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Tribunals and inquiries

Tribunals and inquiries are not courts and are not, therefore, part of the hierarchy of the principal English courts. However, they may be conveniently covered at this point because their function is to resolve disputes (or, in the case of some inquiries, to be part of the process of resolving disputes), and their proceedings and decisions may be challenged in the High Court or the Court of Appeal.

In passing, it may be noted that the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 rather confusingly gave the Upper Tribunal the status of a superior court of record, without actually naming it as a court. Certain technical consequences flow from this status but we need not pursue them here.

One very distinctive feature which tribunals and inquiries share is that they bring technical expertise to bear on the matters that come before them (see below). However, there is also one crucial distinction between them, namely that tribunals are independent bodies which decide disputes (generally between people and the state), while inquiries are integral parts of certain governmental decision-making processes and, as such, can make no claim to be independent of government.

Before the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 there were many separate tribunals dealing with a very wide range of matters such as claims for social security benefits, employment disputes and questions of property valuation. Some tribunals functioned at first instance, while others heard appeals against lower tribunals. The 2007 Act did not replace the existing tribunals but did reorganise them into a two-tier structure, consisting of a First Tier Tribunal (exercising jurisdiction at first instance) and an Upper Tribunal (exercising appellate jurisdiction). Both levels operate through a number of chambers, with each chamber bringing together a cluster of different individual tribunals dealing with more or less similar matters.

Tribunal decisions were (and still are in the post-2007 world) typically made by a panel consisting of a legally qualified chair sitting with lay members who bring technical expertise (in the form of specialised knowledge, skills and experience) to bear on the subject-matter of the proceedings. The idea that some members must have relevant expertise does, of course, constitute a clear distinction between tribunals and courts, but the 2007 Act did blur another distinction by re-designating tribunal chairs as tribunal judges.

Turning to inquiries, the essential point to emphasise is that far from being independent, inquiries are integral parts of governmental decision-making. For example, a typical inquiry will be concerned with whether a local planning authority’s refusal of planning permission can be justified. Originally, the civil servants who conducted inquiries (and who were – and still are – usually called inspectors) would typically write reports which would then be considered by more senior civil servants, who would make the actual decisions on behalf of the relevant Secretary of State. Crucially, the decisions would result from applying government policy to the facts of the case. For many years, however, in all but the most important inquiries, the inspectors themselves have actually made the decisions, but whoever does so, the correct application of government policy to the facts of each case is always the essence of the inquiry procedure.

The European Court of Justice and the General Court

The Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community was established in 1954, and renamed as the Court of Justice of the European Communities in 1958. It was renamed again as the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2009 when the Treaty of Lisbon came into effect. From 1989 until 2009 there was also the Court of First Instance, although this title is somewhat misleading if it is understood to suggest that all cases started there, since some cases began in the Court of Justice.

In any event, when the Treaty of Lisbon came into effect the CFI became the General Court. Detailed rules identify the court in which a particular case will begin but the essence of the scheme lies in distinguishing between cases according to their significance and complexity.

The mass of detail surrounding the jurisdiction of these courts need not be pursued here. Suffice it to say the bulk of the jurisdiction involves two categories of cases. First, either one of the institutions or a member state may allege that one of the other institutions or member states is in breach of Union law. Secondly, where a point of Union law arises in a case before a court of a member state, that court may (and sometimes must) seek the opinion of one of the Union’s courts, in order to enable it to give its own judgment. This is known as the preliminary ruling procedure. The procedure in the Court of Justice, is governed by art. 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (which was originally art. 177 and then art. 234 of the EC Treaty, in both of which it was called the preliminary reference procedure), while the procedure in the General Court is governed by art. 225 of the Treaty.

Although any of the parties to the proceedings before the court of the member state may ask the court to seek a ruling on a question of EU law, no party ever has any right to insist that a request for a ruling shall be made. Furthermore, once a case has been considered by one of the EU’s courts, it will return to the national court that requested the ruling, which will then give its judgment in the light of the ruling. It is, therefore, wrong to describe the preliminary ruling procedure as an appeal.

Individuals, and organisations such as companies and local authorities, have only very limited rights of access to the Court of Justice, although they do have somewhat wider access to the General Court.

Judges of both Courts have the style of judge and are described and addressed accordingly.

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Source: Askey Simon, McLeod Ian. Studying Law. Macmillan Education,2014. — 239 p.. 2014

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