Introduction

During the last decades there have been considerable changes in intergovern­mental fiscal relations in Argentina, some of them focused specifically on the taxation powers of its sub-national units.

In Argentina, some powers are clearly evident from constitutional provi­sions. Others originate more explicitly in specific laws regulating their appli­cation and in judicial interpretations bringing clarification of issues that had not been clearly envisaged in the founding stages of the federal organization of the country.

This situation is not unique, nor exclusive to the Argentinian case. In other federal countries, the lack of clarity or relative obscurity of the founding char­ter's legal theory of fiscal federalism has required later judicial interpretations to adjust the specific operation of the system down to the present day.¹

After Argentina's constitution as a federation in the 19th century,^{[56] [57] its sys­tem of federal finances evolved in three broad stages: a) separation of rev­enue souces (1853-1990), b) concurrency of revenue sources (1890-1930) and c) revenue sharing (1930-) (Asensio, di Gresia and Garat 2016; Nunez Minana 1994; Nunez Minana and Porto 1983). Beyond these principle govern­ing mechanisms for distributing the proceeds of the most important federal taxes, partners in the federation retain their own levies: for example, customs revenues (the nation) and local sales, stamp and property taxes (the provin­cial governments).}

The latter are the ultimate bulwark for the exercise of provincial tax auton­omy over exclusively provincial tax bases: that is to say, the levying of taxes through the exclusive decision of their own authorities, working within the framework of provincial constitutions, as permitted by the federal system enacted in the national constitution.

Both modern federalism theory and fiscal economists have suggested guide­lines for the key features of ‘tax assignment’ and ‘expenditure assignment’ that can illuminate intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. Such guidelines, when embodied in the legislation of any country, define the actual room to manoeu­vre or effective autonomy enjoyed by the actors in the federal system. There exists, too, an important role for the ‘spending power’ of the federal govern­ment vis a vis the margin for sub-national ones.

After these introductory comments, I consider a very narrow framework of issues. Initially I examine some general concepts related to federal finance and options for revenue assignment, embracing notions of fiscal coordination, har­monization and spending power. The chapter then considers developments in this area, in particular as they relate to Argentina and to relative tax powers under its federal arrangements. Finally, the conclusion focuses on the sup­posed and actual tax autonomy of sub-national governments in the federation.

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