After having treated, in the first two chapters, the problems of mandatory norms — rules and principles — and of power-conferring rules, purely con­stitutive rules and definitions, we will now set out to examine permissive sen­tences.

In order to do this, we will first present what, in our view, are the main positions on this matter in contemporary legal theory, and then develop our own conception. Our central point will be that with respect to permissions one must distinguish three contexts: that of rules regulating 'natural' conduct, that of power-conferring rules, and that of legal principles.

More on the topic After having treated, in the first two chapters, the problems of mandatory norms — rules and principles — and of power-conferring rules, purely con­stitutive rules and definitions, we will now set out to examine permissive sen­tences.:

1. 2.2. Second exclusion: Power-conferring rules cannot adequately be under­stood in terms of definitions, conceptual rules, or qualifying dispositions
2. First exclusion: Power-conferring rules are not deontic or regulative norms
3. Chapter I Mandatory Norms: Principles and Rules
4. A functional approach: Power-conferring rules as reasons for action
5. 3.4. Power-conferring rules, non-normative powers, and interests
6. 2. What power-conferring rules are not
7. 3. What power-conferring rules are
8. We will approach our topic by, first of all, excluding a few things, that is, we will begin by explaining what, in our view, power-conferring rules are not.
9. Chapter II Power-Conferring Rules
10. Mandatory rules as peremptory reasons and principles as non- peremptory reasons; the 'closed' or 'open' configuration of the conditions of application
11. Principles and rules as reasons for action