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Arbitration

By voluntary and formal agreement (compromissum), the parties could submit the decision of a dispute to arbitration. The enforcement of the award came from the reciprocal stipulations given by the litigants and was strengthened by penalties as an additional part of the agreement.

The advantage of arbitration was that the arbitrator had more freedom to determine an award than did the judge of the formulary procedure, who was always bound by the praetor’s instructions inserted in the formula. Even the arbitrator, however, was under the supervision of the praetor, insofar as the arbitrator was bound by a unilateral acceptance of his authority (receptum arbitri), enforceable under praetorian law. The arbitrator assumed his duties by using the words “I accept” (recipio). The praetor could compel the arbi­trator to pronounce his award with administrative measures (a fine, a seizure of pledges, and so on). The arbitrator was not to be compelled, however, to make an award if the parties did not properly submit to arbitration (Ulpian, D. 4.8.11.1). Legal capacity for submitting to arbitration was broader than legal capacity for litigation under the formulary procedure. The general rule was that anyone who could make a valid contract could make a formal agreement to arbitration. The death of a party terminated the arbitral agreement, unless there was an express provision that the obligations would survive to the heirs.

Cognitio extra ordinem

As mentioned, extraordinary cognition was the procedure that gradually replaced the formulary procedure, especially in the third century CE. The medieval romano-canonical procedure and many modern procedural systems derived from it. Extraordinary cognition was adopted first in the provinces, until it became exclusive when Constantine II officially abolished the for­mulary procedure in 342 ce (C.J. 2.57.1).

The new cognition was adminis­trative in character. Based on the idea that administration of justice was an imperial function, in the new cognition the centrality of the proceedings resided in the magistrate-judge rather than in the parties. As a result, the contractual structure of the proceedings was gone. Lawsuits no longer depended on the parties’ private initiative.

The magistrate began to be involved not only in the trial but also in the summons. The plaintiff could still summon the defendant privately to appear before the judge (denuntiatio). However, the plaintiff could also address to the magistrate a written statement of claim (libellus) and ask him to summon the defendant. The magistrate sent a copy of the claim to the defendant, ordering him to enter a defense and to appear in court on a fixed date. The magistrate

Civil litigation 125 could also summon a defendant or third party on his own initiative (evocatio). If the plaintiff did not appear on the appointed day, the case concluded.

The litis contestatio remained as a name, as did much of the old procedural terminology, but legislation modified most of its effects. The litis contestatio exactly defined the conflict, but the procedure no longer included an agree­ment to accept the judgment, nor was the action consumed. Exceptions could be admitted even right before the final judgment. The extraordinary cognition contained more rules for the formulary procedure about the burden of proof, the proof of documents, the capacity to give evidence, and other items. The court summoned witnesses and could force them to give surety for their appearance. The judgment was written, but it was recited publicly at a formal sitting of the court. Condemnation was not necessarily monetary.

As result of the tendency toward bureaucratization, an organized appeal system to a higher court (and even to the emperor in important matters) was developed for the first time in Roman law. In the provinces, the governor heard appeals of the cases decided by his subordinates in the first instance. Under Justinian’s law, there could not be more than two appeals on any one judicial decision (C.J.

7.70.1), and no case was to continue for more than three years after joinder of issue. The establishment of an official fee system made litigation more expensive than before.

Further reading

Berger, Adolf. Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law. Philadelphia, PA: The American Philosophical Society, 1953; reprint 1980.

Buckland, William Warwick. A Text-Book of Roman Law. 3rd ed., revised by Peter Stein, 604-744. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963.

Camodeca, Giuseppe. Tabulae Pompeianae Sulpiciorum (TPSulp.): Edizione critica dell' Archivio Puteolano dei Sulpicii.1.Rome: Quasar, 1999.

Cannata, Carlo Augusto. Profilo istituzionale del proceso privato romano: I. Les legis actiones. II. Il proceso formulare i. 2 vols. Turin: Giappichelli, 1980-82.

De Angelis, Francesco, ed. Spaces of Justice in the Roman World. Leiden: Brill, 2010. Domingo, Rafael. Estudios sobre el primer titulo del edicto del pretor, 3 vols. Santiago de Compostela: Universidad de Dantiago de Compostela, 1991-95.

d’Ors, Alvaro. Derecho privado romano. 10th ed., §§68-130. Pamplona: Eunsa, 2004. Fiori, Roberto. Ea res agatur: I due modelli del processo formulare repubblicano.

Milan: Giuffre, 2003.

Jolowicz, Herbert Felix, and Barry Nicholas. Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law. 3rd ed., 175-232, 395-420, 439-50. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

Johnston, David, “Vadimonium, the Lex Irnitana, and the Edictal Commentaries.” In Quaestiones iuris. Festschrift für Joseph Georg Wolf zum 70. Geburtstag, edited by Ulrich Manthe and Christoph Krampe, 111-123. Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2000.

Kaser, Max, and Karl Hackl. Das romische Zivilprozessrecht. 2nd ed. Munich: Beck Verlag, 1996.

Kelly, John M. Roman Litigation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966.

Kelly, John M. Studies in the Civil Judicature of the Roman Republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Liebs, Detlef. Summoned to the Roman Courts. Famous Trials from Antiquity. Los Angeles, Berkeley, and London: University of California Press, 2012.

Metzger, Ernest. “Litigation.” In The Cambridge Companion to Roman Law, edited by David Johnston, 272-298. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Metzger, Ernest. Litigation in Roman Law. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Metzger, Ernest. A New Outline of Roman Trial. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Meyer, Elizabeth A. Legitimacy and Law in the Roman World. Tabulae in Roman Belief and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Murga, Jose Luis. El proceso clasico. Zaragoza: Universidad de Zaragoza, 1980.

Pugliese, Giovanni. Il proceso civile romano. II. Il proceso formulare. Milan: Giufre, 1963.

Roebuck, Derek, and Bruno de Loynes de Fumichon. Roman Arbitration. Oxford: Holo Books, The Arbitration Press, 2004.

Schulz, Fritz. Classical Roman Law, 11 -70. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951.

Thomas, J. A. C. Textbook of Roman Law, 69-122. Amsterdam, New York, and Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1976.

Waelkens, Laurent. Amne adverso. Roman Legal Heritage in European Culture, 141 -192. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2015.

Wenger, Leopold. Institutes of Roman Law of Civil Procedure. Rev. ed., translated by Otis Harrison Fisk. Littleton, CO: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1986.

Wenger, Leopold. “The Roman Law of Civil Procedure.” Translated by Arthur Schiller. Tulane Law Review 5 (1930): 353-395.

Zulueta, Francis de. The Institutes of Gaius. Part II. Commentary, 221-302. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953.

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Source: Domingo Rafael. Roman Law: An Introduction. Routledge,2018. — 252 p.. 2018

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