Federal Bargaining and Legislative Dominance

This final section briefly deals with the degree to which provincial governments dominate their legislatures as a way of thinking about how the authority of first ministers to negotiate intergovernmental agreements might reflect their capacity to guarantee the passage of enabling legislation.

Figure 6.8 displays the proportion of available seats gained by the govern­ing party in Quebec provincial elections. As we know, the single-member plu­rality system usually provides the largest party with a substantial premium in the proportion of seats over its proportion of the vote. The data is suggestive of a pattern of increased dominance across the middle of the 20th century, and a spike during the 1970s consistent with the period of peak constitutional

figure 6.8 Governing-party seats as percentage of total seats, Quebec provincial elections

tensions negotiated via executive federalism. The subsequent decline after the 1990s coincides with a period of relative quiescence in federal-provincial relations.

This pattern is repeated in Alberta and Ontario and, to a lesser extent, in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. There is some limited support, then, for H3 in Quebec and these other provinces. Periods of intense intergovern­mental negotiations are associated with increased numerical dominance of the provincial legislature by governing parties led by first ministers. It is also worth noting that the two provinces with a record of challenging the federal government, Quebec and Alberta, are represented in this group. More detailed contextual analysis that captures the moments of greatest disagreement may be valuable if we are to extract greater meaning from these figures.

A more complex pattern is evident in the remaining provinces, represented by bc in Figure 6.9, although the long-term trend is flat, suggesting little change over time.

Along with bc, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Saskatchewan offer no overall pattern across the century. As such, the data provide no obvious support for H3 in these provinces. Closer examination might be able to tease out episodic effects associated with the dynamics of executive bargaining that would be consistent with a version of H3. It may be that more appropriate measures might help in this regard.

figure 6.9 Governing-party seats as percentage of total seats, bc provincial elections

We have already seen that the Liberals dominated the federal legislature for much of the 20th century. We have not discussed the size of their legislative dominance, but the analysis suggests that longevity may be as important as degree in shaping bargaining dynamics. There are, too, other ways of specifying executive dominance that may prove more tractable in providing insights into legislative dynamics at the national and regional level. For example, electoral and legislative stability may be interpreted by first ministers as an endorse­ment of their bargaining position. A repeated slim majority for the same party may be as important as large majorities in empowering first ministers.

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