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Transactional Practices as Levers of Legal Evolution

From its earliest history Roman law has allowed parties to shape the content of their legal relationships themselves (stipulatio, mancipatio). In practice, this ‘private self-shaping' would—certainly in the Republic—be carried out by the jurists (originally: the priests).

They would have drafted stipulationes and mancipationes which reflected the economic or other needs (e.g., inheritance planning) of transacting parties. The jurists will also have been instrumental in accommodating Greek-Hellenistic transactional practices into the Roman legal system. The outcome of evolutionary culling processes working on transactional practices may have influenced which practices would be subject to litigation and had the potential of triggering legal change. Some transac­tional practices became so common that they were deemed to be agreed and sometimes even evolved into rules of objective law (e.g., a licence to sell). Transactional practices were ‘levers of legal evolution'.[155] This is true for large areas of Roman private law, but there is no other legal institution than pignus and hypotheca where the formative effect of legal practice can be so clearly observed.[156] The structural coupling between law and economy through the pledge agreement (conventio pignoris) was what made the evolution of pignus and hypotheca into highly versatile security interests possible.[157]

Private self-shaping in Roman law

Where in the fifth century bc the law of the Twelve Tables was enacted, the legal institutions mentioned therein were already existing ones. They were not created by the Roman legislator, but were the product of civil and com­mercial practices of the preceding centuries. The law of the Twelve Tables did not introduce these legal institutions, but assumes their pre-existence.5 In fact, archaic Roman law knew only two types of legal transactions (negotia): stipulatio and mancipatio.

They could be enforced with the legis actio sacramenti in personam (stipulatio) and the legis actio sacramenti in rem (mancipatio), respectively. This scantiness and formality of legal institutions did not entail that archaic law lacked flexibility.[158] The structure of these negotia allowed individuals to use them for many different purposes. Thus the con­tract of stipulatio was ‘an empty vessel that could be filled with every content’.[159] [160] Provided that the parties used the prescribed question-and-answer format, they could basically make any lawful agreement a valid and enforceable con­tract. This substantial flexibility (adaptability) must have been the reason for the longevity of the stipulatio, which continued to be used by Romans until well after the classical period. Its ancient origin did not detract from (or per­haps even contributed to) its popularity among the Romans of the Principate.

But also the mancipatio, usually associated with legal areas (law of prop­erty, family law) where party autonomy does not prevail, gave much room to transacting parties to determine themselves the content of their legal relation­ship. The law of the Twelve Tables (tab. VI 1) provided: ‘cum nexum faciet mancipiumque, uti lingua nuncupassit, ita ius esto’.s This can be read as a legis­lative authorization for private ‘self-shaping’.[161] The declarations pronounced during the mancipatio ceremony (nuncupationes) made it so versatile.[162] [163] They enabled jurists to design variations of the original mancipatio, in order to meet new demands from society. The mancipatio could be used not only as a genuine sale but also for many other purposes. The mancipatio came to be used, often in combination with fiducia, for the formal release of debts (solutio per aes et libram), marriage (co-emptio), testament (mancipatio familiae), release from paternal power (emancipatio), and adoption (adoptio).n Most importantly, the mancipatio evolved into a general method of conveyance for res mancipi and became an essential component for the granting of security by way of fiducia cum creditore.

The pactum fiduciae would enable the parties to further specify the legal consequences of the fiduciary transfer (e.g., creditor’s right of sale coupled with a duty to return any surplus)?2 In Cato’s pledge templates the conventio pignoris had a similar function for pignus,13 a function which it continued to have dur­ing the entire classical period?4

Standard form contracts

In a time when there was hardly any dispositive law supplementing the terms of the parties' contracts, there was much room for party autonomy, allowing transacting parties themselves to determine the substance of their legal rela­tionships. This is why transaction templates providing model documents for individual legal transactions were so important, not only in the time they were actually used by transacting parties but later also for the jurists as a treasure trove for designing dispositive rules.[164] In the Roman Empire (and beyond) contract templates and standard form contractual clauses were widespread in space and show a large degree of continuity in timed[165] As early as the time of the Republic, template collections circulated, often stemming from the Greek world. From the republican period we have the standard form pledging clauses recommended by Cato, which may have been derived from an earlier collection of templates possibly of Greek origin?[166] The loan and pledge agreements, auction announcements, and procedural documents in the Sulpicii archive were clearly based on standard form templates drafted by local jurists or copied from Rome or elsewhere?[167] Contractual licences to sell are common throughout the whole of the classical period in virtually identi­cal format.1[168] Documents recording fiducia cum creditore from Campania (Pompeii, Herculaneum, Puteoli) and Baetica (Spain) show strong simil ar- ities in structure and content. The Formula Baetica is particularly interesting. The text of this mancipatio fidi fiduciae causa’ and the accompanying pactum fiduciae is engraved on a bronze tablet.[169] This bronze tablet was probably affixed to a wall of the office of a professional scribe or banker and must have served as a template for specific transfers of ownership by way of security?i It contained fictitious names of the parties and the land transferred as collateral and included several optional clauses (e.g., on secured debts) to adapt it to individual transactions.

In 1885, an engraved stone was found in Rome near the Porta Salaria—the so-called lex horreorum Caesaris—which provides that all the goods stored by customers in the warehouse shall be pledged to the horrearius in order to secure payment of the storage fees.22 Innumerable indi­vidual rights of pledge will have been created pursuant to these ‘general terms and conditions’. Also in the Digest we find evidence of persistent transactional practices relating to secured credit. Thus Pomponius refers to the clause ‘com­monly added to pledges’ that the debtor shall be liable for any deficit in the sale proceeds of the pledged property.[170] In his commentary on the formula hypothecaria Gaius refers to ‘the clause commonly inserted in deeds’ that beside the property specially hypothecated the debtor’s present and future remaining assets will also be charged?[171] The same jurist mentions the wide­spread practice of debtors making declarations to creditors on whether the pledged property was already charged?[172] There is an opinion from Ulpian on the ‘every day’ (‘cottidie’) practice of constructing non-possessory charges by using precarium[173] In a constitution by Alexander Severus from ad 223, the licence to sell is referred to as a ‘common pact’ (‘pactum vulgare').[174] [175] [176] From the classical period many more examples can be given, such as transactional practices in relation to multiple pledges and to the executing creditor’s exclu­sion of liability for eviction?8

Evolution of transactional practices

In particular, standard form contracts and standard clauses can be subject to evolutionary processes: there may be different versions of templates circulat­ing for particular types of legal transactions (variation), certain versions may be preferred over others by transacting parties (selection) and templates often show a large degree of continuity (stabilization). My conjecture is that in pri­vate law an important evolutionary force is that people tend to select those transactional practices that they (or their legal advisers) think best suit their needs.

Where those choices are made rationally?9 those transactional prac­tices which are better adapted to their socio-economic environment are most likely to be reproduced. In this sense a kind of ‘natural’ selection (or biased transmission) takes place?0 When, however, certain transactional practices are no longer used in practice, they will no longer provide input to the legal system, which may result in the corresponding legal rules or institutions becoming obsolete. In evolutionary theory this is called ‘subset selection’?1 the less adapted species becomes extinct.[177] [178] Transactional practices may thus be subject to evolutionary culling processes, whose outcomes may determine which practices will be subject to litigation (or sometimes legislation) and can trigger legal change. From a causational perspective it may look as if selection completely takes place in the economic environment of the legal system. The proper analysis is, however, that ultimately the legislator or judicial author­ities (in Rome: praetor, imperial chancery, jurisprudence) select which legal variants will count as law.

What mechanisms exactly cause certain transactional practices to be trans­mitted more frequently than others? The research of Boyd and Richerson and others has shown that people's choices to prefer one cultural element over the other often follow certain identifiable patterns. The concept of what they call ‘biases' can be usefully applied to the transmission of legal variants in the form of transactional practices. Direct bias means that certain authorities function as ‘an information cost-saving device who have great influence on others' cultural beliefs', such as priests.33 This form of bias must have been instrumental for the evolution of Roman law. Certainly in the Republic private individuals would turn to the jurists in order to ask for advice on how to draft contracts, wills, and other legal transactions.

There is content-based bias where the choice for a particular cultural variant is made ‘because of the inherent qual­ities and content of this variant'?[179] Throughout the classical period transacting parties—often advised (or using templates designed) by jurists—would prefer contractual clauses which best suited their financial or commercial needs. Mathematical models of social evolution demonstrate that when it is difficult to determine which variant is the best, ‘selection favors heavy reliance on imi­tating others?[180] This is model-based bias (imitation).[181] For instance, templates used by reputable bankers may have been copied by other lenders in order to document their credit transactions. Also from a transaction costs perspective imitation can be an effective strategy; rather than spending money on legal advisers, one simply copies templates designed by (or at the expense of) others. A similar bias is frequency dependence bias, which also involves imita­tion. ‘Translated' to the legal domain this bias means that individuals tend to choose those transactional practices which the majority of people around them employ.[182] Again this saves on information costs: others have already tested the new legal variant and considered it useful/[183] It could also lower bar­gaining costs.

From express to implied term to statutory rule

One important economic function of the law is ‘to leave ultimate economic decisions to the parties, but to create institutions that clarify their choices, especially to default rules applicable when the express contract is silent/[184] These supplemental (dispositive) rules will often lower transaction costs as they will not have to be negotiated by the parties.[185] [186] [187] [188] [189] Supplemental legal rules ideally reflect what economically rational parties would have agreed had they chosen to write their intentions down in their contract. This is precisely what happened in the Roman law of secured transactions: contractual clauses which were common practice at the beginning of the classical period evolved into (supplemental or mandatory) rules in late classical law. Certain pledge agreements may have become so typical in certain situations that in the absence of express wording they were deemed also to have been made/1 For urban tenancies tenant's pledges of invecta et illata were so common that they were deemed to have been tacitly agreed/2 In respect of invecta et illata brought into rural premises, however, an express agreement continued to be required.43 The reason for this may have been that the invecta et illata of a tenant farmer were too important to be impliedly pledged: the tenant's liveli­hood would depend on themTh Where the nature of the property, which was pledged in order to secure loans, entailed that it would be used and/or yielded fruit (living accommodation, slaves, agricultural land) and the cred­itor was granted possession of it, it would be presumed not only that the creditor would be entitled to use it but also that the value of the use or the fruit would be deducted from principal and/or interest/5

The evolutionary sequence often is: (1) express agreement, (2) implied agreement, (3) legal rule. We can observe this in the evolution of the creditor's power of sale. The epigraphic sources show that in the first century ad express licences to sell were common (stage 1).[190] Pomp. D. 13.7.5 appears to indicate that during Pomponiuss time (second century ad) the creditor was impliedly authorized to sell the property (stage 2)?[191] For the third century ad Ulpian D. 13.7.4 makes clear that a licence to sell was no longer based on (express or implied) consent, but was inherent to the right of pledge (stage 3)?[192] There is in many (if not all) legal systems a thin (and not always clear) line between implied agreements and supplemental rules of law which apply irre­spective of the parties' intentions. In Rome certainly, it is often impossible to distinguish between pacta tacita and dispositive rules of unwritten law?[193] The ‘statutory' pledges arising by operation of law for the benefit of the imperial treasury have evolved from ‘tacit' pledges, which in their turn evolved from express contractual provisions on pledge.[194] [195] [196] [197] [198] In many cases, the construction adopted in the sources that general pledges were impliedly agreed with the fiscal debtor was a pure fiction.

Hellenistic transactional practices

In the nineteenth century, Dernburg took the view that the use by the jurists of the Greek loan words hypotheca, hyperocha, and antichresis demonstrate a continuous influence of the Greek right of pledge on its Roman equivalent/1 For a long time this position was very influential among Romanists, until scholars like Manigk brought forward that most jurists do not use these words borrowed from the Greek or use them only occasionally. It is therefore no longer thought that there was a pervasive influence of Greek law(s)/2 However, it may not be a coincidence that in the Roman law of real security many expressions are derived from Greek/3 Rome's expansion into the Hellenistic economic world, with its highly differentiated business institu­tions, trade systems, and forms of credit, was the decisive factor for the evolution of the archaic, strictly Roman ius civile to a ‘world law' of the Mediterranean/'1 Hellenistic influences rather concerned the imitation of business practices than the reception of Greek laws.[199] [200] [201] [202] [203] For all variants of pledge discussed in this book it has been suggested that they have Greek-Hellenistic ancestors: pledge of invecta et illata, multiple pledge, conventional general pledge, statutory general pledge, antichresis, conditional sale, and the ‘Gordian' lien.56

Ideally this book would have contained more detailed comparative accounts of pignus, hypotheca, and security interests of other ancient laws. Nevertheless, on many occasions references are made to possible Greek- Hellenistic origins or influences on Roman law. The focus on classical Roman law also entails that any suggestion of how the Roman law of real security could have contributed to economic growth in the Roman empire must be qualified by the fact that Roman law did not apply to every credit transaction concluded within its boundaries, not even after the Constitutio Antoniniana of 212 ad.57 However, in the writings of jurists such as Scaevola and Marcianus we encounter rights of pledge which were granted over assets situ­ated in the eastern part of the Roman empire. Gaius and Marcianus even wrote monographs on the formula hypothecaria: their consistent use of the Greek loan word hypotheca(ria) may be explained by their connections with the eastern part of the Roman empire/8 From this part of the empire many papyri have survived, recording grantings of real security which were similar to those used in the Western empire/9 even where these documents were not governed by Roman law, they reflect transactional practices that were com­monly used throughout the Roman empire and which may have contributed to economic growth in the Roman empire in a manner similar to their Western counterparts.

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Source: Verhagen Hendrik L.. Security and Credit in Roman Law: The Historical Evolution of Pignus and Hypotheca. Oxford University Press,2022. — 448 p.. 2022

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