Political transformation: towards multi-level governance

Economic globalization and other factors have helped increase the inter­connectedness between states. In other words, states are increasingly influenced by events and decisions made beyond their territorial reach.

The development of cross-border co-operation takes place in three major ways. First, interstate relations expand, especially through cooperation in IGOs. The number of such organizations doubled between 1950 and the mid-1990s. During the same period, many international organizations became of increasing importance for the member states (Held etal. 1999: 54). Second, transgovernmental relations have grown; increasingly, ministries and other units of government (such as regulatory agencies, courts and executives) are connected with their counterparts in other countries in a dense web of policy networks. According to one observer, ‘transgovernmentalism is rapidly becoming the most widespread and effective mode of international govern­ance’ (Slaughter 1997: 185).

The third major development is the expansion of transnational relations, that is, cross-border relations between individuals, groups and organizations from civil society (non-state actors). The number of INGOs increased from 832 in 1951 to 5,472 by the mid-1990s (Held etal. 1999; Zacher 1992). They often form part of the public policy networks mentioned in the previous section.

Many observers find that a significant transformations is taking place. In earlier days, national governments ruled within well-defined territorial borders. Today, politics is increasingly taking the shape of international or global governance, a term that refers to activities everywhere - local, national, regional, global - involving regulation and control.

Some argue that a ‘global polity’ is emerging (Ougaard and Higgott 2002). The global polity contains two important changes compared to an earlier phase of national government. First, governments are increasingly enmeshed in a complex network of international organizations to which they make a variety of commitments, some of which are of a more binding nature than previously. Second, many non-state actors influence the processes of governance; regulation and control is no longer a sole preserve of states.

Co-operation across borders is frequently not global in scope; it is rather regional. Regional co-operation has developed the most in Europe. The EU contains a significant element of supranational governance, meaning that EU institutions in some areas have the powers to write the rules for member states. The European Court of Justice, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers can make decisions going against single members. Rulings by the European Court take priority over rulings by national courts.

The EU, then, is the clearest example of what could be called multi-level governance: that is, a situation where political power is diffused and decen­tralised. Instead of a purely or mainly national political regulation, a complex network of supranational, national and subnational regulation has developed. It is a two-way process in the sense that integration at the political level has stimulated integration between societies and vice versa.

There are several other examples of regional co-operation in the world; but the EU is in a class by itself in terms of the intensity and extensity of co-operation. The other regional initiatives are of a more traditional kind, limited to more narrowly defined economic or other policy areas, and without impinging on the sovereignty of their members, defined as their autonomous right to regulate domestic affairs.

How should we interpret the increased importance of multi-level govern­ance? ‘Retreat’ scholars see it as an indication that states are less powerful and influential than before. State-centrists emphasize that states remain in control. There are two major aspects of this debate. First, ‘retreat scholars’ tend to emphasize that co-operation is becoming more demanding, containing supranational elements affecting the sovereignty of states. State­centrists maintain that most co-operation continues to be of the traditional type where states remain in the driver’s seat and can refuse to be pushed around by international organizations. Second, ‘retreat scholars’ find that co-operation generally make states weaker because more power is allocated to other actors, including the international organizations. State-centrists, by contrast, find that co-operation contributes to strengthen states. By co-operating states achieve powers of regulation that they would not other­wise have had, in such areas as environmental regulation, currency stability or crime prevention.

It should take only a moment’s reflection to appreciate that both state­centric scholars and retreat scholars make valid points. International co-operation offers both new opportunities for regulations well as new constraints on states. Some forms for co-operation are more demanding (and perhaps also rewarding) than others. What we can say on the general level is that states are in a process of transformation that probably makes them stronger in some respects and weaker in other respects. The net result is difficult to calculate in advance; it will vary substantially across states and across issue-areas.

One further aspect of this political transformation should be mentioned. The growing importance of multi-level governance presents new challenges to democracy. Multi-level governance is not based on a distinct constitu­tional framework; therefore, core decision-makers are not subject to sufficient accountability and control.

Yet one can also argue that multi-level governance is good for democracy because it helps bring complex regional and global processes under political control: seen from the individual state this means improving the capacity for regulating the forces that shape people’s lives. Furthermore, some scholars believe that the new challenges to democracy can be successfully confronted. Joseph Nye, for example, argues that the democratic legitimacy of multi-level governance can be safeguarded if international institutions are designed in such a way the they ‘preserve as much space as possible for domestic political processes to operate’ (Nye 2001: 3).

Because multi-level governance is such a complex entity, this debate about democratic pros and cons will surely continue. It is no longer sufficient to merely think about democracy within the framework of the independent state.