The Power of Canadian Party Leaders and First Ministers

Canadian first ministers dominate their political parties and the Westminster­style executives that control the legislative agenda of the federal and provincial parliaments. This arrangement has allowed first ministers to conclude defini­tive intergovernmental agreements without fear of legislative contradiction, so long as the partisan complexion of their legislature remains unchanged.^[35] As provincial powers expanded, the capacity to make binding agreements— and its concomitant veto—became the central dynamic of Canadian execu­tive bargaining, both requiring and facilitating the political reconstitution of Canadian federalism.^[36]

The traditionally powerful role of party leaders reflects the 19th-century roots of most Canadian politics.

The use of conventions and direct election makes unseating a party leader difficult. Leaders can claim a distinct source of authority and paint opponents as anti-democratic. Supporters of the winning candidate colonize the central office of the party, extending the power of the leader over the organization and deterring potential opponents.

That local associations still select most candidates under these condi­tions is evidence of a bargain between the central and local parties that helps a leader to control policy. The stratarchical structure of Canadian parties is heavily shaped by the logic of single-member plurality (smp) elections (Carty 2015). Party rules and the electoral system provide a tradable good—control of candidate selection and influence in the subsequent campaign—with which to engage and reward party activists. In return, local activists are expected to accept a limited say in party policy. The relatively high rate of turnover in Canada (often in excess of 40 per cent) exaggerates this effect, as it is difficult for individual representatives or their local supporters to use an electoral dis­trict as a power base from which to challenge the party leadership. Not surpris­ingly, a leader can expect to control the policy-making apparatus of his or her party (Carty 2015; Pruysers and Sayers 2017).

The power to guarantee the passage of legislation is the second key to the functioning of executive federalism, as it allows each first minister to bargain with authority. The oft-noted power of Canadian prime ministers is true also of their provincial counterparts (Bakvis 1989; Savoie 1999; Sayers and Banfield 2013). By over-rewarding the largest party and usually punishing other parties in the translation of votes to seats, smp strengthens the hand of the executive against the legislature. In reducing the likelihood of coalition governments, it removes one of the few possible restraints on executive authority.

Control of party policy and of the legislative agenda are key sources of bargain­ing independence and authority for first ministers. The potential veto this gives each leader, along with a lack of authoritative decision-making rules at first min­isters' meetings, encourage pork-barrel politics and logrolling in order to build super-majority support for intergovernmental agreements (Sproule-Jones 19 74)? ^[37]

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