficits of two alternative conceptions of power-conferring rules: that which we referred to as the deontic (and which they prefer to call the 'prescriptivist') conception, and the conceptualist conception. In the third part, they criticize our proposal to understand power-conferring rules as anankastic- constitutive rules. In our reply, we will follow that same order, and we will try at the same time to reply to the observations made by Ricardo Caracciolo.
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More on the topic Introduction:
- Domingo Rafael. Roman Law: An Introduction. Routledge,2018. — 252 p., 2018
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Introduction: Themes and Literature
- Nicholas Barry, Metzger Ernest. An Introduction to Roman Law. Oxford University Press,1976. — 317 p., 1976
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