APPENDIX

A. The abridged family tree of Patermouthis and Kako (after Geens (2005))

Mariam ~ Tsios

I ¹ I ¹

5 children, among them loannes lakobos/Iakybis Tapia Menas

Tsone, a nun

Patermouthis Kako loannes

B.

Kallinikos Eugenia

Pachymios Maria Arsenios Ioanna

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Kreuzsaler, C., ‘Die Beurkundung außergerichtlicher Streitbeilegung in den ägyp­tischen Papyri', in C. Gastgeber (ed.), Quellen zur byzantinischen Rechtspraxis. Aspekte der Textüberlieferung, Paläographie und Diplomatik Akten des internationalen Symposiums, Wien, 5.-7.11.2007 (2010), p. 17.

Kupiszewski, H., ‘Quelques remarques sur les vocabula uvriyppoic, appa, napahave lost their fathers by the age of fourteen.^[526] In addition, many of the same rules that Roman law developed for tutors who managed the property for underage orphans also applied to minors (males under the age of twenty-five), who were commonly represented in their business dealings by curators. In Saller’s reconstruc­tion, another third of the children would have lost their fathers by the age of twenty-five. In view of this situation, an analysis of agency relationships connected with tutorship had potentially important economic consequences, since the rules surrounding this institution affected the disposition of a considerable portion of the Empire’s property.

The difficulty, of course, is to develop a methodology to analyse the eco­nomic ramifications of Roman agency law. In what follows, I will examine the likely economic consequences of the Roman legal rules surrounding agency by drawing from the contemporary debate on the relationship between law and the economy in the fields of law and economics and the New Institutional Economics (NIE). One particular advantage to this debate is that it presents a useful methodology for understanding the economic incentives arising from various definitions of property rights, as well as the difficulties involved in changing such definitions to more productive ones. An analysis of the Roman legal institutions surrounding agency suggests the difficulties that the Roman legal authorities faced in adapting long-standing social institutions to the changing needs of Roman society. As I will argue, to protect the interests of orphans and minors, the Roman legal authori­ties imposed restrictions on tutors’ scope for action as well as devastating penalties when they failed in their duties.

It will be useful at the outset to sketch out some important theoretical per­spectives offered by the fields of law and economics and NIE. These provide a starting point to analyse the likely effects on the Roman economy of ‘institutional arrangements’, which include laws and property rights, court systems, and the like, as well as informal institutions, such as social norms and customs, that establish the ‘rules of the game’ under which individuals engage in economic activity.^[527] NIE takes into account basic constraints that affect economic activity and decision-making. These constraints include ‘transaction costs’, a concept that encompasses all the costs associated with creating and maintaining property rights, such as the costs of obtain­ing information, negotiating and enforcing contracts. A second constraint can be understood as ‘bounded rationality’, a term denoting constraints on our knowledge that limit our ability to make optimising decisions. In other words, knowledge is costly, so any analysis of the development and perform­ance of economic institutions has to take into account the costs of acquiring information and the difficulty of evaluating, say, one approach to investing wealth against another.^[528] Economic institutions are considered ‘efficient’ when they allow resources to be put to their highest valued use.^[529] In theory, institutions that are inefficient, in that they prevent people from making more remunerative use of available resources, eventually fail, to be replaced by more efficient ones. In the case of tutorship, the evolution of institutions is not likely to be so straightforward, since it was an institution that was not primarily oriented towards profit. Instead, the institutions imposed restric­tions on tutors as managers of private property to which other Roman prop­erty owners were not subject. Since the purpose of these restrictions was to protect the financial interests of a key social group, they would remain in effect as long as society valued this protection.

2.