The 1980 Sovereignty-Association Referendum and the 1982 Patriation

During the audiences of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (the so-called B & B Commission, 1963-71), it is fair to say that English Canada was more inclined than ever to formally recognize Quebec as a distinct society or as a national community within the Canadian pol­ity (McRoberts 1997).

This was the context in the 1960s and 1970s when a series of constitutional initiatives took place, emanating from both the member states of the federation and the central state. Quebec—the only province in the country where French­speakers outnumber English-speakers—found itself isolated most of the time and sought to drive political events rather than simply being subjected to deci­sions made outside its domain of immediate political influence (Bourgault 2004, p. 342). Meanwhile, to take the pulse of its population, the Quebec state embarked on a program of self-examination, establishing several commissions to study its political, cultural, economic, institutional and social needs.

The election of the Parti quebecois with a majority mandate in 1976 set in motion a new political process that could not be stopped until a referen­dum on sovereignty-association had been held. While the pq government was developing its own constitutional platform to be proposed, in the event of win­ning the referendum, to the rest of Canada, the central government did not remain idle. However, as democrats and respectful of constitutionalism, other member states of the federation came to the conclusion that they could not stop the holding of a referendum by the Quebec National Assembly.

Instead, they used all instruments in their power to influence the final result and to derail the Quebec initiative on negotiating a new partnership with the Rest of Canada (roc) (see Gagnon and lacovino 2007; Gagnon 2008). For example, Ottawa joined the ‘no’ forces during the referendum campaign, developing arguments to convince Quebeckers that they would lose econom­ically, socially and politically were Quebec to secede from the Canadian fed­eration. Among the arguments used to mobilize the no vote were: economic uncertainty, political disruption, debts to be reimbursed, closure of economic markets in the rest of Canada, loss in procurement policies, shrinking of per­sonnel working in the civil service, family divisions, outward migration, and the like.

At the very end of the process, a couple of days before the first referendum, in a last-ditch attempt to convince Quebeckers to continue their partnership with the roc, Pierre Trudeau, the leader of Ottawa’s governing party, formally declared that all his Liberal mp s had agreed to put their seats on the line to make appropriate constitutional changes that would satisfy Quebeckers, and that his party, which had defended the place of French-speakers in the country, could be trusted to do so. This last political and dramatic move helped shore up federalist support in Quebec. On 20 May 1980, 85 per cent of eligible vot­ers participated in the referendum. When the votes were counted, 60 per cent of voters chose to turn down the Quebec government proposal to embark on a sovereignty-association project and instead gave their support to what they believed they had been presented with: that is, a genuine renewed federalism.

However, immediately after this defeat for Quebec nationalism, and contrary to what was perceived as a guarantee for change, Ottawa frantically pursued a

series of constitutional reforms that would further reduce the role and influ­ence of Quebec within the Canadian federation (Gagnon and Lachapelle 1996). The first element of the puzzle was to proceed to the patriation of the constitution from the United Kingdom. A complex amending formula was also entrenched in the Constitution Act of 1982, removing the historical (and con­ventional) veto right that Quebec had heretofore been able to exercise.

The central government's plan was that, from now on, provinces would have identical powers and influence on the constitutional process. This transition was welcomed by all nine anglophone provinces, and multilateralism became a key word in constitutional politics. In addition, one of the leitmotivs of the reform was to make provinces equal politically whatever their population size and political responsibilities. This is well encapsulated by the expression: ‘a province is a province, is a province'. Any deviation from this conception of the polity was considered as ‘a threat to Canada's political stability' (Gagnon and Lachapelle 1996, p. 180).

3.2