A concentration of power: but how much?
The view that all positions now see power as, at least to some extent, concentrated seems confirmed by this broader survey of state theory, although, inevitably, with major qualifications as far as pluralism is concerned.
Of course, elitism and Marxism always emphasized that power was concentrated. In addition, of the additional approaches considered in this volume, both feminism and green theory would see power as concentrated; to feminists patriarchy ensures that men exercise power, while, to most green theorists, the state and dominant economic interests combine to ensure the exploitation of the environment in their interest.Even contemporary pluralism acknowledges that some groups are more powerful than others. Smith emphasizes this point arguing that as classical pluralism developed into neo-pluralism authors like Lowi (1969), McConnell (1966) and, particularly, Lindblom (1982) recognized that some groups, especially business, have a privileged position in liberal capitalist systems; that is that they have more power/influence. In addition, they accepted, implicitly if not always explicitly, that this position is, at least in part, structural. So, to Lindblom for example, governments need co-operation from business in order to ensure the economic growth on which they are dependent for re-election. Similarly, other groups may have a privileged position in relation to particular policy areas; for example, farmers’ groups in relation to agricultural policy or doctors’ professional bodies in health policy. Again, the position of these groups is in large part structural, with government depending on them for the effective delivery of policy. Of course, pluralists are not concerned mainly, let alone exclusively, with such structural power. Rather, their emphasis is still on interest group activity and the role that the interaction between these groups and government plays in the evolution of policy; a point we return to in the next section.
However, there remains one way in which pluralism differs from all the other state theories considered here.
Of all the theories discussed in this book, probably only some strands of elitism would not accept a normative commitment to a political system in which power is diffuse or, at least, in which the concentration of power is limited (it is an interesting observation that, while almost all state theorists think power is very concentrated, few defend that concentration) but only pluralists argue that this is the case empirically. Most pluralists may have accepted the idea that certain groups occupy a structurally privileged position, but, in their view, this does not mean that power is concentrated. Instead, they argue that no one group dominates across both time and space. So, business may have a privileged position in relation to economic policy-making, broadly defined, at present, but it does not have influence in other policy spheres and its influence in the economic sphere has, and will continue to, ebb and flow over time.As such, the idea that some groups have more power because of their privileged structural position has permeated pluralist thought, but it remains a much more important aspect of elitism, Marxism and most feminism, than of pluralism. In addition, poststructuralism sees plurality as axiomatic, viewing power as dispersed throughout society, thus, as Finlayson and Martin argue, destabilizing the idea of a singular political power. In this way, it seems to share much with pluralism, but this seeming similarity is illusory. Poststructuralists do not see power, as pluralists would, as diffuse in the sense that it is shared among various groups within society. Rather, in their view, at any one time a dominant discourse may lead to some groups in society being privileged. However, such privilege is always contested and unstable.
More on the topic A concentration of power: but how much?:
- 3.4. Power-conferring rules, non-normative powers, and interests
- National elite power studies
- Principles, control and legitimation of power
- Foucault, power and governmentality
- First exclusion: Power-conferring rules are not deontic or regulative norms
- Deciphering Development: The Productive Power of Myths
- Myths, Post-Structuralism and Power Applied in International Relations Analysis
- 2. What power-conferring rules are not
- Conclusions: Myth and Power
- 3. What power-conferring rules are
- A functional approach: Power-conferring rules as reasons for action