One day in approximately 150, a young man stood before the praetor and stated that, for all his efforts, he could not reach a verdict in a case that had been set before him.
The case presented a moral problem to Aulus Gellius. A respectable man had no proof that he had loaned money to a less than respectable man, and this scoundrel claimed no such loan had been made.
Aulus Gellius realised that the law required him to accept the scoundrel’s word, but he could not bring himself to rule accordingly, so he sought the advice of those friends whom he asked to be advisors on the case, and also asked the opinion of his philosopher friend Favorinus. The former gave him the correct legal opinion, the latter the correct moral opinion.This case came to Gellius through Rome’s legal machinery. Although he had no courtroom experience or expertise in the intricacies of Roman law, he met the necessary qualifications of age and wealth. He appeared on the lists from which magistrates could choose judges. So, a praetor chose Gellius as one to hear cases dealing with private law, most of which, as in the above case, involved financial disputes. While pride may have been the first emotion Gellius felt when chosen to fulfil this duty of the upper-class Roman citizen, the pressure of trying to reach the “right” verdict, of balancing the law with the cultural prejudices of his society, no doubt took the bloom off the rose of being a Roman judge.
The judge within the Roman courtroom is the focus of this chapter. Since the judge plays a central role in a legal hearing — he gives the ruling and therefore controls the outcome of the case, the ultimate goal of the event — it is surprising how limited is the evidence. Yet, in a way, his role is more passive than that of the advocate or even of the audience. For the most part, he listens. He is not a force with whom the advocate constantly strugÂgles to admit certain information. The Roman court process gave the advocate significant latitude in the avenues of attack he utilized, whether character assassination or masses of irrelevant information.
Therefore, the Roman judge was not constantly making rulings throughout the hearing of whether a piece of information or an avenue of inquiry was relevant and acceptable. Additionally, in the Roman courtroom, as in its modern succesÂsor, interest tended to focus on the contest, the agon between the advocates, and the evidence certainly reflects this. Unlike evidence on the advocate, about whom quite a bit of first-hand information is available, evidence for the judge (as for the litigant) is far more indirect. Only one first-hand account of a legal hearing recorded by the judge has survived — the private suit heard by Gellius and described at this chapter's opening. The available sources must therefore be squeezed all the more for information. Even after such efforts, we must accept with resignation that sizeable gaps in our knowledge persist, some of which leave us entirely ignorant of features that are of central importance to understanding the Roman judge.* * *
This chapter considers four main topics. As a foundation for discussion I briefly survey the types of judges that existed in Rome's legal system. This is necessarily simplistic but also very helpful for providing a sense of the cirÂcumstances that placed a given individual or group in charge of a case, and the possible connection or lack thereof between the judge(s) and the litiÂgants. Next, I examine the qualifications, selection process, and identity of judges, who are divided into two groups: those who were listed on the album iudicum, the list of judges, and those selected directly by the litigants or appointed by other methods. This chapter leaves aside the preliminary hearÂings held before magistrates in both public and private procedures. The courts of the praetors have already been thoroughly considered; the courts of the emperor, praefectus urbi, and consul have also received attention and little more can be done with the available evidence. The focus here is on those who served as a unus iudex, single judge, in the apud iudicem stage of private cases and those who served on panels of judges in the standing criminal courts, the quaestiones perpetuae, and in private cases, namely the recuperatores and the cenÂtumviri. We then shift our perspective to that of a judge himself, considering how the status, education, and origin of a judge affected his ability to judge and the pressures he felt in the role. Finally, we place judges within the courtroom itself and look at how they interacted with the other courtroom participants.
The focus of this book is the courtroom itself and in this chapter we are interested in the judge as a participant. Thus, this chapter will not dwell on the steps in the process of a case from initiation to resolution, or on the speÂcific jurisdictions of the various judges within the city. These complicated topics are the source of current research and debate.1
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