Depoliticization

Although the concept of depoliticization has existed as an important theme in international politics, development studies, and political theory for some time, in recent years it has become a significant issue for scholars interested in governance and the state (Burnham 2001).

What governs our approach is a clear desire to place power where it should be: increasingly not with politicians, but with those best fitted in different ways to deploy it. Interest rates are not set by politicians in the Treasury but by the Bank of England. Minimum wages are not determined in the DTI, but by the Low Pay Commission. Membership of the House of Lords will be determined not in Downing Street but in an independent Appointments Commission. This depoliticizing of key decision-making is a vital element in bringing power closer to the people. (Falconer 2003)

Depoliticization refers to an attempt to sever political connections, or as Burnham (2001: 128) defines it: ‘the process of placing at one remove the political character of decision-making’. Buller and Flinders (2005) have sought to distinguish between different types of depoliticization tactics and have outlined three distinct yet inter-dependent forms (see Table 12.3).

Each of these depoliticization techniques raises fundamental questions about the nature, role, capacity and structure of modern states. Moreover, the techniques should not be viewed in isolation; it is common for a range of depoliticization measures to be employed within the same policy sphere in a complementary manner.

More broadly, the logic of depoliticization appears to have been accepted not only within the governing mentality of the political elite of many nation

Table 12.3 Depoliticization tactics

states but also within the minds of the public. As Lord Dahrendorf noted in his afterword to Disaffected Democracies’ (Pharr and Putnam 2000: 312):

Ostensibly non-political institutions are more acceptable to many citizens than explicitly political ones. There is consequently much support for independent central banks... At the same time there is little resistance to the creation of ever more ‘quangos’ or organizations that look non­governmental while in fact serving governmental functions.

Arguably the most common form of depoliticization is institutional and involves the creation of para-statal bodies to which specific policy, decision­making or regulatory powers are delegated. The theoretical rationale is that politicians are rational self-interested utility maximizers, who may adopt irrational policies for short-term political gains, the mere potential of which is said to undermine both policy credibility and the commitment of private actors. However, the adoption of such a theoretical position to legitimate the transfer of functions to insulated bodies largely beyond the scope of parliamentary politics arguably needs to be substantiated with empirical evidence to legitimize the democratic costs of such a reform.

Neither in the UK nor in the Netherlands, nor apparently in any other country has there been any scientific study that shows that the conver­sion from a division of a ministry to an autonomous agency or quangos consistently produces enhancements in efficiency or effectiveness.

The creation of para-statals can arguably only be justified in exceptional circumstances, as the democratic implications are far-reaching. As Shapiro (1997: 289) notes, ‘The creation of such an “apolitical” independent agency is rather like constitutionally guaranteeing rights. It is the announcement by the demos that it does not trust itself and wishes to put certain policy questions beyond its own reach.’ There is also a clear link between depolit­icization and complexity and accountability. The current vogue towards depoliticization has contributed to the creation of an increasingly complex state structure. Moreover, in terms of accountability it is possible to suggest that depoliticization is a strategy that can be used to abdicate political responsibility for making highly emotive value-based judgements in policy sectors that are devoid of historical precedent or societal accord. The danger is that a disconnection between the state and politics may occur through the delegation of responsibilities and the rhetorical veneer of depoliticization. It is in this vein that Poggi (1990: 192) has warned against ‘the neutralization of democratic politics and its replacement by bureaucratic politics... invisible politics’ and Mouffe (2000) has similarly noted the existence of a ‘democratic paradox’ stemming from a belief that reducing the role of elected politicians can enhance the legitimacy of the decision-making process. On the contrary, Mouffe argues that depoliticization may augment public confusion about where responsibility lies and how to play a role in the policy-making process and that visible arenas of political contestation are a vital element of a modern and healthy democracy without which the public may withdraw, disaffected, from politics and adopt less constructive forms of expression.

There are also a number of practical issues that deserve brief comment. First, although politicians may claim an organization operates beyond direct political control it would be naive to assume the organization has been depoliticized or that influence cannot operate via a number of informal channels. The international comparative research of the COBRA network based at the Catholic University of Leuven into autonomy and control in the public sector has discovered a frequent discrepancy between the autonomy some delegated organizations are supposed to enjoy in theory compared to their actual autonomy. This ‘rhetoric-reality gap’ has been evident in rela­tion to a number of theoretically depoliticized organisations. For example, the British Broadcasting Corporation was established as a public corpora­tion on the basis that there was a need to insulate the organization from political influence and manipulation. However, the memoirs of the former Director General, Greg Dyke, highlight the extent of informal pressure placed on the corporation during 2003 and 2004 by the Prime Minister’s Director of Communications and other officials (see Dyke 2004).

The issue of informal political control and influence exposes a deeper and more fundamental problem with the notion of depoliticization vis-à-vis the state - an issue is made no less political by delegating responsibility for that area of policy to an appointed arm’s-length body. While politicians may seek to insulate certain issues from the political domain, it is unlikely that the wider public of that polity will accept that a certain issue is no longer ‘political’ - decisions about interest rates, human cloning or the safety of food remain intensely political decisions. Depoliticization is, therefore, something of a misnomer for a process that might more accurately be referred to as arena­shifting: the politics remains but the decision-making arena changes.

The degree of true ‘depoliticization’ is also questionable at the empirical as well as conceptual level; not only do ‘depoliticized’ bodies operate within a narrow and prescriptive policy framework set by ministers but their members are also generally appointed and funded by ministers. Concerns about depoliticization and the increasing delegation of responsi­bilities to arm’s-length bodies and 3Ps are essentially debates about the (re)distribution of power within evolving state projects: delegation is a synonym for the transfer of power. Majone (2002: 322) notes, ‘the debate about the delegation of powers is really a debate about the fundamental political organization of the polity, rather than merely an issue of political and administrative efficiency’. These wider issues of the role, structure and responsibilities of evolving state projects and particularly in relation to organizations on the fringe or periphery, will be the topic of the next and concluding section.