E. Greenhouse Gas Pricing

Carbon pricing for all greenhouse gases from agriculture could be a highly effective policy lever. While economic uncertainties make it difficult to predict precise impacts, a carbon price creates a broad signal affecting the decisions of most or all actors and can spur innovation toward lower greenhouse gas technologies and practices.

Various carbon pricing mechanisms can generate revenue that can be refunded to taxpayers, used as general revenues, used as an offset for other,

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less popular taxes, or used to support particular projects. Given the long history of using public support to encourage change in the agricultural sector, policymakers should consider using carbon fee revenues to support a reduction of agricultural greenhouse gas emissions and to support practices that increase soil carbon storage. Allowing agricultural producers to earn revenue by storing soil carbon or by increasing biomass, especially if such payments were in lieu of current federal farm subsidies, could be an effective way to significantly cut emissions quickly while increasing the carbon sink. We discuss the option of voluntary markets for agricultural carbon credits, in which there is growing interest, below in Chapter VII.

Most discussions of carbon pricing focus on fossil fuel emissions and thus assume a fee would be placed only on CO₂, and not on other greenhouse gases, thus the term “carbon pricing.” If this were the case, the impact on agriculture would be largely ineffective, as its primary climate change contribution is through nitrous oxide and methane. Thus, despite its name, all greenhouse gases should be included in the carbon pricing mechanisms to ensure that farmers do not shift practices to those with perhaps greater climate impact. For example, practices that use a bit more energy in order to rotate grazing animals or apply nitrogen fertilizer more precisely could be inappropriately discouraged if the price were not applied to all greenhouse gases. However, there are much greater difficulties in measuring precisely nitrous oxide and methane emissions, as well as greater implementation challenges (and opportunities). To date, there has been little study of this option, and we urge its close examination.

Given the difficulty of precisely measuring emissions of nitrous oxide and methane from agricultural operations, however, it would be difficult to have a precise fee applied to such emissions. Whether as an offset or within a cap or tax regime, it would be necessary to create methodologies that can model emissions based on practices, at least until precise measurement tools become available. Thus, the baseline for any greenhouse gas pricing system should be carefully examined.

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Key Recommendations

• EPA should promulgate regulatory programs focused on the largest industrial agriculture facilities, which produce the majority of pollution but represent only about 10% or less of total operations. These regulations should require or support the reduction of methane and nitrous oxide emissions, and could include increased support for practices known to reduce emissions, prohibitions on certain activities or practices known to emit significant amounts of greenhouse gases and pollution, or direct emission limitations.

• EPA should reform the renewable fuel standard to prohibit the conversion of nonagricultural land to grow renewable biomass and to ensure that the program only supports biofuels with substantial climate benefits. In particular, EPA must eliminate or reform the “aggregate compliance” approach to determining whether crops qualify as renewable biomass under the program and should instead ensure that biomass for renewable fuel is not grown on land cultivated after December 2007 and that the progrm does not directly or indirectly support land conversion.

• The Corporate Average Fuel Economy program provides a model for reducing nitrous oxide emissions in fertilizers by encouraging greater sale of enhanced-efficiency fertilizers, which can increase the portion of nitrogen taken up by plants, leaving less excess nitrogen available to convert to pollution.

• States and local governments should pass their own legislation designed to reduce emissions from agricultural operations. At a minimum, they should better target existing agricultural support and water pollution control programs to incentivize proven climate-friendly practices.

• Federal and state legislators should consider adopting a fertilizer fee that could both encourage more judicious use of fertilizer and help fund training on climate-friendly agricultural practices.

• States and local governments can also discourage carbon-intensive practices and encourage carbon-friendly practices through tax policy.

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• Since many CAFOs are not truly independent of the large-scale integrators with which they contract, the Small Business Administration should make those CAFOs ineligible for SBA loans or loan guarantees, or at a minimum ensure that the CAFOs adhere to SBA requirements for eligibility, including size and affiliation standards.

• Policymakers should help animal feeding operations transition to dry manure management and well-managed pasture-based systems.

• Policymakers should not subsidize anaerobic digesters, which tend to benefit large-scale massive factory farms rather than the public or the marginalized communities where they are often placed.

• Policymakers should consider using carbon fee revenues from state or federal greenhouse gas fee programs to support a reduction of agricultural greenhouse gas emissions and to support practices that increase soil carbon storage.

• All greenhouse gases should be included in carbon pricing mechanisms to ensure that farmers do not shift practices to those with greater climate impact.

_________________

1. EPA could use an emissions threshold, as is commonly done in other EPA regulatory programs, to target the largest facilities.

2. Calculated by the authors using data from NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS SERVICE, USDA, 2017 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, U.S. NATIONAL LEVEL DATA 9 tbl.2 (2019).

3. Id. at 124 tbl.72.

4. They receive 45% of farm subsidies and 55% of crop insurance payments. Id. at 94, 124 tbl.72.

5. Id. at 124 tbl.72.

6. 42 U.S.C. §§7401 et seq.; §7402.

7. Id. §7411(b)(1)(A).

8. Id. §7411(b)(1)(B).

9. Id. §7411(a)(1); see, e.g., Lignite Energy Council v. U.S. E.P.A., 198 F.3d 930, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

10. Id. §7411(d); The requirement applies to pollutants that are not covered with National Ambient Air Quality Standards or Hazardous Air Pollutants program. See also Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 US 410, n.7 (2011).

11. Humane Soc’y of the United States et al., Petition to List Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations Under Clean Air Act Section 111(b)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act, and to Promulgate Standards for Performance Under Clean Air Act Sections 111(b)(1)(B) and 111(d), at 3 (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.humane society.org/assets/pdfs/litigation/hsus-et-al-v-epa-cafo-caa-petition.pdf.

12. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS, 1990-2016 (Apr.

13. Letter from E. Scott Pruitt, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Tom Frantz, President, Association of Irritated Residents (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR2017-0638-0003.

14. Public Justice et al., Petition to List Industrial Dairy and Hog Operations as Source Categories Under Section 111(b)(1) (A) of the Clean Air Act (May 2021), https://food.publicjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2021/04/2021.04.06-Industrial-Dairy-and-Hog-CAA-111-Petition-FINAL.pdf; https://food.publicjustice.net/methane-petition-press-release/.

15. J. Merint, How Eating Seaweed Can Help Cows to Belch Less Methane, YALE ENV’T 360, (July 2, 2018), https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-eating-seaweed-can-help-cows-to-belch-less-methane.

16. K. Tomas, Manure Management for Climate Change Mitigation: Regulating CAFO Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 U. MIAMI L. REV. 2, 531, https://repository.law.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4568&context=umlr.

17. J. WIGHTMAN & P. WOODBURY, CORNELL UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK AGRICULTURE AND CLIMATE CHANGE: KEY OPPORTUNITIES FOR MITIGATION, RESILIENCE, AND ADAPTATION FINAL REPORT ON CARBON FARMING PROJECT FOR THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND MARKETS (May 1, 2020), https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.cornell.edu/dist/2/7553/files/2020/07/CarbonFarming_NYSAGM_FINAL_May2020.pdf.

18. EPA, How Does Anaerobic Digestion Work, https://www.epa.gov/agstar/how-does-anaerobicdigestion-work.

19. See supra Petition note 14, at 4.

20. 42 U.S.C. §7411(h)(1).

21. Standards of Performance for Coal Preparation and Processing Plants, 74 Fed. Reg. 51950, 51950, 51954 (Oct. 8, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).

22.

23. See 40 C.F.R. §122.23 (defining a subset of Animal Feeding Operations (AFOs) as Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) based on species-dependent thresholds).

24. 42 U.S.C. §7408(a). At present, EPA has designated six criteria air pollutants: ozone, particulate matter (PM), nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and lead. 40 C.F.R. §50.4-12.

25. Id. at §7408(a)(2).

26. 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(1).

27. ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY PROJECT, HAZARDOUS POLLUTION FROM FACTORY FARMS: AN ANALYSIS OF EPA’S NATIONAL AIR EMISSIONS MONITORING STUDY DATA 2 (2011), https://www.ciwf.org.uk/media/7436155/hazardouspollutionfromfactoryfarms.pdf. At present, EPA regulates airborne ammonia under CERCLA as a hazardous substance, and under EPCRA as an extremely hazardous substance. See 40 C.F.R. §§302.4 and 355 App. A.

28. Environmental Integrity Project et al., Petition for the Regulation of Ammonia as a Criteria Pollutant Under Clean Air Act Sections 108 and 109 (2011), https://web.archive.org/web/20120917005115/ http://environmentalintegrity.org/documents/PetitiontoListAmmoniaasaCleanAirActCriteriaPollutant.pdf.

29. Environmental Integrity Project et al. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency et al., No. 15-0139 (ABJ) (D.D.C., Dec. 1, 2015), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2015/20151201_docket-15-cv-139_memorandumopinion.pdf.

30. 42 U.S.C. §7412(b)(2). Only pollutants not designated under CAA §108 may be regulated under the HAP program. Id.

31. Id. §7412(a)(1).

32. Id. §7412(d)(3).

33. Id. §7412(d)(3)(A), (B).

34. Id. §7412(a)(2), §7412(d)(5).

35. See OIG, EPA, Report No. 17-P-0396, ELEVEN YEARS AFTER AGREEMENT, EPA HAS NOT DEVELOPED RELIABLE EMISSION ESTIMATION METHODS TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS COMPLY WITH CLEAN AIR ACT AND OTHER STATUTES 5 (2017).

36. Id. at 14.

37. 42 U.S.C. §7671n.

38. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, DRAWING DOWN N₂O TO PROTECT CLIMATE AND THE OZONE LAYER: A UNEP SYNTHESIS REPORT 7, (2013), https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/8489/-Drawing%20down%20N2O%20to%20protect%20climate%20 and%20the%20ozone%20layer_%20a%20UNEP%20synthesis%20report-2013UNEPN₂Oreport. pdf.

39. A.R. Ravishankara et al., Nitrous Oxide (N₂O): The Dominant Ozone-Depleting Substance Emitted in the 21st Century, 326 SCIENCE 123, 123-25 (2009).

40. A. McMichael at al., Stratospheric Ozone Depletion: Ultraviolet Radiation and Health, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND HEALTH (World Health Organization 2003), https://www.who.int/globalchange/publications/climchange.pdf.

41. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT SKIN CANCER 1-2 (2014), https://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/calls/prevent-skin-cancer/call-to-action-prevent-skin-cancer.pdf.

42. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF OZONE DEPLETION AND ITS INTERACTIONS WITH CLIMATE CHANGE: 2014 ASSESSMENT 57-60 (2014), https://ozone.unep.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/eeap_report_2014.pdf.

43. Id. at 62.

44. EPA, Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Nitrous Oxide Emissions, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases#nitrous-oxide.

45. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2016, at 5-21, 5-22 (2018) (EPA 430-R18-003).

46. 42 U.S.C. §7411(h)(1).

47. U. Sehy et al., Nitrous Oxide Fluxes From Maize Fields: Relationship to Yield, Site-Specific Fertilization, and Soil Conditions, Agriculture, 99 ECOSYSTEMS & ENV’T 97 (2003).

48. G. Robertson & P. Vitousek, Nitrogen in Agriculture: Balancing the Cost of an Essential Resource, 34 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 111 (2009).

49. 33 U.S.C. §1362(14).

50. Id.

51. Id. §1342.

52. 40 C.F.R. §123.25(a) (2020).

53. 33 U.S.C. §1329; 40 C.F.R. §130.6.

54. D. BRUCE HARRIS ET AL., EPA, AMMONIA EMISSION FACTORS FROM SWINE FINISHING OPERATIONS 1 (2001).

55. 42 U.S.C. §§9603(a), 11004.

56. 40 C.F.R. §§302.6(e)(3); 355.31(g), (h) (2016).

57. Waterkeeper Alliance v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 853 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

58. See Fair Agricultural Reporting Method (FARM) Act, 42 U.S.C. §9603.

59. EPA, CERCLA and EPCRA Reporting Requirements for Releases of Hazardous Substances From Animal Waste at Farms, https://www.epa.gov/epcra/cercla-and-epcra-reporting-requirements-air-releaseshazardous-substances-animal-waste-farms (last updated June 13, 2019). But see Memorandum From the Congressional Research Service to Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (Mar. 13, 2018) (on file with authors) (explaining that the CERCLA exemption does not affect EPCRA reporting requirements). Citizens groups challenged this rule in Rural Empowerment Ass’n for Community Help v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, No. 1:18-cv-02260-TJK (D.D.C.).

60. EPA estimated that 33,000 facilities were exempted by its rule from CERCLA reporting. See EPA, Final Economic Analysisfor CERCLA/EPCRA ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTING EXEMPTIONFOR AIR RELEASES OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES FROM ANIMAL WASTE AT FARMS (EPA-HQ-SFUND-2007-0469-1361) (Dec. 18, 2008), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-SFUND-2007-0469-1361.

61. 42 U.S.C. §6901.

62. Community Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t, Inc. v. Cow Palace LLC, 80 F. Supp. 3d 1180 (E.D. Wash. 2015). See Caroline Simson, Wash. Dairy Settles Enviros’ Manure Contamination Suit, LAW360, May 12, 2015, https://www.law360.com/articles/654586.

63. This figure was estimated for marketing year 2015/2016 as the proportion of 88 million acres planted to corn equal to the proportion of corn production used for ethanol for fuel. In that year, 43% of the corn supply was used for ethanol for fuel, and 88% of the corn supply was produced in the same year (88 million ? 0.43 ? 0.88 = 33 million). All data were obtained from USDA ERS, Feed Grains: Yearbook Tables, https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/feed-grains-database/feed-grains-yearbooktables (last updated Oct. 15, 2020).

64. Joseph Fargione et al., Land Clearing and the Biofuel Carbon Debt, 319 SCIENCE 1235, 1235 (2008).

65. 42 U.S.C. §7545.

66. 40 C.F.R. §80.1454(g) (2016).

67. Christopher K. Wright, Recent Grassland Losses Are Concentrated Around U.S. Ethanol Refineries, 12 ENV’T RES. LETTERS 1 (2017); U.S. EPA, BIOFUELS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SECOND TRIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 37 (EPA-HQ-OAR-2018-0167-1334) (June 2018).

68. Tyler Lark et al., Cropland Expansion Outpaces Agricultural and Biofuel Policies in the United States, 10 ENV’T RES. LETTERS 1, 5 (2015).

69. WWF, 2016 PLOWPRINT REPORT 2 (2016).

70. David S. Kanter & Timothy D. Searchinger, A Technology-Forcing Approach to Reduce Nitrogen Pollution, 1 NATURE SUSTAINABILITY 544, 544 (2018).

71. See supra Chapter IV.A.1; see also id.

72. Id.

73. Kanter & Searchinger, supra note 70, at 548.

74. Id. at 548-49.

75. Id. at 548.

76. Id. at 549.

77. See Ch. IV.A.1.

78. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §39730 (West 2017).

79. Id. §39730.5.

80. CARB, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PROPOSED SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANT REDUCTION STRATEGY 7 (2016).

81. See generally 2016 Minn. Sess. Law ch. 85, S.F. No. 2503 (to be codified at scattered sections of MINN. STAT. ANN. chs. 103A-114B).

82. Tax incentives for climate-friendly practices should be considered with caution since tax expenditures often erode support for direct government action on the issues they are designed to address. SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INDIVISIBLE GOVERNMENT POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011).

83. A 2012 report commissioned by the California Water Resources Control Board examining nitrate in California’s drinking water found that a fee on fertilizer equal to the state’s sales tax rate of 7.2% would raise $28 million in revenue annually and reduce nitrogen application by 1.6%. Fertilizer sales are currently exempt from California’s sales tax. THOMAS HARTER ET AL., CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, ADDRESSING NITRATE IN CALIFORNIA’S DRINKING WATER 33 (2012).

84. Sweden’s tax on synthetic fertilizer, which lasted from 1984 to 2010, is estimated to have reduced the application of synthetic nitrogen fertilizers by only 2%. The estimated price elasticity of the average nitrogen application rate varied by crop, but it was estimated to have ranged from -0.3 to -0.5, meaning that for every 1% increase in the price of synthetic fertilizers, the application rate only dropped 0.3%-0.5%. ANNE PRESTVIK ET AL., NORDEN, AGRICULTURE AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES: POLICIES FOR SUSTAINABILITY AND GREEN GROWTH 72 (2013).

85. After fertilizer prices rose in 2006, 32% of surveyed farmers in the United States reported reducing their fertilizer use. JAYSON BECKMAN ET AL., USDA, AGRICULTURE’S SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR ENERGY AND ENERGY PRODUCTS 17 (2013) (EIB-112).

86. James Williamson, The Role of Information and Prices in the Nitrogen Fertilizer Management Decision: New Evidence From the Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 36 J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 552, 568 (2011).

87. A total of 12,840,000 tons of nitrogen fertilizer were applied in the United States in 2011. ERS, USDA, U.S. CONSUMPTION OF NITROGEN, PHOSPHATE, AND POTASH, 1960-2011, at 1 tbl.1 (2013).

88. Nitrogen fertilizer prices have ranged from $351 to $847 per ton in recent years. Id.

89. See, e.g., Ula Chrobak, The Inconvenient Truth About Burger King’s “Reduced Methane’’ Whopper, POPULAR SCI., July 20, 2020, https://www.popsci.com/story/environment/burger-king-reducedmethane-whopper-debunk/.

90. See, e.g., Aerin Einstein-Curtis, USDA: As Livestock Producers Expand, They Buy Rather Than Grow Feed, FEEDNAVIGATOR, Mar. 28, 2018, https://www.feednavigator.com/Article/2018/03/28/USDA-As-livestock-producers-expand-they-buy-rather-than-grow-feed.

91. See NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS SERVICE, USDA, 2017 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, U.S. NATIONAL LEVEL DATA 202 tbl.75 (2019).

92. Id. at 207 tbl.75.

93. See supra Chapter II; see also, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §7-36-20 (2016). For a complete list, see Lincoln Institute of Land Policy & George Washington Institute of Public Policy, Significant Features of the PropertyTax—TaxTreatment of Agricultural Property, https://www.lincolninst.edu/pt-br/research-data/data-toolkits/signifi es-property-tax/access-property-tax-database/tax-treatment-agriculturalproperty (last visited Nov. 12, 2020).

94. CLARK ISRAELSEN ET AL., UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY COOPERATIVE EXTENSION, UTAH FARMLAND ASSESSMENT ACT (2009).

95. Many states have similar tax reduction programs for lands held for forestry. See JANE MALME, PREFERENTIAL PROPERTY TAX TREATMENT OF LAND 9-11 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Working Paper Product Code No. WP93JM1, 1993). Originally designed to encourage forest products industries, these programs should also be redesigned to prioritize carbon-friendly forestry programs and to require carbon-friendly core practices.

96. In New York, Real Property Tax Law §480-a provides the existing tax reduction. In the 2017 State of the State report, Governor Cuomo proposed enactment of a §480-b to allow for expanded eligibility for tax reductions. GOVERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO, 2017 STATE OF THE STATE 240 (2017). The amendment did not pass in 2017 or 2018. This idea was recently supported by an advisory panel convened to make recommendations on how New York can achieve its climate goals. See Agriculture and Forestry Advisory Panel, New York Climate Action Council, Emissions Reduction and Carbon Sequestration Recommendations (Apr. 2021), https://climate.ny.gov/Climate-Action-Council/Meetings-and-Materials.

97. I.R.C. §170(b)(1)(E) (2016).

98. Id. §170(b)(1)(E)(iv).

99. Gerald Korngold, Government Conservation Easements: A Means to Advance Efficiency, Freedom From Coercion, Flexibility, and Democracy, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 467, 471 (2013).

100. JEFFREY O. SUNDBERG, STATE INCOME TAX CREDITS FOR CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: DO ADDITIONAL CREDITS CREATE ADDITIONAL VALUE? 3 (Lincoln Land Institute Working Paper No. WP11JSS1, 2011).

101. Land Trust Alliance, Income Tax Incentives for Land Conservation, https://www.landtrustalliance.org/topics/taxes/income-tax-incentives-land-conservation (last visited Nov. 12, 2020).

102. I.R.C. §170(h)(4)(A) (2016).

103. Id.

104. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, CONSERVATION EASEMENT AUDIT TECHNIQUES GUIDE 18 (2016).

105. SBA, FY 2020 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 2-3 (2020).

106. Id. at 27.

107. 13 C.F.R. §121.201.

108. OIG, SBA, EVALUATION OF SBA 7(A) LOANS MADE TO POULTRY FARMERS 7-9 (2018).

109. Id. at 2.

110. In one such case, Arkansas paid an SBA-financed hog CAFO $6.2 million to close after it was found to pose a threat to the Buffalo River watershed. Emily Walkenhorst, C&H Hog Farms Takes State Buyout; $6.2M Deal Cut to Preserve Buffalo River, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, June 14, 2019, https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2019/jun/14/c-h-hog-farms-takes-state-buyout-201906/. Local conservation and civic groups had strongly opposed the SBA loan guarantee for the CAFO, arguing that the agency’s environmental assessment of the loan ignored critical information. Letter From the Buffalo River Watershed Alliance et al., to Val Dolcini, Administrator, FSA, and Maria Contreras-Sweet, Administrator, SBA (Jan. 29, 2016) (on file with authors).

111. Catherine Boudreau, Feds Hit Brakes on Loans to Big Farms, POLITICO, Oct. 24, 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/slow-loans-over-green-woes-put-cafos-in-limbo-230234.

112. See supra Chapter II.

113. The U.S. Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory estimates that animal manure generates 24% of the methane suitable for biogas in the United States. NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ENERGY ANALYSIS: BIOGAS POTENTIAL IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2013).

114. See EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2017, at 5-11 tbl.5-7 (2019) (EPA 430-P-19-001). This share is likely even higher since EPA calculates the global warming potential of methane using an outdated formula, which understates methane’s potency. Supra Chapter III.

115. See, e.g., Press Release, Dominion Energy, Dominion Energy and Vanguard Renewables Form Strategic Partnership to Develop First Nationwide Network of Dairy Waste-to Energy Projects (Dec. 11, 2019) (on file with author).

116. Dominion Energy, Natural Gas Storage Systems, https://www.dominionenergy.com/our-company/moving-energy/natural-gas-storage-systems (last visited Jan. 14, 2020).

117. Press Release, Dominion Energy, supra note 115.

118. Mark Lauer et al., Making Money FromWaste: The EconomicViability of Producing Biogas and Biomethane in the Idaho Dairy Industry, 222 APPLIED ENERGY 621, 632 (2018).

119. See NASS, supra note 2, at 23 tbl.18.

120. Cortney Cowley & B. Wade Brorsen, Anaerobic Digester Production and Cost Functions, 152 Ecological Econ. 347, 355-56 (2018).

121. See, e.g., David Kesmodel, Energy Prices Steer Farmers Away From Power Generators, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2016 (discussing the high costs of manure-to-energy digester), https://www.wsj.com/articles/energy-prices-steer-farmers-away-from-power-generators-1455814921. A 2011 study found that electricity costs for anaerobic digesters using manure were between $0.128 per kilowatt hour (/kWh) and $0.204/kWh. David P.M. Zaks et al., The Contribution of Anaerobic Digesters to Emissions Mitigation and Electricity Generation Under U.S. Climate Policy, 45 ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 6735, 6738 (2011). The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that other forms of renewable energy have costs ranging from $0.038/kWh to $0.121/kWh. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, LEVELIZED COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 8 tbl.1b (2020).

122. David Roberts, The False Promise of “Renewable Natural Gas,” Vox, Feb. 20, 2020, https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/2/14/21131109/california-natural-gas-renewable-socalgas.

123. MUBARAK HAMED ET AL., UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI—COLUMBIA, REPORT NO. R-99-02, THE IMPACTS OF ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS ON RURAL LAND VALUES 8 (1999).

124. See EPA, AgSTAR—Livestock Anaerobic Digester Database, https://www.epa.gov/agstar/livestockanaerobic-digester-database (last updated Aug. 16, 2020).

125. U.S. Census Bureau, Pixley CDP, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/profile?g=1600000US0657512 (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).

126. U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey: Data Profiles, https://www.census.gov/acs/www/data/data-tables-and-tools/data-profiles/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2020).

127. Roberts, supra note 122.

128. Most swine and poultry CAFOs are operated under a contract system in which the grower must use material such as feed provided by the integrator. Thus, their contribution to the local economy is limited.

129. NRCS, USDA, CONSERVATION PRACTICE STANDARD: ANAEROBIC DIGESTER, CODE 366 (2017) (366-CPS-1).

130. Jim Eichstadt, Clear Horizons Manure Digester: Public Funds Wasted on Huge Fiasco, MILKWEED, Jan. 2015, at 9.

131. Jacy Marmaduke, Waste-to-Energy Facility Brings Smelly Complications, COLORADOAN, Jan. 15, 2017, https://www.coloradoan.com/story/news/2017/01/16/waste--energy-facility-brings-smellycomplications/96538924/.

132. Grace Hood, Fed Up With the Smell, Neighbors Want the Weld County Biogas Project Shut Down, CPR NEWS, Dec. 16, 2016, https://www.cpr.org/2016/12/16/fed-up-with-the-smell-neighbors-wantthe-weld-county-biogas-project-shut-down/.

133. Phil Dawson, Digester Told to Cover Smelly Lagoons in Holton, 13 ON YOUR SIDE, Aug. 16, 2019, https://www.wzzm13.com/article/news/digester-told-to-cover-smelly-lagoons-in-holton/69d7715bd8-9041-4c6d-b2be-4dcb95fc77f0; Darren Cunningham, Lagoons Leave “Stench” in Surrounding Communities, Meeting Planned, Fox 17, Aug. 13, 2019, https://www.fox17online.com/2019/08/13/lagoons-leave-stench-in-surrounding-communities-meeting-planned/.

134. Jetske Wauran, New Odor and Sewage Complaints About Big Ox Energy, SIOUXLAND NEWS, June 14, 2018, https://siouxlandnews.com/news/local/new-odor-and-sewage-complaints-about-big-ox-energy.

135. Ian Richardson, Odors, Citations Association With Other Big Ox Facilities, Including Riceville, GLOBE GAZETTE, Oct. 10, 2018, https://globegazette.com/news/iowa/odors-citations-associated-with-otherbig-ox-facilities-including-riceville/article_35d8647a-41f8-5594-b851-2571ffea4e87.html.

136. Jessica McKenzie, The Misbegotten Promise of Anaerobic Digesters, COUNTER, Dec. 3, 2019, https://thecounter.org/misbegotten-promise-anaerobic-digesters-cafo/.

137. NRCS, USDA, TECHNICAL NOTE NO. 1, PROFITABLE GRAZING-BASED DAIRY SYSTEMS 8-10 (2017).

138. See Guri Bang et al., California’s Cap-and-Trade System: Diffusion and Lessons, 17 GLOBAL ENV’T POL. 12, 18-21 (2017), for a comparison of California’s cap-and-trade system and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.

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