Philanthropia: the Athenian model

Philanthropia is not prominent in the fifth century. Attic literature supplies only three examples of its use. In Aeschylus’ Prometheus the gods punish his presumption by discontinuing their usual philanthropia towards men (vv.

Most disturbing of all is the silence of Thucydides. One might have expected to find philanthropia on display in that catalogue of human values, Pericles’ Funeral Oration (Thuc. 2.34-46). But Thucydides gives only the substance of human rights, not the label. We are less surprised at its omission from the Mytilenian Debate of 427 (3.36-50); both speakers simply press for a decision based on the public interest (to sympheron). But in the Melian Dialogue (5.84-116) the historian does not even bother to plead the public interest motif.

The advent of the fourth century brings a change. Xenophon has nineteen uses,¹¹ eight of which occur in the Cyropaedia, a treatise on the training of Xenophon’s model philanthropist, the Persian king Cyrus. For example, when Cyrus addresses his allies after completing his conquests, he says that although by an eternal law conquerors own the persons and property of the conquered, philanthropia should persuade them to forgo some of those rights.

Demosthenes’ seventy uses¹³ include our first clear example of philanthropia in the sense of a brake on brutality. Attacking Thebes in 355, Demosthenes says this:

The Thebans do not observe the same laws, customs or system of government as us. They take more pride in brutality and wickedness than we do in philanthropia and justice. May they always refuse honour to those who serve them, may they always treat kindred peoples as savagely as they treated Orchomenus! May we always honour our benefactors and promote justice by debate in harmony with the laws.

(Dem. 20.109, 165 adapted)

Thebes’ treatment of Orchomenus (Diod. 15.79.1-2) provides the contrast that Demosthenes wants. The discovery of a plot by Orchomenus had prompted a revision of the Thebans’ original compliance with the principle that those who sought supremacy should guard by philanthropia what they had won by valour. They ended up by decreeing that all male citizens of Orchomenus be killed, that the women and children be enslaved, and that the city be razed.

Demosthenes’ speech marks a slight shift with respect to the formative influence behind philanthropia.

Demosthenes offers a number of texts dealing with external issues, with relations between Athenians and other peoples. In at least two speeches he draws a distinction between harmonious domestic debate and the (perfectly acceptable) brutal treatment of enemies. The Demos should be gentle and humane towards Athens and her allies; they should be philanthropic in the courts, which are the proper vehicle for the enforcement of civic rights. But enemies must be overcome by force of arms, and one should be terrible and implacable towards them (8.33, 13.16-17). This is in accordance with the generally narrow Greek view of racial differences. It was hard enough to encourage philanthropia between Hellenes of different cities, let alone between Hellenes and barbarians.¹⁶

Megalopolis’ appeal to Athens for help against Sparta in 353 evoked an ambiguous response from Demosthenes:

You are bound to help Messene rather than Megalopolis not only by treaty but also because of your interest [to sympheron] in preserving Messene.

(16.9-10 adapted)

Demosthenes was literally hedging his bets. Cicero would do the same.

When discussing hubris, the infliction of personal outrage on another, Demosthenes makes a rare foray into the area of human rights and slavery. He praises the philanthropia of a law which penalises outrages against any person, whether child, woman or man, and whether free or enslaved. He imagines the astonished reaction of a barbarous nation from whom slaves are drawn, if it were told that â€?Some Hellenes are so philanthropic that although imbued with natural hostility towards you, they permit no outrage to be inflicted on those whom they have bought from you as slaves’ (21.47-50). Aristotle might not have agreed,¹⁷ but Rome understood it.

There are (unexpectedly) no allusions to philanthropia or its violation in Demosthenes’ repeated attacks on his bete noire, Philip of Macedon.¹⁸ There is only one marginal allusion in the Second Philippic, when he observes that although the diatribes against Philip are just and philanthropic, there has been no action to match those sentiments (6.1). Elsewhere he declares that while other nations have experienced the cruelty that always surfaces when Philip gains the upper hand, the Athenians have been lucky enough to enjoy the philanthropia that Philip has contrived to show them with an eye to the future (18.231).

Philip’s concession of lenient terms to Athens after Chaeronea did, of course, envisage a quid pro quo in the shape of the leadership of Hellas.¹⁹ This brought in the ideal of Panhellenism. Philip thus gave a new impetus to philanthropia by using it as a political weapon, and the question is, who put that idea into his head? The answer is almost certainly the theoretician of Panhellenism, Isocrates.²⁰ After first canvassing a Panhellenic movement under Athenian leadership,²¹ he shifted his ground to the ideal monarch, whose rule he considered superior to democracy. His blueprint was based on major philanthropic principles: honours must go to the best, but the masses must enjoy freedom from outrage, injustice, terrorism and cruel punishments; and international relations must be dealt with as one would want stronger states to deal with oneself. This comprehensive Panhellenism, taking in both the domestic and the external aspects of philanthropia, should be entrusted to a paternalistic monarchy under Philip.²²