The Political Correlates of Executive Federalism

Both levels of government in a federation may claim to speak for the interests of voters in a region. The contest for power involves convincing voters of the character of intergovernmental bargaining and, by implication, which of the players might best protect their interests.

These features are sensitive to efforts by premiers to maximize their bar­gaining independence and authority while holding the position of the federal government, personified in the prime minister, as constant. Again, indepen­dence refers to first ministers' desire to maximize opportunities for strategi­cally advantageous behaviour by presenting themselves as sole protectors of local interests, authority to their desire to dominate their legislatures to ensure passage of legislation associated with intergovernmental agreements, in order to maximize their bargaining power.

The logic of independence suggests party leaders and caucuses, along with their supporters, will rebel against limitations on their behaviour such as those embedded in intra-party linkages. This might include a desire to limit links to similarly named parties elsewhere, the creation of new parties, and the adop­tion of idiosyncratic local policies. That is, limiting linkages should enhance independence. Second, provincial first ministers may seek to demonize the federal government in intergovernmental bargaining. If the first minister is successful, we might expect to observe a decline in the aggregate level of sup­port for the federal government in the relevant region at a national election. That is, decline in voter support for the federal government would suggest greater independence for a regional first minister.^[38]

Authority is best viewed through a legislative lens as the relative dominance of a parliament by the governing party.

With respect to independence:

Hi. Intra-party linkages among parties of the same name or similar ideological disposition should reduce as intergovernmental negotiations become more important.

H2. Regional support for the federal government should decline in periods of intense intergovernmental negotiations.

With respect to authority:

H3. There should be an increase in legislative dominance of regional governments in periods of intense intergovernmental negotiations.

The search for the political—electoral and legislative—correlates of executive bargaining that have remade Canadian federalism begins with a discussion of intra-party linkages, before moving on to the regional variation in the disposi­tion of voters towards the federal government and, finally, the dominance of legislatures by regional governments.

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