Conclusions: beyond the state

As presented in this study, government and state are emphatically not the same. The former is a person or group which makes peace, wages war, enacts laws, exercises justice, raises revenue, determines the currency, and looks after internal security on behalf of society as a whole, all the while attempting to provide a focus for people's loyalty and, perhaps, a modicum of welfare as well.

The first place to see this particular form of government was Western Europe, where it started developing around 1300 and where the decisive changes took place between the death of Charles V in 1558 and the Treaty of Westphalia ninety years later. Speaking very roughly, and skipping over the many differences that separated various countries, the process worked as follows. Having fought and defeated universalism on the one hand and particularism on the other, a small number of ‘‘ab­solute'' monarchs consolidated territorial domains and concentrated pol­itical power in their own hands. Simultaneously, in order to wield both the civilian and military aspects of that power, they set out to construct an impersonal bureaucracy as well as the tax and information infrastructure necessary for its support. Once the bureaucracy was in place, its own nature - the fact that the rules of which it consisted could not be arbit­rarily violated without risking a breakdown - soon caused it to start taking power out of the ruler's hands and into its own, thus spawning the state proper.

Closely associated as it was with the breakdown of the medieval world and the consequent civil and religious wars, the state was originally conceived principally as an instrument for imposing law and order on groups and people.

To repeat the definition provided earlier, compared to previous forms of government the most important characteristics of the state are as follows. First, being sovereign, it refuses to share any of the above func­tions with others but concentrates all of them in its own hands. Secondly, being territorial, it exercises such powers over all the people who live within its borders and over them only. Thirdly and most importantly, it is an abstract organization. Unlike any of its predecessors at any other time and place, it is not identical with either rulers nor ruled; it is neither a man nor a community, but an invisible being known as a corporation. As a corporation it has an independent persona. The latter is recognized by law and capable of behaving as if it were a person in making contracts, owning property, defending itself, and the like.

As of the last years of the twentieth century, it is becoming apparent that the third characteristic of the state - the fact that it has a persona - is starting to make the other two redundant. In the main, the threat to the state does not come either from individuals or from groups of the kind which exercised the functions of government in various communities at various times and places before 1648. Instead it comes from other cor­porations: in other words, from such ‘‘artificial men” as share its own nature but differ from it both in respect to their control over territory and in regard to the exercise of sovereignty.

A few of the corporations in question are of a territorial nature, but the majority are not. Some are regional and larger than states, others smaller and merely local.² Some are intergovernmental, others nongovernmen­tal. Some are primarily political by nature, others dedicated to different ends such as making money, protecting the environment, spreading some religious message, or propagating some special cause which may range from reducing pollution to animal rights. As one recent pundit put it,³ though, all have in common that they are more attuned to modern technology, communication and transportation in particular, than the

¹ Most recently by C. Tilly, ‘‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Evans, et al., Bringing the State back in, pp. 169-91.

² For the shape that some such organizations might take, see K. Ohmae, ‘‘The Rise of the Region State,” Foreign Affairs, 72, 2, Spring 1993, pp. 78-87; and, at the other end of the spectrum, G. Gottlieb, ‘‘Nations Without States,” Foreign Affairs, 73, 3, May-June 1994, pp. 100-12.

³ J. Mathews, ‘‘Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs, 76, 1, January-February 1997, pp. 50-66. state. As a result, some of them are able to grow much richer than most states; or take over some of the latter's functions; or evade its control by establishing colonies and moving their resources outside its borders; or influence the opinions of its citizens more than governments can; or (as in the case of numerous guerrilla and terrorist organizations) successfully resist it weapon in hand; or, not seldom, some combination of all these things.

In many instances the retreat of the state is voluntary. Such is the case, for example, when it sets out to evade its responsibilities by cutting back on welfare, social security, education, and the like; so also when it seeks to improve opportunities for trade by opening its borders, integrating its infrastructure with that of its neighbors, joining international organiz­ations of various kinds, and submitting to such regulations as those organizations may lay down.

The obverse side of this coin is the feeling, which is prevalent among the citizens of many developed countries, that when the time for delivery comes the state just does not keep its promises, that it pays, if at all, in false coin. And that, in order to secure any kind of future for themselves and their children, citizens are left with no choice but to look after themselves in ways that are independent of, and may even stand in opposition to, the will of the state.

As the modern state abandons the commanding heights which it reached between 1945 and 1975, some of its most characteristic in­stitutions are likely to decline. Among them are, naturally enough, state- owned economic enterprises (which from China to Britain are being either circumvented or sold); social security systems (whose share of GDP is declining just about everywhere);^[493] the justice system (in some countries private justice, also known as ‘‘rent a judge,'' is already taking over as being both faster and cheaper than that which is provided by the state); the prison system (from Australia through Britain to the United States, all developed countries are desperately looking for a cheaper alternative to imprisonment and experimenting with private prisons);⁵ the armed forces (many of which, having shrunk dramatically since the end of the Cold War, are even now seeking to take on new missions in everything from search and rescue to waging war on drugs); the police (who are being supplemented, and in some cases pushed aside, by private security forces); public schools (which, as well-to-do parents either send their children to private schools or revert to home schooling, are being turned into pens for the offspring of the underprivileged); publicly owned media (which, on top of the subsidies that they require, are often synony­mous with boredom); and the statistical apparatus (which, to the extent that it still operates in terms of individual states, is becoming increasingly irrelevant).

As other organizations step into the shoes of the retreating state, they will no doubt seek to fill its role in many of these respects. Unlike the present members of the international community, all of which are sover­eign, most of them will probably be unable to exercise exclusive control over a given territory; instead they will be forced to share that control with other organizations. Instead of being at least formally equal, as states are, some of them will no doubt be superior and others inferior. In other words, we are talking about a world whose legal structure will be more in harmony with political realities that already exist and which, in many ways and places, have never ceased to exist.

The organizations which, in the future, will carry out the functions of government will be more fragmented, more integrated with each other than those with which we have become familiar during the last 300 years or so. Unlike states, which in theory at any rate are each other's equals, they will also tend to form hierarchical relationships with each other. Sometimes sovereignty will be divided, as is currently happening in Northern Ireland and as may eventually happen in the Holy Land. A hierarchical structure in which some political entities are more equal than others also means that those entities will operate at one or more removes from their populations. This carries the danger that they will be less representative and less democratic than most modern states, much in the way that, already today, senior Eurocrats and the UN secretary-general are appointed or elected by governments rather than being voted for by the people of the European Union and the world respectively.

As used to be the case before 1648, all these organizations will interact with each other and bargain with each other. Occasionally, no doubt, they

⁵ For the privatization of America's justice and prison systems in particular, see R.

Fitzgerald, When Government Goes Private: Successful Alternatives to Public Services (New York: Universe Books, 1988), ch. 3. will also make use either of their own forces or, which appears more and more likely, those of contractors in order to direct violence against each other. While such a situation will be nothing new to the inhabitants of much of the Third World - which is characterized by nothing so much as the fact that the state never succeeded in establishing an effective monop­oly over violence - in many developed countries the effect on day-to-day security will almost certainly be adverse. People and organizations who used to rest peacefully in the bosom of the state will have to do, indeed already are doing, more to defend themselves, for example, by purchasing all kinds of specialized equipment; fortifying the premises in which they live and operate; mounting their own guards, whether in or out of uni­form; and possibly even setting up their own armed forces under suitable commanders (retired officers and NCOs, no doubt).

Compared to what we have witnessed in 1914-45, most of the violence in question will almost certainly be local, sporadic, and on a rather small scale. There can be no question that the future has many conflicts such as Bosnia and Sri Lanka and Rwanda in store; not only will terrorists and guerrillas continue to make their presence felt in many countries, but the possibility of their resorting to chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out.⁶ Contrary to the fears of many and the hopes of a few, however, World War III - meaning a large-scale clash between superpowers each of which dominates the better part of a con­tinent or hemisphere - will almost certainly not take place. But then, if it does take place and nuclear weapons are used in any numbers, then the result will be a return not just to pre-Westphalian days but to the stone age.

For people and organizations who are limited to individual states and dependent on them for their defense, livelihood, education, and other services, such a situation represents bad news. For groups as diverse as government employees and the recipients of social security (particularly those who hope to receive benefits in the future), the writing is on the wall. Either they start looking elsewhere for their economic status and, in some cases, even their physical protection; or else there is probably no future for them. As was also the case during previous periods when empires fell apart and feudal structures emerged, often looking elsewhere will mean losing their freedom by becoming the clients of the strong and the rich, whether in the form of individuals or, which is perhaps more likely for the majority, of corporations of various sorts. The reemergence of a politically deprived, disfranchised underclass similar to that which,

⁶ Speaking on Panorama on 14 September 1997, General Lebed claimed that, out of 100 suitcase-sized nuclear bombs manufactured for the Soviet Union’s special forces, two-thirds could no longer be accounted for. even in the most ‘‘advanced” countries, continued to exist until the French Revolution and beyond appears likely. Some would say that, from California to Italy, it already exists in the form of so-called illegal aliens, guest workers, and so-called economic citizenship^[494] - meaning people who, while subject to taxation and enjoying at least limited access to the justice system and social services provided by the host country, are without any political rights.

Conversely, organizations and people whose wealth and status are independent of the state, internationally oriented, and prepared to take advantage of opportunities that are opening up in every field from global communication and trade to providing private education stand to gain; and, as several analysts have argued,^[495] are already gaining at the expense of all the rest. With the state weakening, many of them will undoubtedly find it both easier and more necessary to translate whatever advantages they have into direct political power. Instead of merely lobbying and bribing, as is the case today, they will rule - at least by carrying some of the functions of government, in regard to some people, and to some extent.

For each person, whether the coming changes will be good or bad depends on one's sex, family relationship, economic position, social status, occupation, organizational affiliation, and so on. Above all, it is a question of our willingness to discard old certainties and come to terms with the brave new world awaiting us. In some places change will be accomplished peacefully. The result will be unprecedented prosperity as national borders become less significant, technology advances, economic opportunities open up, and transportation and communications enable different cultures to fructify each other. Regional and local organizations will acquire a new lease on life; as is already happening in Spain (Catalonia), Britain (Scotland and Wales), Belgium (Flanders and the Walloon regions), and Australia (many of whose constituent states now have their own representatives abroad) inter alia. Finally, those who wish to escape at least some of the state's more meddlesome tendencies will be able to do so by moving elsewhere or simply linking up via the internet.

In other places, the retreat of the state will have less fortunate con­sequences. At best, the reemergence of the ‘‘market'' at the expense of administrative controls and welfare will mean diminished security and, often enough greater turmoil. At worst, the tables may be turned and people may find themselves living under, or governed by, organizations that are less accountable and more authoritarian. Depending on circum­stances, such organizations may or may not be able to keep the peace, both among themselves and with whatever remains of the old states; in which case public authority may collapse, violence break out, the blood of both combatants and noncombatants flow, and at least a temporary reversion to more primitive ways of life ensue. There may even be a few regions and countries which will continue to vegetate much as they have always done, neither keeping up with the accelerating pace of change nor, it is to be hoped, falling into greater confusion than usual.^[496]

On balance, the dangers and the opportunities are probably about equal. Neither is the retreat of the state to be regretted, nor will tomor­row’s world be either much better or much worse than the one which is even now fading into the shadows. Asked about the shape of things to come, Mao Tse-tung once answered in a characteristic verse:

The sun will keep rising

trees will keep growing

and women

will keep having children.