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The Sociability of Man

The genesis of early society and the concept of ownership are major themes in Grotius's works. They are retractable in various disciplines and hark back to philosophical and literary tradition alike.

As Grotius argues time and again, reliability and accountability are the bottom-rock of social intercourse. Good Faith is the cornerstone of his philosophy, and of natural law as he read it. To that extent, one might say, Adam's exchange of immortality for the awareness of good and evil had paid out.

3.1 Good Faith[494]

Good faith, in Grotius's perception, is axiomatic to all human relations and, in Cicero's famous dictum, the touchstone of one's word and the consistency of agreements.[495] [496] [497] It is the common ground of all rational nature, whether cre­ated (man) or not created (God)?1 Whether defined as fides, as in the private sphere, pacta sunt servanda, as in the public domain, or religio, touching Man's relation to God32 the overarching concept asserts itself throughout. It holds true indiscriminately vis-a-vis enemies, heretics or, as the case might be, non­Christians.[498] [499] [500] [501] [502] [503] [504] [505] In short, the concept is all-encompassing and transcends all political and religious barriers, the ideological and the ecclesiastical divide^4 This perspective has inevitably raised questions regarding Grotius’s Protestant backdrop (Fikentscher 1979), his link to his scholastic sources (Vermeulen 1985) and his secularizing ambitions (Roelofsen 1990).35

Marking the basis of all voluntary obligation, fides as sketched by Grotius in his State Parallels (c. 1600) presents the paramount concept that commands the virtues he coins circa voluntatem (as against those circa intellectum), these being Fortitudo, Iustitia, Moderatio (strength of character, righteousness and self-discipline).36 Fides notably asserts itself as the touchstone of justice and is addressed within this context/” Its obvious moral implications lend it a rich political potential.

Its inception is the promise, the sign of intent that expresses the manifest will to bind oneself. However, in its Roman perception fides entails an interaction, a sense of mutuality38 and the same holds good for the promise. The gesture is conditional, its implementation is only actu­ated by the concomitance of the other party.3≡ In other words, reciprocity is a keystone and the prerequisite for the promise to be effectuated into a formal obligation.4° This formula holds good at all levels: whether in private contracts, the Contrat Social, or the Covenant with God. Man relates to God as the cliens to the patronus, or the civis to the respublica. With Grotius fides is no mean concept: it is Man's haven of last resort when all the chips are down (residuum communionis humanae).

Grotius had drawn the above conclusions from the rule of nature to which both God and man obliged in sharing the indelible law of immutable justice. In other words, to reach this verdict he never needed the backing of either scholasticism or Protestantism. But then, this works both ways: in other words, on this basis we cannot conclude upon Grotius's intentional aiming at secu­larisation. By the same token, the concept was of great pertinence to Grotius in dealing with the Remonstrant Troubles. Another way to prove this is by reference to the direct link Grotius draws between good faith and the free will.

3.2 Free Will

Being a voluntary act, the promise and good faith epitomised man's free will, his creation as homo pro se and sui iuris. It underpinned and facilitated the articulation of what, in the last resort, the natural bond was meant for - com­munication, exchange and protection - in implementing treaties, forms of gov­ernments, and the civil laws by which citizens of their own accord and by pac­tum commune curtailed their plenary liberty; Grotius articulates these aspects in ∕pc.[506] However, in addressing the free will we also touch upon man's Achilles heel.

With God, will and intellect are identical: being the fons boni God aims at the good exclusively. But as we saw in Adamus exul, to agents other than God liberum arbitrium invited an acute moral dilemma, as e.g. Satan's abuse of the faculty in pretending good faith illustrated[507] The same held good for man: he was positioned at the crossroads. Whenever he posed his will against his intel­lect, liberum arbitrium could well become the source of evil, as Eve's dilemma articulated[508] [509]

From the first Grotius's stand is unequivocal. Free will might be the source of all obligation (obligandi radix),44 its binding force was only activated by the concomitant fides; it could never be applied in fraudem alterius - and this implied reciprocity. In Adamus exul the free will was presented in the ethical context of the choice between good and evil[510] Grotius is equally emphatic in ιpc, in Regula ιιι, and in his argumentation of stare pactis in the Prolegomena of ibp[511] The demand holds notably true with respect to the political sphere,[512] [513] [514] as Grotius argues in Christus Patiens (1608) with respect to the Christ and in Sophompanes (1635) with respect to Joseph the viceroy. More than their words, their actual life and works reveal their doctrine.

The same applies to the bond between man and God: whether called lex, foedus, testamentum, diatheke or sponsio48 the bond is based onfides4^ Being eternal and fons boni, and having created man in his own image, God stands to warrant that free will equates good will.[515] [516] [517] [518] However, as with any other promise in Grotius's perception, God's promise of forgiveness, dispensation and grace is conditioned, to wit, by the performance of Good Works. The tenet typifies Grotius's Remonstrant outlook on predestination?1 Forty years from Adamus exul he emphatically confirms this thesis in De Fide et Operibus (1640).

Just as in contracts sales were conditioned by the delivery of goods, in man's Covenant with God the combination of good faith and pious works was the prerequi­site to the fulfilment of the promise of dispensation?2 Piety did not stop at prayers, but included the intent to act, as epitomised in political life. In 1635, to underpin his outlook on politics (τα ∈ργα πολιτειαν) Grotius portrays Joseph as the perfect regent, the epitome of the βiος πολιτικoς. We must conclude that, regardless of scholastic thought or Protestant doctrine, and well before the Remonstrant Troubles surfaced, Grotius had long made up his mind on these issues. Indeed, as a consequence he landed in the Remonstrant camp, and inev­itably so.53 Never in his life did he change his views on these crucial issues.

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Source: Blom Hans W. (ed.). Sacred Polities, Natural Law and the Law of Nations in the 16th-17th Centuries. Brill,2022. — 361 p.. 2022

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  2. Select Bibliography
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  4. Hume’s Position Considered for the Fifth Time
  5. Myth and Normalisation