Are we treating the conceptualist thesis fairly?
3.1. Mendon^a/Moreso/Navarro say that we "do not distinguish clearly between the properties of conceptual rules and the properties of semantic rules" and that "since [we] do not clearly distinguish between different kinds of conceptual rules, [our] treatment of the matter is not fair with those who defend a conceptualist approach".
The only thing we can say to that here is, first, that we have not tried to debate against the best conceivable version of the conceptualist thesis, but against the most reliable versions of it in contemporary legal theory we are aware of. And second, that in the version of Alchourron/ Bulygin, what is stressed are not the differences between the different kinds of conceptual rules, but precisely what they have in common (as is shown, for example, in the passage by Bulygin quoted by them: "what all these [conceptual] rules have in common is their defining character, that is, they can be seen as definitions of certain concepts"). If the objection of Mendon^a/Moreso/Navarro is that, instead of improving the conceptualist thesis before criticizing it, we took it just as it is presented by its most representative defenders, they are certainly right. But in that case, we are grateful for the excuse they themselves offer: "the missing distinction in A-RM could be partly the responsibility of Alchourrdn and Bulygin, since they do not analyze clearly what the defining or determinating property conceptual rules share consists of.3.2. Mendonga/Moreso/Navarro think it "rather strange" that we attribute to Alchourron and Bulygin "the idea that a legal order can be satisfactorily reconstructed with the help of two categories of norms: norms of conduct and conceptual rules". In our critics' opinion, "Alchourron and Bulygin have insisted that legal systems can contain a substantial variety of sentences". In order to support this claim, they quote a passage from Eugenio Bulygin where he says — obviously speaking in general and not specifically of the law — that "there can be many classes of rules". What happens is that this does in no way invalidate our interpretation. As far as we know, no other category besides rules of conduct and definitions has ever been used by Alchourron and Bulygin to account for legal sentences — except for the fact that in some of their works they mention "sentences presenting political theories, expressing a people's
gratitude to the head of State, or asking for God's protection..." (Alchourron/ Bulygin 1974, 107); but such sentences "have no influence whatsoever on the normative consequences of the system" and therefore, they can be considered irrelevant.
4.
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