The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Ethiopia is one of the largest and, with over 100 million people, the second most populous country in Africa. With over 80 ethno-linguistic communities, the country has an extremely diverse population (Central Statistics Agency of Ethiopia 2007).

2.1 Decentralization in Ethiopia: Motives and Processes

Ethiopia had an extremely centralized system until eprdf assumed power and began a process of decentralization which was implemented in two phases. Having diagnosed the key political predicament facing the country as the mis­management of its ethnic diversity, eprdf intended the first phase (1991-5) to address the ‘nationality question' (Gebre-Egziabher and Berhanu 2007). The nine states were structured along ethnic lines, designed to allow ethnic communities to enjoy territorial autonomy. Each of the five largest states (Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, Afar and Somali) has a dominant ethnic community and is considered a ‘mother state' or ‘homeland' of the ethnic community whose name it bears (Fessha 2010; Fiseha 2007).

The second phase of decentralization was launched in the early 2000s with the aim of ensuring the efficient delivery of basic services so as to reduce pov­erty in the country (Gebre-Egziabher and Berhanu 2007). The nine states revised their subnational constitutions with the declared purpose of restructuring their local government and devolving to the latter certain local political and financial powers.

2.2 Local Government Structure in Ethiopia

There are two categories of local government in Ethiopia: ethnic and regular local governments (Ayele and Fessha 2012). The ethnic local governments are nationality zone (special zone) and liyu-woreda (special district). Nationality zones are established as institutions of self-government for intra-state ethnic minority communities occupying a territorial area covering two or more dis­tricts, while a liyu-woreda is established for a community inhabiting a single district. The territorial demarcation of a nationality zone or liyu-woreda fol­lows the territorial settlement structure of the particular ethnic community for which it was established (Ayele and Fessha 2012). A nationality zone or a liyu woreda is not only an autonomous local unit, it may also secede from its state to become a separate state (see also Ayele 2014). Recently, more than 10 nationality zone councils, the most notable being the Sidama zone, have resolved to secede from the snnp—f implemented, this would be the end of the snnp as a state.

The regular local government is comprised of rural woredas and cities. In principle, a woreda is established in an area inhabited by approximately 100,000 people.^[74] There were 600 woredas when the second phase of decen­tralization began.

2.3 Local Autonomy in Ethiopia

2.3.1 Local Autonomy at Constitutional/Statutory Level

The 1995 constitution does not explicitly recognize local government as an autonomous third level of government after the federal and state levels. Under the constitution, local government falls within the exclusive competence of the states. However, the constitution makes references, albeit vague and passing, to local government. Article 39(3), which recognizes the right to self­government of every ethnic community, implies that ethnic self-government could be established as the local level and would have some degree of political autonomy. Article 50(4) also suggests the establishment of what is referred to above as a regular local government. Moreover, by linking the establishment of regular local government with the need to ensure democratic participation at the lowest level of government, the constitution implicitly enjoins the state to provide it with some degree of autonomy.

The nine sub-national constitutions recognize the woreda as a local-level government with the power to autonomously decide on local matters. They provide that each nationality zone, liyu woreda, woreda and city should have a representative council composed of elected representatives and an exec­utive appointed by the local council. The executive council (or cabinet) of a woreda, liyu woreda or nationality zone is composed of a chief adminis­trator and the heads of the various executive organs of that local unit. The chief administrator, who is elected by and from among the members of the woreda, liyu woreda or the nationality zone council, chairs the executive council of the local unit.

The fdre constitution does not allocate functional competences to local government since its division of powers is restricted to the federal and regional states (Arts 51 & 52).The state constitutions are also less than clear regarding local government functions. They simply provide that woredas can plan and implement their own ‘economic development and social services' without defining the relevant functions (Ayele 2014). The functional competences of cities, including the federal cities, are categorized into ‘state functions' which include primary education, health care, drinking-water, and agriculture and municipal functions which include cultural and recreational centres, muse­ums, housing, sewerage, street, street lighting, fire-fighting, abattoirs, ambu­lance services, and the like (Ayele 2014, p. 166). Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa may be assumed to have certain competences on matters that are reserved as state functions under Article 52 of the constitution, even though they cannot trace their competences directly from the constitution. This is so because these cities are not within the jurisdiction of a state. Each derives its authority from a charter adopted by parliament.^[76] Like the regional constitutions, the charters contain general provisions that authorize the cities to formulate policies and design plans for their social and economic matters.^[77]

Woredas do not have constitutionally allocated (including by sub-national constitutions) revenue-raising powers, except that they are mandated to col­lect, on behalf of the states, some state taxes and user fees, such as land-use fees. The revenue so collected, however, belongs to the states and cannot be considered as woredas’ internal revenue.

For instance, Addis Ababa covers over 90 per cent of its expenditure from internal revenue.

2.3.2 Local Government Autonomy in Practice

In practice, local government enjoys barely any autonomy. While members of woreda and city councils are directly elected by the people, local elections are not held as regularly as national and state elections, and may be postponed for various reasons. Addis Ababa was administered for several years by caretaker provisional administrators. Local elections were due to be held throughout the country in May 2018, but political unrest caused their postponement for a year. However, a year later, preparations for local elections were still not underway.

In any case, previous local elections—all elections in Ethiopia for that matter—have been less than competitive, resulting in eprdf’s or its affili­ate parties' exclusive control of every seat in every woreda and city council. Moreover, eprdf has a centralized and hierarchical structure in which those running the local-level structure of the party are subordinate to those in charge of the party structure at state and federal level. The subordinate position in the party structure of local authorities mean they can enjoy barely any political autonomy. As Assefa Fiseha argues from field research in Tigray:

In terms of party positions, the heads at the zones...

fiseha 2019

In addition, when political exigencies demand, local government are even leg­islatively deprived of their political autonomy altogether. In the 2005 national elections, the one and only competitive election in the country's history, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (cud) defeated the ruling party in many urban areas of Oromia, Amhara and other states. Presumably with a view to preventing any chance of opposition parties controlling any city in Oromia, the Oromia state council reacted by enacting a piece of legislation in which it transferred the power to appoint mayors from city councils to the state president and rendered mayors accountable to the state president. The state thus reduced its cities into agents of the state without an iota of political autonomy.

Furthermore, the states exercise excessive supervisory power over woredas, extending from vetoing decisions of local authorities to dissolving woreda and city councils. Constitutional and legislative provisions regulating state intervention into local government are often driven by political motives. For instance, the Tigray state constitution had contained no provision for state intervention in woredas. Explaining the political motive for the insertion of intervention clauses in the state constitution, Fiseha writes:

Following the tplf party crisis in 2001... a wereda in the central zone was not happy with the way the party and the government managed the crisis in the party and the process of ‘tehadiso (renewal).' The wereda consid­ered the act of the regional state as undue interference in its autonomy. The then new regional state governor (Tsegay Berhe) and senior party members visited the wereda in an effort to sort out the issues. Yet the wereda did not concede and this was understood as a misuse of wereda level political autonomy. This was unprecedented in the experience of the party and thus called for a more rigorous system of control and accountability on weredas to the higher level.

fiseha 2019

As stated above, the state constitutions also do not clearly define the functional competences of woredas. The states have unfettered discretion over the func­tional competences that woredas can and cannot exercise. Moreover, under state constitutions and statutes, not only have woredas few internal sources of revenue, but they are not entitled to transfers from the states. They receive only grants, which can be denied for political reasons. Furthermore, there is an enormous imbalance between the expenditure needs and the revenue of woredas, despite the increased amounts transferred to them in the form of block grants. More than 90 per cent of these go to paying the salaries of woreda employees, leaving very little for capital investment in building schools, health­care facilities, and the like (Garcia and Rajkumar 2008, p. 36).

Following three years of public protest that propelled Abiy Ahmed to the premiership, various institutional reforms are now being implemented with the declared purpose of opening up the political space.^[78] Different pieces of legislation have been revised and other are in the process of revision, includ­ing anti-terrorism laws, electoral law and the media law which eprdf report­edly used to silence any dissension in the country (Tsige 2019; Ethiopian News Agency (2019)). The institutional reforms and political negotiations are, how­ever, exclusively focused on the federal and, to a very minor extent, state gov­ernments. Neither the ruling party nor the opposition seem concerned about democratizing and empowering local government. This is indeed ironic since in the past three decades, opposition parties have lamented that local author­ities were the principal impediments to their electoral success. Not only did local authorities harass and intimidate their members and supporters, but they also blocked their access to the public. Meanwhile, the ruling party has accused local authorities of failing to properly execute federal and state pol­icies with respect to land administration, expansion of health care and edu­cation and more and of supplying inflated reports of their achievements in expanding the provision of basic services.

The first targets and victims of the angry public protests mentioned above were local government and local authorities. In many areas, the protesters dis­mantled local institutions and attacked (even killed) or forced local authorities to flee. They did so for two reasons. First, local governments and local authori­ties were naturally the easiest targets. They were the nearest, in most cases the only, government institutions in most parts of the country. Federal and state governments were too remote for the fuming protesters to attack. Second, the public has witnessed first hand government at the local level going amiss, with entrenched corruption and nepotism and human rights violations. The pub­lic expressed its anger and frustration by burning woreda offices and attack­ing local officials. It is common knowledge that, in many parts of Oromia and Amhara, there is barely any functioning local government structure. However, thus far, empowering local government and enhancing its autonomy are not on the reform agenda.

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