Conclusion
The reconstitution of Canadian federalism by first ministers via executive federalism is one of the more remarkable outcomes in the annals of federal constitution making. Well before the patriation of the constitution in 1982, Canadian politicians managed to rewire major political institutions to serve the difficult and often fraught politics of this complex federation.
This was achieved across a century marked by rapid social and economic change as well as world financial and military crises. The use of executive federalism to bootstrap institutional reform in the absence of a domestic amending process while maintaining democratic legitimacy is a remarkable political achievement.Executive federalism is not without its weaknesses. The very dynamics that allow it to function successfully have anti-democratic elements. Meetings of first ministers held in closed session with no official records of debates or decisions and lacking clear voting rules do little to enhance democratic transparency or accountability. Executive dominance of legislatures encouraged by the electoral system, party dynamics and Westminster parliamentary norms conspire to limit the effectiveness of political opposition. So, too, do periods of sustained one-party dominance in several Canadian jurisdictions, including at the federal level. Yet, in contributing to the bargaining power of first ministers and pitting them against each other—as relatively independent actors able to authoritatively deliver results—executive federalism allowed for the political de-integration of a relatively centralized federal constitution.
As Riker's approach predicted, the analysis here suggests that the dynamics of executive federalism and bargaining are intimately connected to electoral and legislative realities that help determine the negotiating power of first ministers.
Cross-jurisdiction internal party linkages are unusually rare among Canadian parties. First ministers of regions making the heaviest claims on the federation and in intergovernmental negotiations appear to benefit from diminished regional electoral support for their perceived bargaining foe, the federal government. Regions that more easily identify with the federal government do not experience this effect. Evidence of legislative correlates of first minister authority (seat dominance) is harder to find. Government dominance appears to track the dynamics of intergovernmental relations in some provinces, but not in others. This is an invitation to deeper analysis of the link between electoral and federal dynamics in search of a better understanding the factors that shape political power in federal countries.References
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CHAPTER 7 ‘Swimming Outside the Flags'
More on the topic Conclusion:
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