Reproducing the Myth of Civil Society Participation in Global Policymaking

One concern of CSP in global governance is lending legitimacy. By con­tributing to more transparency and inclusiveness, CSOs are said to force states to justify their decisions and to argue, learn, and be persuaded (Risse 2004, 304).

Steffek 2004; Steffek and Nanz 2008, 8). While this—assumed—effect has been discussed in depth in the academic literature, we assume that the myth we describe here not only builds on CSO participation to legitimise the process but is also reproduced by CSOs that gain legitimation from the same source. CSOs are thus not simply instrumentalised but willing participants that help perpetuate the myth.

The example of the two WSIS summits illustrates this reproduction of the myth—despite all well-known flaws—by civil society actors themselves through its enactment. As a consequence of their limited influence in the first phase of WSIS, civil society temporarily withdrew from the process when the first summit approached and drafted an alternative declaration with their vision of a sustainable information society (WSIS Civil Society Plenary 2003; WSIS Civil Society 2003). Although this was supposedly a statement against the limited legitimacy of the WSIS process, by ostenta­tiously dropping out, CSOs showed they never stopped taking the process seriously. Moreover, states had initially fought over whether CSOs should be excluded from certain meetings (Kleinwachter 2004, 61-62) but did not openly question the idea of CSP either. Eventually, CSOs re-entered the process in the second phase, not only signalling continued interest in the policy matter but also signalling, and increasingly so, their support for the overall idea of CSO participation in global governance.

This development did not go uncontested within the civil society com­munity at the WSIS, and it created conflicts. One of the most pervasive criticisms directed against CSOs in global governance forums generally is their lack of inclusiveness. While the myth claims that CSOs act for marginalised interests, e.g. groups from the Global South, and that they represent those who would otherwise not be represented, the dominance of Northern actors within civil society (Roth 2005), the flawed represen­tativeness of CSOs (Ottaway 2001, 266; Hertel 2006), their close con­nections with and functions for states (Brand 2000, 172), and their biased transnational advocacy agenda have been repeatedly criticised (Bob 2001; Carpenter 2007). This problem of inequality within the CSO community is well known, yet the myth effectively silences it by constructing a (stron­ger) antagonism between CSOs and states or vague and concrete threats that CSOs as a group help counter. Any form of antagonism between the protagonists themselves, i.e. the representatives of civil society, however, is not part of the narrative. Yet, at the WSIS, for example, conflicts among CSO actors became visible. Although many civil society actors perceived the summit as a great opportunity to participate in and influence policy­making, their participation rights and influence were constantly restricted. Over time, some CSO representatives became increasingly frustrated not only with the limited influence but also their fellow CSO colleagues:

At the beginning I thought the voice of civil society in an international process sounds wonderful and I could make some difference in there.

Different groups within civil society further openly argued about the civil society procedures to decide on the composition of the Working Group on Internet Governance, the most important multi-stakeholder working group of the whole summit process (PCT Working Group 2005). As civil society organised itself bottom-up, lacking procedures and agree­ment on best practices, a few civil society actors that came into the posi­tions first were able to prevail, while others—arguably most of all those with less prior experience in UN conferences and/or from the Global South—were excluded (Mueller et al. 2007, 284).

The strong emphasis on the positive characteristics of CSOs in global governance documents camouflages the actual conflicts that arise between states and CSOs or among CSOs. What is more, CSOs are often seen as antagonists of unhindered liberal market economy and states’ politics— their achievements are frequently measured in terms of reaching their goals in opposition to states but rarely in cooperative measures with them. This obscures the fact that co-optation often takes place, e.g. when only some CSOs are included in a meeting and others left out for opaque rea­sons. It is for this reason that CSO participation also seems to depoliticize global governance. Once CSOs are included and become part of the pro­cess, they are more likely to be co-opted and tamed, which reduces the diversity of views they bring into the policy process (Joachim 2011, 226; Dany 2013, 117ff.). Contrarily, there is no reason why CSOs should not cooperate with states for a common goal, so opposition need not be in the best interest of good results. All in all, both sides, states and CSOs, effectively uphold the legitimacy of the process.

These brief insights into the WSIS process illustrate the power of the mythical narrative. Even though the actual circumstances of a summit would suggest that CSP has built-in flaws, well known to all participants, the participants of the summit would all act upon the mythical narrative and sustain it. Thus, the impossibility of realising their role does not pre­vent CSOs from trying to fulfill it, since challenging the myth’s storyline would possibly undermine their own participation. The myth needs to be enacted and re-enacted, otherwise it cannot live on.