Problems of Interpretation

A second stumbling block to interpretation is the inconsistent terminology Grotius applies in successive treatises. While not untypical of the period, the phenomenon is suggestive of an ongoing process of thought. The successive stages of Grotius's career will have added to the change of perspective. From a barrister with a specific brief (1605) he turned to legislator (1613-1618), then assumed the role of a New Justinian and Judge of Mankind (1625).

Symptomatic of the above ambiguity is Grotius's method of reasoning, which has only diffused the discourse on his alleged â€?modernity'. To the champion of right reason, the a priori method of science would suggest itself. Grotius's cursory references to mathematics, his claims of reasoning more geometrico, and his solemn pledge to argue in abstracto have been advanced as illustra­tive of this approach?³ But then, in Pufendorf's wake critics have struggled to rhyme this claim with Grotius's obvious reliance, throughout his treatise of 1625 and its many reprints, on the (forever growing) wealth of â€?evidence' drawn from induction and the a posteriori argumentation of the humanities?⁴ From Grotius's almost debonair linking of empirical and historical findings one would rather conclude upon his impotence to let go and mere lip-service to modernity.

To exemplify the complexities and quicksand involved, two other fun­damental issues have puzzled commentators. The first concerns Grotius's seemingly shifting position on Aristotle's concepts of virtue and justice?⁶ Aristotle distinguished two kinds of justice, of a universal and a particular nature respectively,^[482] the first posing as the epitome of virtue, the second as the correcting force in human relations?^[483] In exposing his theory of â€?perfect and less perfect' rights Grotius, to the bewilderment of critics, only accepted the former category as legally relevant?^[484]

The same holds good for Grotius's position on Aristotle's notion of the Golden Mean as catalyst in outweighing the active and passive elements.^{[485] [486] [487] [488] [489] [490] By 1600, in his State Parallels, Grotius demarcated the virtues issuing from the Will from those linked to the Intellect. In 1605 his claim read, in line with Aristotle, that to endure injury was as reprehensible as to inflict injury.21 But then, how does this tally with the eminently Christian virtues of patience and endur­ance? Grotius's drama Chrlstus Patiens (1608) is all about character, virtue and vice. Its perimeters are drawn in Peter's impetuousness and cowardice, Judas' hypocrisy and repent, Pilatus's struggling with the dilemma of Justice and rai­son d’etat, and the Christ's predicament in reconciling his divine and human natures in his prayers at the Mount of Olives.22 The piece de resistance of the play is the very intentional contrasting of two philosophies: the Stoic as pre­sented in Seneca's plays on antiquity's Son of God, Hercules, who in Hercules Furens rebels against his fate, and the Christian concept of virtue that makes its Son of God endure injustice: active furor vs.}

By 1625 Grotius had, with all due respect to Aristotle, abandoned the posi­tion that the essence of virtue, whether with respect to feelings or acts, was to be found in the Golden Mean?⁴ As he argued, this applied notably to the virtue of justice, which found its sublimation in the suppressing of personal interests and proclivities that might impair human society and the commonwealth?⁵ Right reason impelled man to identify virtue with obedience to the law.^[491] However, there was a mean in the Aristotelian sense to which Grotius adhered unconditionally. This concerned the discretion, indeed moral perplexity natu­ral law left man with when he faced the infinite complexities the human con­tingency offered?^[492] We will return to this issue.

A last ground for the diverging interpretation of Grotius's position on the pivotal issues of his day and age is that his views on natural law hinge on two notions that, so to speak, invite conflict. He insists on the human urge for self­preservation, and therefore procreation; by the same token he emphasizes the quintessential sociability of man?^[493] From the first, commentators have found it hard to balance the two concepts. We will address this discourse and start with the pillar of οικεiωσις and human fellowship.

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