Limits of stateless societies

The above short survey does not cover all the different types of political communities that existed before the advent of the state. To do so it would have to mention several other, mostly intermediate types such as so-called big-men or rank societies;¹⁰⁸ and, standing somewhere midway between chiefdoms and bureaucratic empires, kingdoms of every period, size, and shape.

¹⁰⁸ See M. D. Sahlins, Tribesmen (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1968), chs. 4 and 5; and M. H. Fried, The Evolution of Political Society: An Essay in Political Anthropology (New York: Random House, 1967), ch. 4. them into chiefdoms by insisting that a single leader be appointed and take responsibility for such matters as internal administration and taxation; on the other hand, in subjecting chiefdoms they often de­capitated them and, in an attempt to forestall rebellion, turned them back into kin-based organizations. City-states, too, were likely to find their constitutions eroded by conquering or being conquered until, sooner or later, they themselves ceased to exist as independent self­governing communities. None of these communities represented new principles of government but merely recombinations, on one scale or another, of those already examined. What remains is to point out some political, social, and economic implications that followed from the struc­ture of pre-state societies.

In the absence of the state as a separate legal persona, most historical societies were unable to develop a clear distinction between government and ownership in their various forms. The resulting confusion between the public and the private spheres led to all sorts of paradoxes, such as Aristotle’s claim that barbarians, who did not live in self-governing poleis but were subject to the will of their ruling chiefs or kings, were ‘‘by nature’’ slaves.¹⁰⁹ In Rome during the first centuries AD, we are confron­ted with the curious fact that the cursus publicus, or mail system, was anything but public, but could be used exclusively by the emperor or those acting on his behalf.

To be sure, these problems did not affect either Greek city-states or the Roman Republic in the same form - and indeed the latter in particular probably came closer to being a ‘‘state’’ than any other premodern political entity. Both were perfectly able to distinguish the functions of government from the private property of the individuals who, for a time, occupied the offices and acted as magistrates. Getting oneself elected was usually (though not invariably) expensive; however, there was no need for rulers to be the richest citizens of all. Many cities also maintained special

¹⁰⁹ See the discussion in Aristotle, Politics (London: Heinemann, Loeb Classical Library, 1977), I, ii, 19-21. This view is echoed in 1 Samuel, 51, 8, where the Philistine Goliath calls the Israelites Saul’s ‘‘slaves.’’

¹¹⁰ See J. F. Niermeyer, Medicea Latinitatis Lexicon Minus (Leiden: Brill, 1976), vol. I, p. 353; and J. H. Bruns, ‘‘Fortescue and the Political Theory of Dominium,’’ Historical Journal, 28, 4, 1985, pp. 777-97. boards, such as the Athenian logistai and the Roman censores, whose function was to ensure that peculation did not lead to the boundaries between the two being crossed.^[62] Two of the greatest Greek and Roman statesmen, Pericles and Scipio Africanus, had their problems in this respect. To avoid suspicion of collusion with his Spartan kinsmen during the Peloponnesian War, the former felt compelled to turn over his prop­erty to the polis.

As the orderly succession of magistrates shows, the system made it possible for a ruler to step down without at the same time losing every­thing else as well; or, which amounts to the same thing, for the ruled to change their rulers without resorting to a coup, revolt, rebellion, or violence of any kind. In particular, the largest city-states - Rome, Athens, and, during the first few centuries of its recorded history, Sparta - were able to preserve civil peace. By avoiding the repeated loss of life and property that political change often entailed elsewhere, they launched themselves on the road to success.

Government other than that of the polis was often powerless as in tribes without rulers and under feudalism in its looser, more decentralized forms. Alternatively it was arbitrary as in the more strongly governed chiefdoms and empires. In them the legislative, judiciary, and executive functions were all concentrated in the hands of a single ruler; with the result that, technical obstacles and the ever present possibility of rebellion apart, the only ‘‘legal'' constraint on his power consisted of religion whose head, whether as the god's descendant or as his representative on earth, he was. As John Locke, writing in the 1680s, was perhaps the first to point out,^[64] both kinds of political community had more in common than met the eye. Opposed as they were, neither was able, or indeed attempted, to guarantee the security of either the life or the property of individuals.

Under feudalism, anyone who owned anything was ipso facto forced to be a warrior as well, thus violating the principle of the division of labor and putting limits on economic effectiveness. Under an imperial regime whatever large-scale economic success could be attained almost always took the form not of market-oriented enterprises but of government- related activities - as in tax-farming (an occupation which in both Rome and China often gave rise to the largest fortunes), contracting to erect ‘‘public’’ works such as fortifications or aqueducts on the emperor's behalf, leasing imperial possessions such as forests or mines, and sup­plying the army.

As Adam Smith said, the one thing more important than opulence is defense.¹¹⁴ Insecurity, whether due to the weakness of government or to its excessive strength (in empires with their heterogeneous ethnic com­position and far-flung territories, both factors sometimes applied) pre­vented the accumulation of a surplus among the people and the emerg­ence of sustained per capita economic growth. Sporadic attempts to the contrary, not one of these societies was able to develop a paper currency or advance very far toward building something like a central bank. Sim­ply put, the confidence in the government’s ability and willingness to honor its obligations was non-existent; it is not for nothing that, in Hebrew, ‘‘sending one’s money down the drain’’ is derived from a term whose original meaning was ‘‘public treasury’’ (Greek timaion).¹¹⁵ This in turn meant that, in spite of the often remarkable ingenuity displayed by individuals, technological progress was obstructed, retarded, or pre­vented. Not much needs to be said of the backwardness in these respects of tribes without rulers and chiefdoms; it has led directly to their down­fall which, under the name of modernization, is still proceeding in many places.

¹¹⁴ A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations,E. Cannan,ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976 [1776]), vol. I, p. 487.

¹¹⁵ I am grateful to my student, Ms. Talma Luft, for bringing this fact to my attention. of the roads;^[65] even the first printing press was established there only in 1783.^[66]

Much the same applied even to the most advanced of these societies, such as early imperial Rome, Ming China, and Mogul India. All were the seats of sophisticated civilizations capable of conceiving and erecting immense ‘‘public” works. All also developed literary and artistic products that have never been surpassed for quality or splendor. And yet, with the partial exception of a class of merchants who were themselves dependent on the ruler, most of those products were earmarked for the court, its servants, and its favorites. Often they were manufactured in the imperial workshops or composed by imperial hangers-on; the name of one cour­tier, Augustus' friend Maecenas, has even become a byword for artistic patronage. Once the limits of court, capital, and provincial administrative centers had been left behind, civilization and its amenities all but disap­peared. Not one empire ever succeeded in moving beyond the point where at least 90 percent of the entire population lived on the land, and where, often sharing their homes with their ‘‘domestic'' animals, they eked out an existence at something very close to the subsistence level.^[67]

As for city-states, they were small by definition and, equally prob­lematic for their prospects of anything but modest economic success, they were jealous of their independence and autarchic by preference.^[68] In theory the ideal city-state was the one which, being self-sufficient, did not need to engage in trade and was able to preserve the constitution handed down by the citizens' ancestors without change.

Rome where, thanks to its military prowess, immense fortunes were accumulated by means of booty and tribute.^[69]

Partly because they refused to incorporate foreigners into the citizen­body, and partly because incorporating too many would inevitably have led to the loss of the democratic principle on which they were based, city-states could extend their dominion only so far. Going beyond that point, the larger political entities that they tried to build collapsed, the fate that overtook both Athens and Sparta; in the long run they found it impossible to maintain their rule over reluctant subjects. Alternatively they were taken over by an empire, as Greek ones were by Macedonia (and as may have happened in pre-dynastic Mesopotamia), or else themselves took the road of the Roman Republic toward empire and despotism. Here it is worth noting that, in spite of its unique origins, the impact of Roman despotism on the economy was similar to its effect anywhere else. Already during the second century AD, the towns' autonomy was being lost as imperial procurators were appointed to supervise their finances and ensure that their taxes would be paid. Gradually power was taken out of the magistrates' hands so that their only remaining function was to pay for the liturgies. Another hundred years passed and the demands of the government began to weigh so heavily on society that they threatened not just prosperity but urban life in general. Particularly in the West, where cities were more recent and less well established, the result was to force the inhabitants to flee to the countryside.^[70]

Finally, the language used by our ancient historians makes it very clear that neither Greeks nor Romans ever conceived of the state as an abstract entity separate from its citizens. Where we could say ‘‘the state,'' they would write ‘‘the public'' or ‘‘the people''; after all, it was the historian Thucydides who wrote that ‘‘the city is its men'' and the lawyer Cicero who defined the res publica as ‘‘an assembly of men living according to law.''^[71] Thus premodern thought, regardless of civilization and degree of development, failed to come up with the corporation as an abstract legal entity separate from that of its officials and members. This helps explain the role which religion played in these societies; given the absence in both public and private life of the corporation, many of its functions, such as exercising ownership and providing legitimacy, were assigned to the equally invisible deities. So long as the state did not exist, the only way in which political units larger than chiefdoms and city-states would be created led through empire with all its imperfections. Thus understood, the state represents the second most important invention in history after the Greek separation between ownership and government. Its exact na­ture and functions will occupy us later; for now, we must focus on the process that led to its emergence out of feudalism and the Middle Ages.