We will approach our topic by, first of all, excluding a few things, that is, we will begin by explaining what, in our view, power-conferring rules are not.
The first of these exclusions is the following: power-conferring rules are not deontic or regulative norms. This expression — 'deontic or regulative norms' — may sound strange and seems to be a perfect example of a pleonasm: if a norm is a sentence that commands, prohibits or permits something, then to speak of 'deontic norms' or 'regulative norms' is like speaking of 'rectangular rectangles'.
The same thing happens if norms are understood as the meaning of such sentences. And it stays the same if norms are conceived as the result of acts of prescription (that is, of an order, a prohibition or a permission). Thus, whatever perspective (syntactic, semantic or pragmatic) we adopt to account for norms, their characteristic is always precisely their regulative or deontic character. Hence, if one assumes that this character is a defining element of norms, our thesis would be that power-conferring rules are not norms. Later, we will discuss the question of whether it makes sense to continue calling those rules, which — according to our thesis — do not order, prohibit or permit anything, norms, thus stretching the usual meaning of the word (or, more precisely, its intension — since power-conferring rules in our view have no deontic or regulative character —, but not its extension — since power-conferring rules usually belong to the denotation of the term 'norm').Our second exclusion is the following: the thesis which presents powerconferring rules as definitions, conceptual rules or qualifying dispositions blurs important differences between such rules and two other kinds of sentences, namely, definitions, and what we will call 'purely constitutive rules'.
After these dismissals, we will now present our conception of powerconferring rules and explain how they differ, in our view, from deontic or regulative rules, from definitions, and from purely constitutive norms.
2.1.
More on the topic We will approach our topic by, first of all, excluding a few things, that is, we will begin by explaining what, in our view, power-conferring rules are not.:
- A functional approach: Power-conferring rules as reasons for action
- After having treated, in the first two chapters, the problems of mandatory norms — rules and principles — and of power-conferring rules, purely constitutive rules and definitions, we will now set out to examine permissive sentences.
- 2.2. Second exclusion: Power-conferring rules cannot adequately be understood in terms of definitions, conceptual rules, or qualifying dispositions
- 3.4. Power-conferring rules, non-normative powers, and interests
- First exclusion: Power-conferring rules are not deontic or regulative norms
- 3. What power-conferring rules are
- 2. What power-conferring rules are not
- Chapter II Power-Conferring Rules
- In building my case for moral scepticism I begin with reason, by deciding what can be considered its ambit and abilities.
- Differentiation: Where do Obligations Fit in the Roman View of the Law?
- A structural approach to the distinction
- 10.2 ENCOUNTERS WITH THE LEAGUE AS A ‘NEW STATE OF THINGS’