Cicero and universalism

Strictly speaking universalism takes in not only non-Romans as well as Romans, but also slaves as well as free persons. But Cicero is not known as a champion of slaves’ rights.

Cicero’s classic statement on universalism appears in De officiis:

Nature has established principles of human community and society. The first principle, applicable to all members of the human race, is reason and speech, which unite all people in a natural association. Everything that nature has produced for the common use of man is defined by statutes and common law where such exist, while everything else falls under the Greek proverb, â€?Amongst friends all things are common.’ The notion of the common property of all men is in the same line of country as Ennius’ allusion to â€?Courteously [comiter] showing the way to a wanderer.’⁸ This involves giving even a stranger what it costs nothing to give, such as taking fire from our fire. Following these principles, we should make it our business to contribute to the common advantage [communis utilitas].

(Off. 1.50-2)

Cicero here touches on the ius gentium—natural law—humanitas combination with which Demosthenes and Polybius are familiar. But elsewhere in De officiis Cicero weakens the principle. He says that displays of kindness (benignitas) should be graded according to the closeness of the relationship. The lowest priority should be given to the universal bond (societas hominum), after which should follow, in ascending order, membership of the same clan, nation or language group; citizenship of the same state; and propinquity, between husband and wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters, and cousins (Off. 1.53-4). In other passages he cites Terence’s Homo sum. In one place he says that it is not an easy matter to worry about other people’s affairs, and in another he cites it to show that justice must be in accordance with nature.⁹

The priority accorded to members of the same ethnic or linguistic group seems to have been in contention in Cicero’s day, for Dionysius of Halicarnassus has this to say:

The Romans are magnanimous, unlike the Athenians and Spartans who treated people of their own stock with the brutality of barbarians.

(Dion. Hal. 14.6.1-6 adapted)

The classification of the Romans as honorary Hellenes is a novel idea, but would it have appealed to Cicero?

The low priority that Cicero assigns to the universal bond conflicts with his views on the treatment of non-Romans who happen to be provincials.

In the famous letter to his brother Quintus on the prorogation of the latter’s Asian governorship, Cicero offers the following advice:

Use your wisdom and humanitas to make the additional year worthwhile. Your province is a peaceful one, the inhabitants are the most civilised members of the human race. You are well qualified to put down corruption. By doing so you will make the Greeks think that a deified mortal has come down to them from heaven. Your custodial function makes you answerable to the provincials, the citizens and the Republic. You may administer justice with the utmost severity, as long as you are consistent and impartial. You must be affable in hearing cases, and lenient in deciding them. Severity must be sweetened with a seasoning of humanitas. If that quality is welcome in Rome, how welcome must a governor’s courtesy [comitas] be in Asia, where people watch for the nod of a single man. A great man, refined by learning and the arts, should see to it that his subjects never regret his power. Priority must always be given to the interests [utilitas] of the governed—not only of provincials and citizens, but also of slaves and dumb animals. You meet these criteria fully.¹⁰ In your command there is nothing harsh or cruel, all is clemency, leniency, humanity.

(Ad Q.fr. I 1.3-8, 10, 17, 20-5)

The letter makes another important pronouncement:

Plato thought that states would only prosper when wise and learned men ruled them.

(Ad Q.fr. 1.1.27-9)

So far so good. Cicero has given his most detailed exposition of humanitas Romana, and he has identified universalism as the ultimate ideal. But elsewhere, specifically in his court speeches, he almost destroys this favourable impression. His agility in one of the speeches against Verres almost obliges us to suspend belief:

The Sicilians have none of the failings of other Greeks. Their hardiness, uprightness and honesty remind us of the stern Roman manners of old. They have repeatedly tolerated acts of oppression on the part of Roman officials, including Lepidus in that dreadful year (80 BC) and M. Antonius (74 BC). But they have never until now sought the protection of the law. It was a tradition of theirs to consider Rome so great a benefactor that they should even endure oppression if the oppressors were Romans. They would even have endured Verres if he had wronged them in ordinary human fashion—humano modo.

(Verr. II 2.7-9 adapted)

Cicero was no doubt compelled to devise this extraordinary role for the Sicilians. The depredations of M.Aemilius Lepidus in 80, and of M.Antonius in 74¹¹ were still fresh in the jurors’ minds. But the passage further qualifies the system of priorities. A certain amount of ill-treatment is acceptable, given the benefits of Roman rule. But beyond a certain point it becomes inhumanitas. The dividing-line is, it seems, in the eye of the beholder. But racist considerations also come into it, as in the speech in defence of M.Aemilius Scaurus:

I am not so inhuman as to close my eyes to Sardinian complaints, especially after my brother’s integrity and humanitas as supervisor of their corn supply. But they are not entitled to any credence in this case, descended as they are from the same treacherous stock as the Carthaginians.

(Scaur. 39-45 adapted)

The appeal to the jury’s racial prejudices was a trump-card. Despite the damaging evidence of Scaurus’ malpractices in Sardinia, he was aquitted by 62 votes to 8.

The racist theme was also used successfully on behalf of L. Valerius Flaccus, charged with malpractice in Asia. This time the racist attack was aimed at the very people whom Cicero urged Quintus to treat with humanitas:

Some Greek cities have been persuaded by Mithridates to spurn the friendship of the Roman people, to violate all the laws of duty and humanity. Mithridates massacred Roman citizens,...imprisoned Roman envoys, and issued documents that nearly obliterated the memory of the Roman name and empire. If I were defending a man of humble birth but still a citizen, I would beg you by the law of common humanity and pity not to surrender a citizen to suborned witnesses, to men who have the fickleness of Greeks and the cruelty of barbarians. The Greeks are unable to tell the truth, any more than they have been able to conduct their assemblies properly.¹²

Cicero here makes universalism turn on itself, setting the law of common humanity against the humane treatment of all members of the human race. An advocate naturally wants to win his case, but he will not be able to do so unless the line that he adopts strikes a responsive chord in his audience. Cicero himself makes this clear: �In order to arouse people to anger or hatred, or to recall them to mildness and mercy, the speaker needs insight into people’s natures and motives, and into the whole force of humanitas’ (Orat. 1.53-4).

Cicero occasionally says something about the treatment of non­Romans who are not provincials:

The laws of war must be upheld. To settle a dispute by negotiation is proper for man; the use of force is the mark of a beast, only to be tried as a last resort.

Cicero knows that the treatment of Carthage, Corinth and Numantia violated this doctrine. But he is trying to weaken the impact of the criticisms listed by Polybius in regard to the destruction of Carthage. That is why he goes on to say that Rome has acted justly towards those who surrendered at discretion.¹⁴

In the dialogue on the Republic Cicero notes Numa’s reforms which dampened the people’s martial ardour, turning their thoughts from the savage pursuit of war to humanitas and kindness. The discussion then takes an interesting turn. Aemilianus denies that Numa was a pupil of Pythagoras, to which Manilius replies that it is a good thing that they have been educated by native excellence rather than by arts imported from abroad. To this Aemilianus rejoins that even borrowed institutions have been greatly improved by the Romans (Rep. 2.27-30). This clear exposition of some of the fundamentals of humanitas Ramana is not offered by Cicero as a mere historical excursus. He offers it because he subscribes to it.¹⁵