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Conclusion

The distinction between federal and regional systems remains one of the unre­solved dilemmas in federalism studies. Although regional states can be con­strued as incomplete federations (they display some, but not all, of the typical federal features), it is not easy to draw a line between the two.

Regional systems are often the compromise when federalism is contested, as in Italy. However, while centralizing forces are stronger in regional states, there are also federa­tions that work in a centralized fashion, to the point that their federal nature is questioned. And although this distinction might appear irrelevant (after all, federalism in its broadest term encompasses regional and quasi-federal states), it might be still important to understand why we put one label instead of another to a given system.

The goal of this chapter was to contribute to the debate on distinguishing between federal and regional systems by looking at the conceptual and prac­tical understanding of autonomy and sovereignty of constituent units, using Italy as a case-study. In fact, while in federal systems the distinction between sovereignty and autonomy seems irrelevant—the two terms are used as syn­onyms, and the understanding of sovereignty rests on the Anglo-Saxon con­ceptualization of the principle—at regional level it becomes pivotal: it is the very point on which the state is labelled regional and not federal. However, sov­ereignty is far from being an accepted concept, and while it generally implies ‘the undefeatable ability or right to have the last word, politically or legally' (Oliver 2003, p. 142), its meaning becomes less clear whenjuxtaposed with autonomy in decentralized systems.

This may be relevant for at least two reasons. First, federalism has signifi­cantly evolved since the implementation of the 1787 US constitution, as new forms of quasi-federal models have emerged, regional systems being exem­plary.

Second, illuminating the differences between the two, as well as exam­ining the sovereignty and autonomy of constituent units, may have a broader comparative significance, especially for those countries now considering fed­eralism reforms.

The case law of the icc has been useful in showcasing three main argu­ments: the sacrosanct principle of unity and indivisibility of the state sanc­tioned by article 5; the different role and functions of regional legislative assemblies and the national parliament; and historical reasons. The conclu­sions reached by the icc seem to be rooted in the understanding of ‘undi­vided' sovereignty that has deeply imbued European constitutionalism since Bodin and Hobbes. Two observations can be made at this point. First, the icc has strongly insisted that regions enjoy ‘constitutionally protected autonomy' instead of sovereignty but has not offered a clear explanation of the distinc­tion. Second, and most importantly, the case law of the icc has changed little since the significant constitutional amendments of 2001. This can be explained by the deep discrepancy between the constitutional text and the real functioning of Italian regionalism; in fact, the 2001 reforms have not been fully implemented. Consequently, Italy still functions and is understood as a unitary state.

In conclusion, I point out that even the original and sovereign powers of federated entities are not unlimited or absolute. In fact, their sovereignty is only internal, since the federal government remains the only one acting at international level. Their purpose is to protect local interests, but it is the federal government that acts in the general interest of the country. Likewise, they are also bound domestically by constitutional law and in case of conflict between a federal and a regional law, federal law usually prevails. So, their sovereign powers are not absolute, but subject to limitations—as in regional systems.

References

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Wheare, Kenneth C. (1963). Federal Government, 4th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Source: Fenwick Tracy B., Banfield Andrew C. (eds.). Beyond Autonomy: Practical and Theoretical Challenges to 21st Century Federalism. Brill | Nijhoff,2021. — 265 p.. 2021

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