The Paradigmatic Structure of the Warlord Myth: The Myth of the State
The analysis of the paradigmatic structure of a myth is Claude Levi- Strauss’s further development of Propp’s sequential analysis. In his otherwise eulogistic discussion of Propp’s work, Levi-Strauss makes one sharp judgment, which distinguishes his own approach from the former’s:
What has [Propp] lost on his way? Exactly, the content.
Propp has discovered—and that’s his glory—that the content of tales is transformable; he has often drawn the conclusion that it thus is arbitrary, and that’s the reason for the difficulties he had [in his analysis] for even the substitutions follow rules. (Levi-Strauss 1996 [1958]: 148)Levi-Strauss asserts that any syntagmatic structure is mirrored in positive or negative, yet always stereotyped, connotations of syntagmatic terms, and that this paired structure reveals the paradigmatic structure. Such oppositions tend to be stable throughout a large variety of narrative forms and dramatis personae and to rely on stereotypes, which intuitively make sense to the audience. Levi-Strauss gives the example of the night owl symbolising the night and being contrasted with a pigeon that as a day-active animal symbolises the day and light. Examples from folk tales are the dark-haired and old witch, symbolising darkness, wickedness, and age, with the blonde-haired young girl, symbolising youth, innocence, and kindness.
In the case of the warlord myth the other of the pair, the mirror, is the myth of the Western state. Already the metaphor of warlord contains implicit meanings about the West and legitimate statehood. The paradigmatic myth of the state contrasts ‘good’ lords, i.e. rulers, with ‘wicked’ warlords, i.e. anarchic individuals. As the republican period of violent turmoil in China’s pre-communist era is the obligatory reference for the definition of the term ‘warlord’, it is almost by definition orientalist (and erroneous,2 as the China historian Arthur Waldron has pointed out).
The experience of disorderly state-formation in China is then commonly contrasted with state-formation processes in Europe. Just like the warlord myth relies on stereotypical images of tribes and warlords, so does the state myth rely on a peculiar reading of Max Weber’s definition of a state as monopoly of the legitimate use of violence.For example, Kimberley Marten explicitly defines warlords in opposition to the state in her book Warlords: Strong-arm brokers in weak states:
“Warlords” are individuals who control small pieces of territory using a combination of force and patronage. [...] Warlords rule in defiance of genuine state sovereignty but through the complicity of state leaders. Warlords today flout and undermine state capacity and state institutions, and they do so by colluding with cost-conscious, corrupt, or frightened officials and bureaucrats. In other words, warlords are parasitic creatures of the state. (Marten 2012: 3)
Marten refers to Max Weber’s socio-historical elaboration of the concept of the state as a specific category of social organisation. However she reads Weber in a functionalist and deterministic way, so that what are heuristic concepts in Weber’s investigation of the emergence of the law-territory-authority triad in Germany’s middle ages become ontological facts of statehood. The ontology of states that Marten evokes is a very different one from Weber’s account. In Marten’s account, states are mythologised as ahistorical and acontextual, functionalist, and rationally necessary entities—hence, reflecting the mainstream ontology of the international system of (mostly American) international relations scholarship and neglecting most of the major critiques addressed at these ontologies and epistemologies from critical, postcolonial, gender, or historical- sociological studies (including the critique Max Weber himself would formulate of such a misinterpretation of his work).
Marten’s book and articles on warlordism in Afghanistan are particularly well constructed examples of the paired warlord-state mythology (Marten 2002, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2012).
Both myths are narrated in parallel and constant reference to each other. Figure 7.4 shows how the state myth reflects the warlord myth in Marten’s account of warlordism in her 2012 book. Every function and every sequence (indicated by Roman and
Fig. 7.4 Functions and sequences of the state myth as opposed to the warlord myth. Source: Author
Arab numbers for the warlord myth and Latin and Greek letters for the state myth) has its exact mirror image in the mythologisation of European state-formation.
From here on, it is possible to oppose the warlord functions to the state functions and to elaborate what Levi-Strauss called mythèmes (a neologism combining the words ‘myth’ and ‘theme’), the inside topics, so to say, of the myth. These mythèmes have to be contextualised in the cultural usages of the images and metaphors they evoke in order to understand the discourse (the meaning and morality of the tale) underlying the narrative (the dramatic development). As Levi-Strauss argues with the examples of the skate and the south wind, it is neither the dramatis personae per se nor the sequences that give meaning. It is the discourse constituted by the mythèmes. In his example, the skate and the south wind stand for something and contextual analysis allows capturing what they stand for.
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