The Republic of Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is a landlocked country in Southern Africa with a population of over 17 million people (ZimStat 2019). The country is divided into 10 prov­inces, which are subdivided into several administrative districts.

The gnu also successfully steered the adoption of a new constitu­tion in 2013,13 which is progressive in many respects. It established a new Constitutional Court at the apex of thejudiciary, provides for a wide array of constitutional bodies with a mandate to promote and sustain democracy and requires multi-level governance. The harmonized elections of 2013 and 2018, held under the new constitutional dispensation, were won by zanu-pf (though under disputed circumstances). Hence it is no surprise that the elec­toral victory of zanu-pf has failed to translate into the popular legitimacy needed to steer political and economic stabilization. A military-assisted tran­sition in November 2017, otherwise described as a coup d’etat or soft coup, cul­minated in the removal from power of the long-time ruler, Robert Mugabe. Mugabe’s successor, Emmerson Mnangagwa, also of zanu-pf, has signalled that his government will implement devolution.

4.1 Decentralization in Zimbabwe: Motives and Processes

The adoption of a multi-level system of government in Zimbabwe, under which sub-national governments exercise devolved powers, was heavily contested during the constitution review process (2009-13) (Chigwata 2018, pp. 58-9). The entrenchment of decentralization was meant to realize a number of goals linked to development, service delivery, democracy, national integration and peace. Zimbabwe had experienced a steady deterioration of public services prior to the introduction of more autonomous local government in the 2013 constitution. From the early 2000s, the state delivery of public services, includ­ing by local government, had begun to fail, primarily due to the economic crisis that was being experienced (Muchadenyika 2015, p. 115). For example, local government’s failure to supply safe drinking-water and proper sanitation resulted in several cholera and typhoid outbreaks. Local autonomy was thus seen as a vital element in improving local government's ability to improve the delivery of public services.

The centralized system of government, which zanu-pf inherited from the British settlers and developed after independence, had proved incapable of driv­ing equitable development (Mhlanga 2012). The entrenchment of local auton­omy was therefore motivated by the desire to empower people in different parts of the country to champion their own development (Mapuva and Miti 2019, p. 15; Moyo and Ncube 2014, p. 294). There was a need to establish democracy at the local level in order to give back power to the people (Muchadenyika 2015, p. 116; Moyo and Ncube 2014, p. 294). Local autonomy would promote citizen participation, entrench multi-party democracy and enable vertical account­ability. Since the top-down approach had failed, it was thought that building democracy from below was the ultimate solution to Zimbabwe's problems.

Independent Zimbabwe has generally been peaceful. However, disturbances in the Ndebele-dominated provinces in the early days of independence were attributed to claims that the Shona-dominated zanu-pf government margin­alized those provinces and favoured the Shona region (Mhlanga 2012, pp. 207, 209, 218). Other minority ethnic groups, such as the Tonga and Kalanga who generally occupy the border areas of the country, have expressed similar sen­timents. Surprisingly, though, some Shona tribes in places such as Manicaland province have also complained of marginalization (Moyo and Ncube 2014, p. 296). Against this background, local government was seen as a means for minority groups to exercise a measure of self-government (Chigwata 2018, p. 59). The ultimate objective is to promote national integration and peace within the confines of a unitary state (Mapuva and Miti 2019, p. 15).

4.2 Local Government Structure in Zimbabwe

Local government in Zimbabwe is constituted by 32 urban and 60 rural local authorities. There is a single category of rural local authorities, but three types of urban local authorities: municipal councils (cities and municipalities), town councils and local boards. The population sizes of cities, municipalities and towns varies considerably, from a couple of thousand to Harare's more than 1.5 million residents. The jurisdictions of rural local authorities also vary both in physical size and population numbers. What is peculiar to rural areas is that rural local authorities govern alongside the institution of traditional leadership constituted by chiefs, head persons and village heads. While traditional leaders can make certain decisions, rural authorities are the ultimate decision makers. Traditional leaders are, however, the immediate form of local government in these areas, and thus have the most contact with the citizens (Chigwata 2018, p. 19).

4.3 Local Autonomy in Zimbabwe

4.3.1 The Constitutional Place of Local Government in Zimbabwe While Zimbabwe remains a unitary state, the 2013 constitution required the establishment of a multi-level form of government (Constitution of Zimbabwe, sections 1 and 5).

Democratic governance is at the centre of the system of local government under Zimbabwe's new constitution. Both urban and rural local authorities are governed by councils constituted by councillors directly elected by the citizens of that jurisdiction (Constitution of Zimbabwe, section 265(2)). The councillors, who are elected under the first-past-the-post electoral system, are voted into office on the same day as the president, members of parliament and members of provincial governments (Constitution of Zimbabwe, section 277(i)(a)). The direct election of all councillors is a departure from the previ­ous constitutional position, where some councillors were elected while others were appointed by the national government. Cities and municipalities are led by a ceremonial mayor who is elected on the first day the council sits from among its membership. Town councils, local boards and rural local councils are led by a ceremonial chairperson also elected from the membership of the council. The constitution, however, allows mayors and chairpersons of urban local authorities to exercise executive decision-making powers provided that they are directly elected by citizens in the relevant communities (Constitution of Zimbabwe, section 274(5)).

The 2013 constitution requires the devolution of powers and responsibilities to the local government level and empowers every local authority with the right to govern its area and with ‘all' the necessary powers to do so (Constitution of Zimbabwe, sections 264(1), 276(1)). Furthermore, the provision gives every local authority a certain level of discretion when undertaking this governing role.

While investing local government with these ‘generic' powers, the constitu­tion does not set out their functional areas. This is left to the determination of national legislation. Under existing primary local government legislation, local authorities have a variety of functional areas that have significant implications for people's lives, including water supply, refuse removal, land-use planning and the provision of sanitation, education, fire-fighting and health services. City councils and municipalities enjoy more discretion in carrying out these functions than town councils, local boards and rural local authorities. The rele­vant pieces of legislation that assign responsibilities to local authorities are yet to be reformed in line with the 2013 constitution. It is expected, however, that even when this reform process takes place, local government will retain most, if not all, of the functional areas they are currently responsible for. What may change is the level of discretion they are granted over them.

The 2013 constitution envisages local authorities exercising some resource­raising and spending powers, but the exact nature and extent of these pow­ers is again left to the determination of national legislation. The existing local government legislation empowers local government to raise revenue in various ways. Local authorities can impose property rates, levies, fees and charges; they are allowed to borrow money internally and externally to finance recurrent and capital expenditure; and they can also engage in a diversity of income-generating projects to mobilize resources needed for service delivery and development. To ensure the financial sustainability of local authorities, the 2013 constitution introduced the new requirement that national revenues in each financial year must be shared equitably among the three tiers of gov­ernment (Constitution of Zimbabwe, section 2g8(i)(b)(ii)).

The extent to which the 2013 constitution actually entrenches local auton­omy is debatable. It determines clear and enforceable boundaries with respect to local democracy, with respect to the election of local leaders. However, it does not provide in clear terms for any other aspects of autonomy, such as the security of existence of local authorities, their powers, their revenue and their administrative autonomy. These matters are left to parliament. As discussed in detail below, the courts have not yet added their voice to clarify the boundaries of local autonomy. A number of provisions that touch on some aspects of local autonomy have not yet been tested.

4.4 Local Government Autonomy in Practice

There is a big difference between the constitutional framework for local auton­omy and what is happening in practice. Local autonomy largely remains on paper, with the government putting in little effort to ensure that it is realized in practice. According to Mapuva and Miti (2019, p. 15), ‘events on the ground seem to show lack of political will to implement devolution for fear of losing power to local communities'. They further argue (2019, p. 15) that ‘the major reason for lack of political will for implementation of devolution is that the current crop of political leaders does not want to share power'. Their view is supported by Cameron (2014, S82), who contends that ‘[n]ational elites often fear losing power at local-government level' and tend to undermine local autonomy, especially when opposition political parties control strategic local authorities, such as the capital city.

In Zimbabwe, the legislative reforms required to implement devolution or operationalize the constitutional framework on local autonomy have not been enacted more than six years after the adoption of the constitution. This reluc­tance suggests that the ZANU-PF-dominated parliaments have had insufficient political will to make local autonomy, and devolution in general, work (Moyo and Ncube 2014, p. 303; Mapuva and Miti 2019, p. 13). This means that some of the broad powers endowed by the constitution have not been given practical effect. The judiciary has not helped the cause. Several court challenges aiming to clarify the autonomy of local governments have not been heard or concluded. In the few cases that have been concluded, the courts do not seem prepared to uphold the elevated status of local government enshrined in the new constitution.

The national government has also undermined local autonomy by revers­ing the process of decentralization (Moyo and Ncube, 2014, p. 230). Not only has it retained key decision-making powers on local affairs, it has recentralized some of the responsibilities previously undertaken by local government—for instance, motor vehicle licensing, which had been a reliable revenue stream for (mostly opposition-controlled) urban local authorities.

A major obstacle to achieving local autonomy are the huge economic prob­lems that hinder resource mobilization by the state as a whole (Moyo and Ncube, 2014, p.302). There are insufficient resources to fund the operation of existing structures and establish new structures. For decades in Zimbabwe the national government has not been in a position to provide meaningful support to local authorities. While acknowledging the impact of the underperforming economy, some scholars believe that misplaced or skewed priorities, where significant resources are used in fighting to consolidate power rather than on matters that directly affect public welfare, are a more fundamental explana­tion (Mapuva and Miti 2019, p. 13.)

4.5 The Impact of Local Autonomy in Realizing Decentralization

Objectives

The 2013 constitution promised a better life for ordinary citizens after decades of economic crisis which led to the deterioration of public service delivery. At the least, this means that citizens should be able to access basic public services, irrespective of where they reside. However, more than six years later, little has changed. The cholera outbreak of September 2018 was a good indicator of the poor state of public service delivery, particularly access to potable water and proper sanitation. One of the reasons for this continued failure is that the local autonomy enshrined in the constitution has yet to be realized in practice.

Equitable development remains a pipe dream in Zimbabwe. Governmental powers and resources are still centralized in Harare, with the national govern­ment determining who gets what and where. Natural resources in various parts of the country are exploited, but most of their proceeds continue to support development at the centre. Even where these proceeds are distributed to the local level, they are usually channelled through centrally controlled structures such as deconcentrated agencies of the national ministries, the army and tra­ditional leaders (Mapuva and Miti 2019, p. 16). Democratically elected local councils are therefore often marginalized, despite having advantages such as better familiarity with local environments.

Local autonomy has also yet to achieve its potential for counterbalancing the centre. As we have seen, local governments have not been able to assert their autonomy. And as the constitution is relatively new, the multi-level sys­tem of government has yet to gain traction. In practice, central government continues to treat local government as an easily macro-managed extension. There is a clear gap between the constitutional intentions and what is hap­pening in practice. However, with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change controlling 28 of the 32 urban local governments, including the two biggest cities of Harare and Bulawayo, there is vertically divided authority— ‘which occurs when different political parties control disparate levels of gov­ernment' (Cameron 2014, S81). Thus, opportunities for vertical oversight exist, especially if the constitutional provisions that speak to local autonomy were to be taken seriously.

The potential of local autonomy to hold the nation together remains untested, since the constitutional framework for local government is yet to be fully implemented. No measure of local self-government promulgated in the 2013 constitution has been realized to date. It is therefore no surprise that minority groups still complain of marginalization. The question is for how long will these groups be satisfied to pursue non-violent means of amend­ment. At what stage will they consider other options, including secession? Mhlanga (2012, p. 210) argues that the ‘continued suppression of [devolution or local autonomy] might create fissures that like in a boiling pot, will lead to an uncontrolled pro-secessionist eruption in the future'. The constitution requires devolution of governmental powers and resources to hold the nation together—in other words, to prevent secessions. The non-implementation of devolution may threaten national integration.

The effects of local autonomy on democracy are mixed. On the positive side. multi-party democracy is gaining traction and would have been blossoming, if it were not for elections which are often disputed. In urban areas, the par­ties in power at the national and local levels are often different, which is good for accountability. We are seeing a diversity of candidates, particularly inde­pendence candidates, contesting local elections. On the negative side, hold­ing presidential, parliamentary and local elections simultaneously has not been beneficial for the state of local government and democracy, in general. Councillors are often elected not on their basis of their personal performance or profile, but rather on the basis of their party. As a result, the link between voter and representative tends to be weak (Chigwata 2018, p. 431). We are also seeing fewer and fewer women contesting positions at all levels of government. Meaningful opportunities for citizen participation in between elections at all levels of government remain scarce. Thus the progressive constitution appears to have delivered no significant benefits for direct participatory democracy (Mapuva and Miti 2009, p. 16).

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