Slaves

Florentinus defined slavery as an “institution of the law of nations by which someone, contrary to nature, is submitted to the ownership of another” (D. 1.5.4.1). Roman slavery was an institution essentially based on capture of enemies in war, not racially grounded as slavery in the New World would be.

Under Roman law, slaves were considered both human persons and things. Their legal position, therefore, was complex, as is shown by the abundant legal literature discussing issues in relation to slaves. As humans, slaves lacked all personal rights and responsibilities and had no legal capacity. They were able, however, to have quasi-marital relations (contubernium) (see implications in Ulpian, D. 21.1.35), and their tombs were considered religious places. Slaves could own nothing but could only acquire things for their owners.

Slaves could be neither plaintiff nor defendant in a lawsuit, but they were able to act on behalf of their master, doing business or managing his property. They often worked as financial or commercial agents in charge of a shop or a ship. They were also able to administer some assets (see section: peculium). Many slaves of both sexes provided sexual services at the request of their masters.

As property, slaves and their positions were subject to the master’s absolute power (dominica potestas). Slaves were a type of property called res mancipi, which also included land, houses, and beasts, among other things. As property, slaves could be bought and sold, given, lent, donated, and bequeathed by will, like other goods and commodities. They could also be mistreated at will. For humanitarian reasons, some imperial legislation restricted the power of the owner to kill slaves or to inflict severe harm on them. Domitian, for instance, prohibited the castration of male slaves, and Hadrian imposed the capital penalty to the physician who performed the operation (Ulpian, D. 48.8.4.2). Hadrian also prohibited masters from killing slaves without the consent of a magistrate, and Antoninus Pius established that the gratuitous killing of a slave by a master constituted criminal homicide (Gaius 1.53; Inst. 1.8.2).