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Introduction

The Belize Constitution, like most Commonwealth constitutions, is based on the eponymous Westminster model of parliamentary democracy. In terms of the structures of governance they created, the Commonwealth constitutions substantially mirrored Westminster’s.

In using the term â€?Westminster model,’ one is mindful of SA de Smith’s caution that â€?the Westminster model will never be a term of art, and the political scientist may also prefer to handle it circumspectly’[903] as well as Professor Carnegie’s repartee â€?that when we speak of Westminster model constitutions, we are not being lawyers or even political scientists. We are at best being poets.’[904] To avoid issues of constitutional taxonomy, the label â€?Westminster model’ is used here simply to describe those Commonwealth constitutions which reproduced the essential features of parliamentary democracy as it obtained in England at the time of their independence, described by Professor Albert Fiadjoe as the â€?barest bones of the “Westminster model.â€â€™[905]

The bare bones of the Westminster model included: a ceremonial head of state who is the Queen’s representative, a legislature with at least one chamber democratically elected by the people, an executive of cabinet ministers accountable to the legislature, safeguards for an independent judiciary, an office of Leader of the Opposition and a public service. But there were also some key differences. Commonwealth constitutions, unlike the old Westminster constitution, contained clauses declaring the supremacy of the written constitutions and had entrenched bills of rights which, together, sourced the principle of separation of powers and the tool of judicial review.

By the time of the promulgation of the Constitution of Belize in 1981, the Commonwealth already had 20 plus years of experience with Westminster-style constitutions.

While in many Commonwealth African countries there had been by 1981, fundamental departures from the Westminster model, in the Caribbean countries and Pacific Islands of the Commonwealth, there was little that could be termed as fundamental change.[906] [907] Caribbean judiciaries and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had already begun shaping the region’s constitutional jurisprudence through such seminal cases like Thornhill v AG,[908] Collymore v AG6 DPP v Nasralla,[909] Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher,[910] Hinds v R,[911] Maharaj v AG.[912] Thus, when Belize attended the constitutional conferences in London in the months leading up to independence, it had the benefit of the Commonwealth’s two decades of constitutional experience to guide it. In terms of the drafting of its constitution, Belize could avoid some of the deficiencies that had been exposed in the working of the Westminster transplant in the Caribbean, if not the Commonwealth. In terms of interpreting the Constitution, the Belizean judiciary, with the benefit of the Caribbean’s 20 years of constitutional adjudication, could help to exorcise the spectre of hesitancy and conservatism that haunted the region’s early constitutional judgments.[913] The lateness of its independence, therefore, presented Belize with an opportunity to make a strong and early contribution to the defining of a distinct Caribbean jurisprudence.[914]

The framers of the Belize Constitution introduced some significant alterations to the Westminster transplant model which, as will be shown, assisted the judiciary in expanding the frontiers of Caribbean constitutional interpretation. But the advancement of constitutionalism in Belize was not the exclusive province of the judiciary. Unlike many legislatures throughout the Commonwealth, the Belizean legislature was proactive, even aggressive, in discharging its role of developing the Belize Constitution.

Since the enactment of the Belize Constitution in 1981, the legislature has amended the Belize Constitution six times. By these amendments the Belizean legislature, regardless of the degree of its consciousness of this philosophical truth, grasped the fundamental importance of constitutional reform as an equally important, if not more efficient process, alongside adjudication, for ensuring that the Constitution remained true to its purpose.

Professor Simeon McIntosh makes the point that constitutional reform — the amending of a democratic constitution according to its own terms — aims to make changes to the constitution �that experience reveals to be required by justice or the general good, in order to strengthen the political values to which the society has committed itself.’[915] The values to which the Belizean society committed itself can only be found in one place, that is, the preamble of the Belize Constitution which states that the people of Belize:

...desire that their society shall reflect and enjoy [certain] principles, beliefs and needs and that their Constitution should therefore enshrine and make provision for ensuring the achievement of the same in Belize.[916]

The principles, beliefs and needs referred to include faith in human rights, the dignity of the human person, the equal protection of children, respect for the principles of social justice, belief in a meritocracy, democracy, the rule of law and that the resources of the community should be so distributed as to serve the common good. The framers of the Belize Constitution were then tasked with making �provisions for ensuring the achievement’ of those principles, beliefs and needs in the body of the Constitution.[917]

But a society does not remain static. While the framers of the Belize Constitution devised a set of core structures and institutions for the achievement of the people’s aspirations, there had to be appropriate mechanisms to ensure that those structures and institutions were able, despite the passage of time, to remain relevant.

The Belize Constitution therefore gave the judiciary, through the process of adjudication, the power to ensure that the Constitution has continuing relevance, regardless of the times. Through the process of constitutional reform, the legislature was given the power to introduce changes to the Constitution to achieve, as Simeon McIntosh puts it, �the most appropriate ends or purposes for which the text was constructed.’[918]

As the Belizean judiciary interpreted the Constitution, and as the legislature responded with reforms, what emerged in Belize was a symbiotic, mutually re-enforcing dynamic between the judiciary and the legislature. This was an actualization of roles implicitly envisioned for them under the Belize Constitution to ensure its own resilience. It is worth mentioning that four of the six constitutional amendments were based either on recommendations of a broad-based political reform commission or manifesto promises of political parties. The point here is that the bulk of Belize’s constitutional reforms emanated from a process of consultation with the people. This dynamic for constitutional development produced some results worthy of emulation elsewhere in the Commonwealth.

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Source: Berry David S.. Transitions in Caribbean Law: Law-Making, Constitutionalism and the Convergence of National and International Law. Ian Randle Publishers,2014. — 311 p.. 2014

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