Emerging models of governance

In a different context (Pierre and Peters 2004) the present authors have elaborated a typology of governance model which aims at distinguishing between different such models along various key dimensions of governance, such as actors, processes and outcomes.

On one end of the spectrum we see institutions powerful and resourceful enough to do basically what they see fit - either in terms of their own interests or in terms of what they believe to be in the interests of society - in any given situation (see Table 11.1). This model of governance ensures that collective goals are imposed on society but runs the risk of choking markets and civil society. This model of governance is also likely to make ill-informed deci­sions; the degree of institutional self-sufficiency which is typical to this type of governance provides few incentives for institutions to engage in dialogue with key actors in its external environment. The other end of the spectrum sees governance as a process shaped by inter-organizational networks at the level of the policy sector, pretty much the way Rhodes (1996) describes ‘the new governance’. Here, collective objectives are obstructed by coalitions of sectoral actors and interests. While this model of governance might be said to be sufficiently in touch with society to make good choices, those choice will not reflect the collective preferences of the polity but rather those of a very small segment of society.

Between those two stark alternatives are a variety of forms of governing that relate state and society in different ways, but find a means of balancing the roles of those two broad segments of political and social life.

Table 11.1 Models of governance

civil society, but yet allowing that civil society some influence over policy. Likewise, a state-centric conception of governing, exemplified by corporatist models (Wiarda, 1996), permits societal actors even greater involvement, but at the price of co-optation into the governance activities of the state. Finally, the ‘Dutch’ model (Kooiman, 2004) uses networks for a significant portion of governance activity, but government still retains the capacity to ‘steer at a distance’.

Given these complex trade-offs between different aspects of governance, it is perhaps little surprise that much of contemporary design of governance appears to be a process of trial and error. One example is the current wave of regional institutional reform across Europe where objectives related to economic development and EU-compatibility are weighed against collective input, democratic debate and accountability.

At the same time, it should also be noted that although many of the currently emerging forms of governance display some form of institutional­ized exchange between state and society, the object of reform does not seem to be to look back in time at the models of governance that were typical to many countries prior to Thatcher, NPM and deregulated financial markets. Instead, there are signs that the pendulum movement is slowly beginning to swing back towards governance models that accord political institutions a more central role. In the Scandinavian countries, it appears as if the fascination with decentralized government is slowly fading and that processes of subtle forms of recentralization are on their way. In Sweden, for example, several major government commissions are examining carefully both the decentralized local government system and the deconcentrated system of public administration.

If anything, it seems clear from the current debate in many countries that institutions are much more capable of adapting than most observers have hitherto believed them to be. We will return to that issue later in this chapter. The state that remains in the face of the numerous changes in governance is still a powerful actor. There may have been some hollowing out, but when assessed more carefully we can now see that the ‘shell’ that remains retains much of its real power.

Likewise, at the domestic level, clearing some of the baggage of the hier­archical state may produce even more capacity to govern. This enhancement in governance capacity is manifested simply because the power is not used on every minor detail of policy but instead is used to shape the directions of policy and the basic goals for governing. As described in several places the State now ‘enables’ as much as it ‘directs’, but it can still make the choice of what things to enable and what things not to support. That selectivity then becomes a means of husbanding resources, choosing those battles that must be fought, and making strategic choices about governance. Thus, the enabling state can also become the strategic state.