Coordination asa Rationalised Myth

Early theoretical propositions of sociological institutionalism have been developed in an influential article of John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan (1977). The proponents of the Stanford School start from the assumption that institutions are cultural accounts or rules of how the social world works (Scott 1995, 33, 141-2).

In modern society, many products, services, management instruments, and programs have acquired a rule-like status in social thought and behaviour. As classifications built into society, they are templates and prefabricated formulae of organising. Hence, they have become institutional rules or ‘rationalised myths’ in the sense of exemplary models (Eliade 1963, 1). Some of these myths, such as expertise, universalism, restitution, or contract, are very generalised, while others are more specific and may, for instance, describe a particular organisational practice. These myths are imputed with legitimacy based on the assumption that they are rationally effective. Thus, the term myth is not to be understood as a sacred narrative or false belief clung to against all evidence. It is rather a manifestation of ‘widespread understandings of social reality’ (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 343). These understandings may take the form of organisational rituals or rules that are taken for granted and supported by public opinion, political agendas, the law, or social prestige (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 341). They are uncontested truths but are also grounded in common expectations. ‘[T]he basic “myths” of society operate primarily by establishing beliefs about what others think and expectations about how others will behave’ (Jepperson 2002, 232). In modern society, increasing numbers of rationalised myths emerge and prevail (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 343-4, 347).³

The central assumption of Meyer and Rowan is that rationalised myths which are embedded within an institutional environment have a significant impact on organisations.

organisations incorporate the myths of their environment in order to gain legitimacy, resources, and stability, with the ultimate goal of organisational success and survival. Hence, the techniques, programs, and procedures of particular organisations are often only manifestations of wider institutional rules which have been adapted for practical purposes (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 340, 343). To give an illustration: institutions define what schools, firms, or hospitals are to look like and what they are to do (Scott and Meyer 1994, 3). Thus, schools as organisations exist not because of their particular effectiveness but because of conformity with institutionalised myths in the wider society, such as the basic idea of what a school is, what a grade is, or what mathematics is (Jepperson 2002, 234).

Moreover, myths have two effects: first, they define new domains of rationalised activity or organising situations, and they indicate the means for handling them in a rational way. In doing so, rationalised myths ‘identify various social purposes as technical ones and specify in a rule-like way the appropriate means to pursue these technical purposes rationally’ (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 343-4). Thus, rationalised myths suggest suitable procedures in order to pursue goals that are often pseudo-technical. Second, myths give rise to practices of loose coupling. Organisations must support the socially legitimated myths but they also have to consider problems of practical activity or efficiency. When these two requirements are in conflict with each other, organisations can create gaps between their formal structures and actual work activity. Loose coupling means maintaining legitimate ceremonial rules while everyday activities vary in response to other considerations (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 356-60).

These notions are also applicable to the subject of International Relations and more specifically to the context of intervention, where the proliferation of actors has led to a plethora of coexisting, overlapping, and interconnected organisations.

Theoretically, the interactions of these organisations can be conceptualised according to two basic processes, namely opposition and cooperation (Dillman 1969, 17). Opposition, defined as the struggle of units against each other for a good, goal, or value, can take on different forms such as competition, rivalry, or conflict. In contrast, cooperation can be understood as the joint striving of units in pursuit of the same good, goal, or value (Dillman 1969, 17-20). One special form of cooperation is coordination. These two types of interactions are similar to each other but need to be distinguished. Cooperation denotes the collective and voluntary efforts of actors who are willing to associate to achieve specific objectives. The notion of coordination builds on the idea of cooperation but in addition refers to conscious and constant efforts in achieving these objectives. Thus, the principle of coordination can be regarded as a more inclusive form of cooperation. Coordination involves executive management, concerted action, and deliberate harmonisation in order to bring together the activities of disparate actors.

In international politics, forms of intervention comprise the whole range of possible inter-organisational relations. Among the multitude of IOs, NGOs, and state agencies, cooperative and non-cooperative forms of interactions are equally common. However, the principle of coordination has become the dominant prescription and representation of what these interactions should look like. Coordination is seen by a wide range of actors across different policy fields as the exemplary model of inter- organisational relations. Thus, the principle of coordination can be characterised as an institutional rule which functions as rationalised myth. Coordination has become a rationalised myth in the sense of an uncontested and unquestioned organisational formula that is taken for granted and grounded in common beliefs. The basic assertion of the institutional rule is that coordination among the ever-increasing number of actors will make intervention more rationally effective and operationally efficient.

It is thus imputed with legitimacy and seen as fundamental for achieving broader goals such as enhancing aid, development, or peace. Like other policy myths, this is presented as a statement of fact without argument (Yanow 1992, 414).

As a legitimating narrative, the rationalised myth is incorporated into official declarations and statements. Moreover, as myths define new organising situations and suggest appropriate procedures to deal with them rationally, the lack of coordination is primarily tackled in a technocratic way, namely by the creation of a specialised bureaucracy tasked with coordination. However, the myth of coordination also gives rise to loose coupling. The principle of coordination is often adopted only ritually by organisations while the practice of coordination diverges in response to disguised political conflicts underlying the coordination problem. Thus, coordination in intervention features elements of organised hypocrisy, which tends to deny the political dimension of the coordination problem (cf. Brunsson 1989; Lipson 2007; Weaver 2008). The next section provides empirical evidence for these processes.

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Source: Bliesemann de Guevara Berit. Myth and Narrative in International Politics. Palgrave Macmillan,2016. — 329 p.. 2016

Coordination asa Rationalised Myth

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