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True intention and justifiable reliance

Modern German law tends to follow a more objective, or normative, approach; the emphasis is not so much on what a party may have meant, but on how a reasonable man would have understood his declaration.93 There is no room for an inquiry into the "true intention" of the parties if the justifiable reliance of the addressee deserves protection.

A declaration of intention, as the emanation of an individual's autonomy, does not exist in a social vacuum; it gives rise to reasonable expectations on the part of others, which must not be disappointed. This reflects a significant shift from a theory of contract based on individualism to a perspective which accentuates the social

SK Cf. also Coing, p. 411. On the nature of the ius commune in the 16th. 17th and 18th centuries, not as professorial law characterized by impractical abstractions, deductive reasoning and concept jurisprudence, but asjudicial law, jurisprudentia forensis, developing through lawyers' interpretation andjudicial opinions, cf. e.g. Gino Gorla, Luigi Moccia, "A 'Revisiting' of the Comparison between 'Continental Law' and 'English Law' (16th—19th century)", (1981) 2 journal of Legal History 143 sqq. Protagonists of the law in action were judges and legal counsel, lawyers such as Molinaeus and Domat, Grotius and Bynkershoek, Huber and Sande, Carpzov and Mevius; the method of their decisions was largely casuistic; and a particularly important part of legal literature written or compiled during this time was forensic in character.

® Cf. supra, p. 625.

50 D. 50, 16, 219.

9 Cf. e.g. Pothier, Trails des obligations, n. 91.

$ Donellus, "Ad. Tit. Dig. de Rebus dubii", Ad L. Ubicst 21., in: Opera Omnia, vol. XI (Lucae, 1767), col. 99.

83 Cf. e.g. Flume, AT, pp. 51 sqq., 307 sqq.; Ludentz.

op. cit., note 2, pp. 278 sqq.; Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte, p. 517. consequences of human behaviour.[3296] It is a change of perception which had been prepared and foreshadowed in the writings of the natural lawyers. They had laid, it will be recalled, the foundations for the modern concepts of contract and of a declaration of intention.[3297] More particularly, they had emphasized that the will to be bound must find some external manifestation. Both voluntas and signum voluntatis are essential elements within the process of contract formation. Conse­quently, then, the interpretation of contracts cannot be determined by a purely subjective criterion either. Grotius firmly rejected Cicero's advice "[sjemper autem in fide quid senseris, non quid dixeris, cogitandum",95 and expressed his own view in the following words:

"Sed quia interni actus per sc spectabiles non sunt,... ipsa dicante naturali ratione jus est ei cui quid promissum est promissorem cogere ad id quod recta interpretatio suggerit. "y7

But how is this recta interpretatio to be established? "Si nulla sit conjectura quae ducat alio, verba intelligenda sunt ex proprietate, non Grammatica quae est ex origine, sed populari ex usu." [3298] [3299]

3.

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Source: Zimmermann R.. The Law of Obligations. Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition. Juta & Co, Ltd,1992. — 1241 p.. 1992

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