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Robbery (rapina)

Regarded originally as a type of furtum, robbery (rapina) - i.e., theft by violence - was later considered a delict in itself, prosecuted separately by the praetor. To punish robbery, a special action (actio vi bonorum raptorum) was introduced, probably by the praetor peregrinus Licinius Luculus in 76 bce.

The edict text, quoted by Ulpian (D. 48.7.2pr.), also included banditry, but it is possible that this expansion of the edict took place in the postclassical period.

Since robbers usually were not caught in the act, the penalty imposed for robbery was that of the nonmanifest theft, that is, double the value of the thing. This penalty was clearly too light, especially in times of social convulsion. By introducing this new action, the praetor increased the penalty to four times the value of the stolen thing, but only if the action were brought within a year of the robbery; otherwise, only the value of the stolen thing could be recouped. For recovery of the stolen thing or its value, the victim could bring a reipersecutory action in addition to a penal action. Gaius (4.8) mentioned this action for robbery as a mere penal action. However, since the value of the thing was included in the damage award, Justinian classified this action for robbery as a mixed action (Inst. 4.6.19). In addition to the private delict of robbery, in certain cases of private violence (e.g., offensive assaults, the use of arms), criminal proceedings were added.

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Source: Domingo Rafael. Roman Law: An Introduction. Routledge,2018. — 252 p.. 2018

More on the topic Robbery (rapina):

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  2. Rapina
  3. Theft and robbery
  4. 2. FURTUM AND RAPINA
  5. Roman Law Terms with Letters R
  6. Introductory
  7. Along with contracts, the other significant branch of the law of obligations is that of delicts, i.e., private wrongs for which redress was provided by civil law.
  8. Observations
  9. History of the NFR
  10. CHAPTER I The Function of Advocacy
  11. In General
  12. In Chapter 2 it appeared that different ways of referring to the appli­cable law can be distinguished.