Legislative interpretation in the European Court of Justice
The civil law tradition has always been purposivist (or to use the word which that tradition itself generally uses, teleological) in its approach to legislative interpretation. It has never fallen into the trap of literalism.
Two passages from van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] CMLR 105, which is one of the most important cases in the whole of EU law, indicate the approach of the European Court of Justice.The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a common market, the functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community, implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states. This view is confirmed by the preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to governments but to peoples. It is also confirmed more specifically by the establishment of institutions endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects member states and also their citizens. ((1963) CMLR 105, 129.)
On the basis of this, together with a detailed consideration of the case itself, the court concluded:
It follows … that, according to the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of the Treaty, art 12 [of the Treaty of Rome] must be interpreted as producing direct effects and creating individual rights which national courts must protect. ((1963) CMLR 105, 130.)
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- The European Court of Human Rights
- Justice
- Communication and interpretation
- The legislative supremacy of Parliament
- The content of justice
- The relationship between law and justice
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- The Court of Appeal