Empirical Narratives: Institutions and Actors

The Zeitgeist of federalism and democracy in the 1990s, decentralization (devo­lution) did not produce the intended outcome of increasing accountability and transparency and/or reducing corruption.

As Miguel Asensio demonstrates, using the case of Argentina (Chapter 10), de facto ‘effective autonomy' (which he defines as the actual manoeuvring room enjoyed by sub-national actors in a federal context) is conditioned by fiscal factors. An array of centralizing fiscal mechanisms enables central authorities to constrain sub-national autonomy and, likewise, enables local authorities to shift blame for suboptimal policy outcomes on to higher lev­els of government—both of these scenarios obfuscating accountability in a federal setting. Paradoxically, in many emerging democracies, decentralization enabled sub-units to opt out, perpetuate undemocratic practices and human rights violations, and undermine national stability. Decentralization in theory was about enhancing self-rule, often at the consequence of shared rule as shared decision making.

Increasingly however, in the context of highly sophisticated technologies and digital networks, global terrorism threats, dense organized crime networks, climate change and immigration, the idea of isolated self-governing territories and US President Reagan's ‘fend for yourself federalism' (wherein state and local officials are encouraged to be self-reliant in order to further neoliberal priorities) seem hardly realistic for federalism to thrive in the future. Using two distinct policy sectors, Chapters 8 (health care) and 9 (public security) show us how the inherent complexity of many policy systems leads to increased inter­dependence between levels of government. The realities of global networks of terrorism and organized crime described in Chapter 9 entail that the poten­tially overbearing security capacity of the federal level in the 21st century does not necessarily reflect divisions of power in the constitution.

Alan Fenna (Chapter 8) refers to ‘complex systems of collaborative inter- governmentalism' which, in the case of Australia, account for the considerable divergence from state policy autonomy as it was originally enshrined in the federal constitution. Isi Unikowski further analyses these webs of intergovern- mentalism in Chapter 7, focusing on the role of the bureaucracy. Deploying a discursive analysis, Unikowski demonstrates how bureaucratic actors navi­gate that intersection of public administration and federalism on a day-to-day basis. He asserts that the bureaucracy (its norms, values and culture) plays a role in harnessing a federation's cooperative capacity.

In contrast with Australia, the federal policy role in Canada, particularly in social areas such as health and education, is increasingly passive. Neither a constitutional nor a cultural ‘federal spirit'-type analysis alone can account for how Canada has preserved sub-national policy autonomy. Returning to an institutional analysis in Chapter 6, Anthony Sayers examines how the party system affects the distribution of power among the constituent units in the Canadian case. He suggests that, beyond autonomy, provincial premiers have a considerable amount of authority to legislate in areas under their jurisdiction because of the nature of executive federalism in Canada.

3