The rule of recognition as ultimate norm

From all this it follows that the identification of the supreme source of a legal system depends on a norm existing only insofar as it is commonly accepted. In the Haitian tradition of legal theory, that norm is called the rule of recognition.

"As a material basic norm, [art. 1.1] is the norm of identification of the other norms, with respect to their material content. That is, a norm is considered to be of the order, is identified as part of the order, if it endorses — positive perspective — or does not contradict — negative perspective — the highest values. What the material constitution adds to the identification of norms in legal orders is precisely that that identification is not only produced by formal criteria — a competent organ and an adequate procedure for producing the norm —, but also by criteria of content.

Article 1.1 is the basic norm of material identification of the order (what Hart calls 'rule of recog­nition', with some nuances, giving it a material sense)." (Peces-Barba 1984,97)4

Now, in our view, what this author has confused here is the concept of ultimate norm, or rule of recognition, and the concept of materially most important norm. Article 1.1 may be the materially most important norm of the Spanish legal order,^{[69] [70] but it does not, of course, stipulate the ultimate criteria of legal validity, because its own identification as a legal norm depends precisely on the previous recognition of the Constitution as the supreme source of the system.}

4.