Sources of law in the Republic

The chief sources of law in Republican Rome were legislation, the edicts of the mag­istrates, and latterly the interpretatio of those learned in the law (see Mousourakis, Legal History, 27-30, 49-64).

2.2.1 Legislation

The expulsion of the Kings and the formation of a republican constitution resulted in some confusion as to what was binding law:

Pomponius, Manual, sole book:... the Roman people set about working with vague ideas of right and with customs of a sort rather than with legislation... (D.1.2.2.3.)

The extent of the legal powers of the consuls became a particularly sensitive issue in this period of uncertainty and was one of the major grievances of the plebeians in the struggle of the orders (see generally 1.2.1.2). The power of the tribunes to intercede on behalf of plebeians was another source of confusion. The patricians were eventually forced to agree to the demands of the plebeians for publication of the law. The result was the enactment of the Twelve Tables in 451-450 BC, the first important landmark in Roman legal history. This enactment has been regarded as a concession extracted by the plebeians during the struggle of the orders (see Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 3.31-59). 'The compilation of the XII Tables was an episode in the ^5truggle of the orders and constituted a victory for the plebs' (Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 14). However, Livy's account has been doubted in Roman Statutes'. 'Nor need any historian feel obliged to accept the traditional account of the first college as legislating in response to plebeian and popular pressure. The Twelve Tables may as readily be the result of self-regulation by a patrician elite' (11, 560).

2.2.1.1 The Twelve Tables

Pomponius, Manual, sole book:... it was decided that there be appointed, on the authority of the people, a commission of ten men by whom were to be studied the laws of the Creek city states and by whom their own city was to be endowed with laws.

(Rostra: platforms used by speakers in the Forum Romanum, Rome's commercial, political, and legal centre.)

The main thrust of Pomponius' account can be accepted, even if parts of it are ques­tionable, especially the reference to the study of Greek models. On the other hand, this is not the only reference to possible Greek influence on the Twelve Tables. Livy also mentions that the commissioners visited Greece to study the laws of the great Athenian legislator, Solon. However, modern scholarly opinion on the matter is more cautious. It is improbable that the commission would have made a potentially perilous voyage to Greece; more likely that 'the Greek city states' mentioned referred to cities in southern Italy. But there is little in the Twelve Tables that can be clearly identified as Greek, although some provisions—e.g. those concerning behaviour at funerals—appear very similar to Athenian legislation (see Roman Statutes, 560). (See, however, the interesting alternative theory proposed by Westbrook, R., 'The Nature and Origins of the Twelve Tables' (1988) 105 ZSS (rA), 74-121 on the Twelve Tables and its resemblance to legal codes of the Ancient Near East.) The constitution was suspended for a while and supreme executive power was vested in the commis­sion. The provisions of the Twelve Tables were eventually enacted by the comitia centuriata and given publicity. The original tablets were said to have been destroyed when the Gauls sacked Rome in c. 386 BC; so our knowledge of the Twelve Tables is based on references by later writers.

The Twelve Tables can be broadly described as Rome's first code of law, although the provisions fell short of the comprehensive restatement of the law that a modern codification normally entails. It is likely that, in some areas of the law, only the main rules were stated, or those which needed clarification. Procedure was dealt with rather skimpily and acquisition of property received little mention. This may have been a deliberate ploy to limit the amount of expertise that the plebeians could acquire in the law: 'The Twelve Tables were prepared by patricians as the law they were willing to share with plebeians, in response to the latter's demand for equal rights of liberty' (Watson, Spirit of Roman Law, 38). Overall, the Twelve Tables were probably based on the existing customary law of Rome, but with some royal decrees and a few innovations added. The content can be broadly classified as con­sisting of public and private law, the latter greatly predominant.

(a) Public law The Tables contained some provisions of a religious or constitu­tional character. Table X, entitled 'Of sacred law’, prescribed detailed rules on buri­als and funerals: e.g. bodies are not to be buried or burned within the city; not more than ten flautists can be hired to play at a funeral; and women mourners must refrain from mutilating themselves or displaying excessive grief. Table IX contained vital constitutional provisions: e.g. legislation inflicting capital pun­ishment can be passed only by the comitia ce/itiiriiita; no one can be ordered to be executed except after a trial; there is a right of appeal against a death sentence.

(b) Private law The Twelve Tables contained provisions relating to procedure as well as substantive law.

A major part of the Twelve Tables was concerned with substantive private law. For example, Table IV contained the fundamental principle of Roman family law: a paterfamilias has absolute power over his children. Table VII, concerned with land, laid down some rules of practical importance, especially for neighbours, e.g. action can be taken in respect of overhanging branches from a neighbouring tree. Table VIII penalized the commission of various wrongs, e.g. theft; pasturing cattle on another man's land; charging excessive rates of interest; setting fire to houses. Table XI prohibited marriage between a patrician and plebeian, a highly controversial measure, that was repealed within a few years. (For a reconstruction of the text and a comprehensive survey of recent literature on the Twelve Tables, see Roman Statutes II, 555-721.)

The Romans considered the Twelve Tables as the foundation of their civil law.

2.2.1,2 The assemblies

After the enactment of the Twelve Tables, legislation did not constitute the domi­nant force in substantive law reform during rhe Republic. The Roman assemblies rarely enacted laws that conflicted with the Twelve Tables. Until the late Republic, there were only a handful of statutory changes. The most important, as regards private law, was the lex Aquilla c. 287 EC, which reformed the law on wrongful damage to property (see generally 10.2). Statutes dealing with constitutional and administrative reform, such as the leges Liciniae Sextiae and the lex Hortensia were more frequent (see 1.2.1.2).

The comitia centuriata was the most important of the assemblies. It elected high- ranking magistrates and was organized as the Roman people (or later their repre­sentatives) in military array. It enacted the Twelve Tables. The comitia curiata was the oldest assembly but had a minor role in legislation, its main function being formally to confer powers on superior magistrates. The comitia tribute, an assembly based on a geographical division of the populace into 'tribes', handled routine leg­islation and elected lesser magistrates. The concilium plebis, the plebeian assembly, became the dominant assembly long before the end of the Republic, both in terms of political clout and legislative reform; 'Though the legislative competence of all the assemblies was equal, the concilium plebis became the usual organ for the pass­ing of laws in the later Republic as its presidents, the tribunes, had more time for, and interest in, legislation than the consuls, who were frequently engaged in mili­tary duties' (Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 26).

A plebiscite (plebiscitum) is what the plebeians laid down in response to a proposal from a plebeian magistrate, like a tribune... But once the Lex Hortensia had been passed [c. 287 BC], plebiscites came to have as much validity as statutes. (Inst.1.2.4.) (cf. 1.2.1.2.)

Although the assemblies differed in their functions, they had certain features in common. Each was sovereign within its own particular jurisdiction and met only when summoned by the presiding magistrate. The assemblies could not initiate legislation—they met to vote on proposals drawn up in a draft bill that normally would have been debated in the Senate. It was the task of the assembly to accept or reject the bill, but not to debate or amend it. Each citizen of age voted orally and publicly within his particular group in the assembly. A simple majority of votes within a group carried the vote of that group. The possibilities of bribery and cor­ruption in such circumstances necessitated the introduction of a secret ballot in the late Republic. Although the procedure was ostensibly democratic, in practice some votes counted for more than others. In the comitia centuriata, for example, the centuries voted in order of rank, beginning with the highest: thus, those voting first tended to have an influence on the later voters. Women could not appear in the assemblies and thus could not vote. On the organization, voting procedures, and purpose of the Republican assemblies see Lintott, Constitution, 40-64.

2.2.1.3 The Senate

Although the Senate was the pre-eminent body in Republican Rome, it did not pos­sess legislative power. It acted as an advisory council, exercising influence and control over the leading men of the State, who would invariably be among its members. The Senate's directives, senatus consulta, carried great persuasive weight, but were not legally binding unless they had been incorporated into a resolution of an assembly or an edict of the magistrates. A magistrate who wished to put a proposal before one of the assemblies of the people would normally have to obtain the Senate's approval. Indeed, the Senate was often the prime mover in the initiation of legal reform although it could not meet until convened by the appropriate magistrate. Its 'advice' would be conveyed by a magistrate to the appropriate assembly: senatus consulta were thus a vital (if indirect) source of Republican legislation. Additionally, the Senate had the power to declare laws invalid for want of form and could even suspend the opera­tion of valid laws in emergencies. On the organization and authority of the Senate in the Republic see Lintott, Constitution, 65-93.

2.2.2 Edicts of the magistrates

High-ranking magistrates had the ius edicendi, the right to issue edicts, i.e. legally binding statements of intent within their appropriate sphere of jurisdiction. The edicts of the praetors can be fairly said to have revolutionized Roman civil law in the late Republic, forming a body of law later described as the ius honorarium—'the law laid down by magistrates' (cf. D. 1.2.2.10.). The significance of the ius honorarium in the history of Roman law was immense. This body of law constituted a gloss or a supplement to the main body of civil law, the ius civile, in a manner comparable to the relationship between equity and the English common law. The ius hono­rarium infused Roman law with new vigour and a fresh direction, transforming an introverted, parochial body of law into an outward-looking, cosmopolitan system. This process helped to give Roman law widespread appeal, making it relatively easy to assimilate in later ages. Lintott, Constitution, 94-146, provides a comprehensive account of the functions and powers of the various magistrates during the time of the Republic.

2.2.2.1 Praetor urbanus and praetor peregrinus

Pomponius, Manual, sole book: And when the consuls were being called away to the wars with neighboring peoples, and there was no one in the civitas empowered to attend to legal busi­ness in the city, what was done was that a praetor also was created, called the urban praetor on the ground that he exercised jurisdiction within the city. [28] Some years thereafter that single praetor became insufficient, because a great crowd of foreigners had come into the civitas as well, and so another praetor was established, who got the name peregrine praetor, because he mainly exercised jurisdiction as between foreigners (peregrini). (D.1.2.2.27-8.)

We have already seen that the office of urban praetor was created in 367 BC to con­duct the administration of justice. Later, the influx of foreigners into Rome led to the creation in c. 242 BC of the peregrine praetor. He came to exercise jurisdiction over cases in which at least one of the parties was a foreigner, although it is prob­able that initially the jurisdiction was confined to disputes between foreigners. And Rome's territorial growth necessitated the creation of praetors for the provinces. Two praetorships were introduced for Sicily and Sardinia in 227 BC and another two positions were created for the two Spanish provinces in 198 BC (see Brennan, Praetorship 1, chs. 6 and 7). The number of praetors was later increased (the Sullan reform created eight positions) but the urban and peregrine praetors were the only ones with full jurisdiction over the civil law.

How was the ius honorarium developed? The praetors did not necessarily regard themselves as creating a supplementary body of law, but that is what in effect they did. The crucial factors that made this possible were their role in litigation and their right to issue edicts.

2-2.2.2 Litigation

lile urban praetor inherited a system of procedure enforced by the legis actiones, the actions-at-law'. It was a highly formal system and claims had to be fitted into a limited number of set forms of action (see 3.2). The praetor would have to decide whether to grant the plaintiff an action, and what form of trial was appropriate. Despite his position, the praetor had scant opportunity to influence the develop­ment of the law because he was strictly bound to follow the ins civile, where appli­cable. However, the influx of foreigners into Rome in the third century BC brought about a fundamental change. They could not participate in the procedure by legis actiones since it was confined to citizens. So, a new procedure was developed by the peregrine praetor for the benefit of foreigners—the formulary system. It was much more flexible than the legis actiones: the issues between the parties were stated in writing—the formula—and did not have to be accommodated within rigid forms of action. I'he peregrine praetor thus acquired considerable discretion in influ­encing the law that was applicable to disputes involving foreigners (see Brennan, Praetorship}, 130-5).

The irony was that, whereas foreigners enjoyed the advantages of the formulary system, citizens were presumably restricted to the ancient actions-at-law. But not for long: the urban praetor found himself under pressure to adopt the new proce­dures, with the result that the procedure applicable to disputes involving foreign­ers were generally absorbed into the ins civile. Consequently, the formulary system gradually ousted that of the legis uctiones, which became largely obsolete well before the end of the Republic.

2.2.2.3 Issuing edicts

I’omponius, Manual, sole book:... in order to let the citizens know and allow for the jurisdic­tion which each magistrate would be exercising over any given matter, they took to pubfish­ing edicts. These edicts, in the case of the praetors, constituted the jus honorarium (honorary law): 'honorary' is the term used, because the law in question had come from the high honor of praetorian office. (0.1.2.2.10.)

Edicts were issued on wooden boards (alba} displayed in the l-’orum at the begin­ning of the praetors' tenure of office. They consisted of a mixture of directives and proposals concerning the performance of the magistrates' functions, e.g. T will grant an action if...' or '1 will allow' possession of the goods if...'. The praetor could allow new remedies or new defences, but the greater part of his edict nor­mally consisted of measures adopted from that of the previous praetor. In this way, a stock body of rules was carried over from year to year, thus contributing to the evolution of the ins honorarium. Since the praetors at times lacked legal expertise, they tended to consult those learned in the law. Edicts thus proved to be an ideal vehicle for law reform.

The peregrine praetor issued an edict similar to that of the urban praetor, but normally far shorter. Although the content of their respective edicts necessarily differed at first, by the end of the Republic there was considerable assimilation between them. Edicts w'ere also regularly issued by the aediles and by provincial governors. The latter had considerable discretion in administering the law to take account of local circumstances, but the main thrust of their edicts was to provide the local inhabitants with the same legal remedies that applied in Rome.

Once an edict had been published, the praetor was expected to act in conform­ity with it, though initially there appears to have been no legal sanction except for public opinion to compel him to do so. In 67 BC, a lex Cornelia was passed (precipi­tated partly by the irregular behaviour of Verres), w'hich required magistrates to act in a manner consistent with their own edicts.

2.2.2.4 Ius civile and ius honorarium

1'apinian, a jurist of the late classical period (see 2.3.4.4), described the ius hono­rarium (which he identified with praetorian law) as:

1’apinian, Definitions, book 2:... that which in the public interest the praetors have introduced in aid or supplementation or correction of the jus civile. (D. 1.1.7.1.)

The praetor would 'aid' the civil law by granting more convenient and effective remedies for the enforcement of civil law claims. ‘Supplementation’ occurred when the praetor granted a remedy in circumstances for which the civil law did not cater. For example, the somewhat narrow provisions of the lex Aquilla (concerning wrong­ful damage to property) were significantly extended by the grant of supplementary remedies (see 10.2.5). 'Correction' of the ius civile occurred less frequently—a prae­tor would have to exercise the greatest caution in such a case. But he did have the overriding power to act in the interests of the Roman people (when he saw fit to do so), and thus to act in contradiction of the civil law. For example, the praetor could allow an inheritance to be taken by a claimant in preference to the rightful heir under the civil law (see generally 8.3.2).

In the early years after the creation of the office, the urban praetor had little room for manoeuvre: aiding the civil law was the limit of his intervention because of the formalism of the legis actioiies. Later, the praetors became more radical, particularly after the lex Aebutia c. 150 BC formally recognized the applicability of the formulary system to disputes between citizens: 'the history of the praetorian edict reveals itself as a progress from adjective to substantive law' (see Kelly, J. M., 'The Growth-Pattern of the Praetor's Edict' (1966) 1 ij, 341-55). Indeed, by the late Republic, the prae­tors had become the leading reformers within the Roman legal system. Among the important praetorian innovations of that period were the introduction of remedies for robbery, fraud and duress, more effective protection of proprietary interests, and the recognition of informal agreements. More radical still was the development of an alternative form of succession to property on death. The fact that the prae­tors were able to 'correct' the civil law in such important matters demonstrates the extent of their indirect law-making powers in the late Republic.

2.23 Interpretatio

Interpretatio was the elucidation of existing rules of law. It was not initially a direct source of law—the 'interpreter' could not create new law. But the process of interpre­tatio inevitably led to a gloss being put on enacted law through a process of implica­tion and extension by analogy. The skeletal bones of the law thus acquired some flesh. Who were the interpreters of the law?

Pomponius, Manual, sole book: In relation to all these statutes, however, knowledge of their authoritative interpretation and conduct of the actions-at-law belonged to the College of Priests, one of whom was appointed each year to preside over the private citizens. (D. 1.2.2.6.)

Given the connection between religion and the civil law in early Rome, the pontiffs were the most obvious interpreters of the law. Their advice on the meaning and applicability of the law constituted interpretatio. At times, it could be very creative: a rule of the Twelve Tables that a father who sold his son three times thereby lost BPower over him became through interpretatio the basis of the institution of eman- tion not only of sons, but of daughters and grandchildren as well (see 5.1.2.4; wicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 88 ff.). The enactment of the Twelve Tables and the vesting of their interpretation with the pontiffs were developments of huge long-term significance: 'The major characteristics that shaped Roman law forever flowed from these circumstances' (Watson, Spirit of Roman Law, 37). The characteristics that Watson particularly attributes to pontifical interpretatio were 'the importance subsequently attached... to the giving of legal opinions, and the acceptance by the State of the individual's important role in lawmaking' (Spirit of Roman Law, 39).

The Twelve Tables, while containing some detail on litigation procedure (see 2.2.1.1), did not describe the operation of the system in much depth. This allowed the pontiffs to exercise influence over civil litigation for a considerable period there­after. However, their monopoly was eventually broken;

Pomponius, Manual, sole book: Thereafter, when Appius Claudius had written out these actions-at-law and brought them back into a common form, his clerk Cnaeus Flavius... pirated the book and passed it over to the people at large. (D. 1.2.2.7.)

A nice story; some of it may even be true. The Appius Claudius mentioned above was known to have been censor in 312 BC. His collection of actions-at-law was made public in the closing years of that century and was later known as the ius Flavianum. Its significance was that the pontiffs were no longer necessarily the only interpreters of the law. A tradition evolved whereby eminent individuals, learned in law, gave legal opinions (responsa) in public. They came to be known as 'jurists'.

The first jurist to give legal advice in public, it seems, was Tiberius Coruncanius:

Pomponius, Manual, sole book:... tradition has it that of all those who mastered this knowl­edge, none earlier than Tiberius Coruncanius made a public profession of it. The others up to his time either thought it right to keep the civil law unknown or made it their practice only to give private consultations rather than offering themselves to people wishing to learn. (D.l.2.2.35.)

Coruncanius is known to have been Chief Pontiff in c. 253 BC, the first plebeian to achieve that office. Pontifical influence was therefore not yet at an end, but the number of jurists outside the college of pontiffs was gradually increasing.

The jurists of the second half of the Republic can hardly be described as a class, still less as a profession, but they did have some features in common. They tended to be rich men from aristocratic families, bent on a political career. The gratuitous sharing of their legal expertise for the public good earned them considerable gratitude, respect, and a step on the political ladder: see generally Bauman, R., Lawyers in Roman Republican Politics (1983). In the late Republic, jurists increasingly specialized in the law on a full-time basis. The number of jurists grew, partly as the result of the manifold legal disputes arising in the dis­turbed conditions of that time. It is very likely that the pronounced increase in the citizen population following the Social War, and the expansion in commer­cial activity were also contributory factors. See Frier, B. W., The Rise of the Roman Jurists (1985) (see, however, Alan Watson's criticism of this work in 'The Birth of the Legal Profession' (1987) 85 Michigan LR, 1071-82). There is evidence that some of the jurists in the later Republic came from humble backgrounds, and that they were happy to receive payment for their services. A profession was emerging.

Consult the online resources for a list of Republican jurists and their biographies.

What sort of work was done by the jurists of the late Republic? The giving of advice was their most important function, because of its potential effect on the whole Roman legal system. Consider the variety of persons that might approach the jurist for advice: judges—normally they would be distinguished citizens but lacked legal expertise; praetors—the administration of litigation and the drafting of edicts would invariably be done with the help of jurists; magistrates and provincial governors— they would need advice on the performance of their duties; advocates—most were skilled orators but unskilled in the law; members of Senate; prospective litigants, and ordinary citizens. The advice that the jurists gave was not binding—it did not create a precedent—but the accumulation of responsa helped to elucidate the law, to give it shape, and to fill in the gaps.

Apart from advising, the jurists were engaged in cautelary jurisprudence—they drafted formal written documents such as wills; coached people in the uttering of the set words that were required in some legal ceremonies and transactions; and prepared prospective litigants and advocates in the presentation of their cases. The less-eminent jurists probably did some formal teaching. The leading jurists taught by example: a young man, intending a legal or political career, would attach himself to a leading jurist and assist him in his work. In this way, the most eminent jurists attracted a following of adherents, with the result that a tradition of loyalty and continuity was fostered:

When I had assumed the toga virilis, I was taken by my father to Scaevola [consul 117 BC] with the intention that, so far as I was able and he would permit, I would never leave the old man's side. So I committed to memory many points skillfully expounded by him and also many of his brief and well-expressed opinions.... After his death I took myself to Scaevola the pontiff [consul 95 BC]. (Cicero, De Amicitia, 1.1.)

What else did the jurist do in his busy day? He wrote: 'The literature of the jurists was varied: collections of forms and responsa; commentaries on the Twelve Tables or on individual statutes; general treatises on the civil law; and monographs, i.e. detailed exposition of specific legal topics', see Watson, A., 'Limits of Juristic Decision in the Later Roman Republic', ANRW I, 2 (Berlin 1972), 215-25. The Republican jurists established a tradition of legal writing, a development of fundamental importance in the history of Roman law. Juristic literature converted Roman law into a science— a body of rules that was analysed in writing, thus providing a rich source of material for further study and comment. (On the use of writing in Roman law generally, see Meyer, E. A., 'Writing in Roman Legal Contexts', in Cambridge Companion, 85-96.) But these jurists were not purely academics, spending their lives secreted behind books. Many of them achieved distinction in other fields of endeavour, whether as statesmen, governors, high-ranking magistrates or distinguished generals. And, although advocacy was not regarded as a normal pursuit for the jurist, the occa­sional individual achieved distinction in both professions.

The extent of Greek influence on the work of the Republican jurists is controver­sial. Schulz takes the view in History of Roman Legal Science (1946) that the influence Was extensive: indeed, he describes the later Republic as the 'Hellenistic' period of Roman jurisprudence. On the other hand, Watson, in Spirit of Roman Law, con­siders that the influence was minimal as regards the borrowing of rules (hence,.Hellenistic period' is a misnomer in his view), while accepting that other aspects

of Roman life—literature, philosophy, rhetoric, and architecture—were affected. Kunkel, An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History (1966) takes a mid­dle view, arguing that there was some, though not extensive, Greek influence on Roman jurisprudence: e.g. the employment of dialectical methods of reasoning; the trend towards a more systematic arrangement of materials; and the evident expo­nential growth of juristic literature (ascribed to Greek literary traditions). For a good survey of the eclectic use of Greek philosophy by the Roman jurists, see Giltaij, J., 'Greek Philosophy and Classical Roman Law: a Brief Overview', in OHRLS, 188-99.

2.2.3.2 Some outstanding jurists

O Consult the timeline on the online resources for dates. Among the leading jurists of the later Republic were the following:

(a) Sextus Aelius Consul in 198 BC; the author of the earliest important juristic work—a commentary on the Twelve Tables and the actions-at-law. He was probably the author of the ins Aelianum, an updating of the ius Flavianum (see 2.2.3). His interest in the actions-at-law suggests that they had not yet been superseded by the formulary system at the time when he wrote.

(b) Quintus Mucius Scaevola Tribune in 106 BC, praetor in 98, consul in 95, governor of Asia in 94, and chief pontiff in 89. He came from a distinguished family—'the great­est politico-legal family in Roman history' (Bauman, R., Lawyers in Roman Republican Politics (1983), 422). Scaevola was one of the last in the long line of pontiffs to influence the development of Roman law. He appeared as advocate in some famous trials, notably therausu Curiana (concerning the interpretation of a will). His most important achieve­ment as a jurist was his treatise on the ius civile. This was a trail-blazing work—the first comprehensive treatment of the civil law; the first to attempt a classification and detailed analysis of the law; and an inspiration and model for later writers. Scaevola's talents and influence made him a dangerous enemy—he was murdered in 82 BC.

(c) Aquilius Gallus Praetor in 66 BC. He was responsible for some of the impor­tant praetorian innovations of the period, the edict on fraud, for example. He seemed to earn widespread respect and popularity, a rare phenomenon in those troubled times. Declining the very highest honours, he preferred to devote himself to writing and teaching.

(d) Servius Sulpicius Rufus Praetor in 65 BC, consul in 51; a pupil of Aquilius Gallus, he initially earned a reputation as a distinguished advocate. He became the most eminent of all Republican jurists, apart from Scaevola, a meeting with whom appears to have inspired Servius. Pomponius relates how Servius:

Pomponitis, Manual, sole book'.... once sought out Quintus Mucius to consult him about the business of a client of his. When Servius failed to understand Quintus's opinion on the law, he questioned Quintus again; again an opinion was given, and again not understood; then he was severely reproached by Quintus. For, indeed, he told him that it was disgraceful for a patrician of noble family who regularly appeared as advocate in courts to be ignorant of the law on which his cases turned. Stung by this near insult, Servius applied himself to learning the civil law... (D. 1.2.2.43.)

He applied himself well. He became a prolific author, his works including Ad Rrutum (the first commentary on the praetorian edict) and the Notata Mucii, a correction of some of Scaevola's analyses of the civil law. Several distinguished jurists, among them Ofilius and Alfenus, regarded Servius as their 'teacher'. See, furthermore, Stein, P. G., 'The Place of Servius Sulpicius Rufus in the Development of Roman Legal Science', in Festschrift Wieacker, 175-84.

2.3