Conclusion

Federalism and democracy are principles for designing a political system. Such a polity—that is, a federal democracy—consists of different, but connected institutions serving different purposes in different processes.

Loose coupling is a very abstract design principle. It can be implemented by particular patterns of democracy and intergovernmental relations. As pat­terns of democracy are unlikely to be susceptible to institutional reform, due to their path-dependent evolution and the impact of changes in society, we should investigate ways to adjust patterns of multi-level governance. These can not only be changed, varied and adjusted to specific policies, but also offer sig­nificant potential to democratize federalism.

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