The lex Sancimus (C. 7, 47, 1)

By the time of Justinian, the formulae had disappeared and the distinction between the estimation, in some cases, of quanti ea res est and, in others, of quod interest no longer needed to be perpetuated.

"qui certain habent quantitatcm vel naturam... hoc quod interest dupli quantitatem minime excedere; in alus autem casibus, qui incerti esse videntur, indices... requirerc, ut, quod re vera inducitur damnum, hoc reddatur. "^{3.. ita particularis ratio limitationis in casibus certis est, quia verisimiliter non fuit praevisum, nee cogitatum dc susdpiendo maiori damno, vel periculo ultra rem principalem, quam sit res ipsa principalis. Hacc autem ratio quandoque; etiam in casibus incertis quadantenus reperitur".}

For both casus certi and incerti it is equitable to limit the amount of damages recoverable to those that could be foreseen at the time when the contract was entered into: this is the rationale which underlies and finds expression in both parts of Justinian's enactment (casus certus and casus incertus).^[4255] Pothier generalized this idea and detached it from the specific provisions contained in C.

. le debiteur n'est tenu que des domtnages et ititerets qu'on a pu prevoir, lors du contrat, que le criancier pourrait soujfrir de I'inexecution de V obligation. "^Ml

Reason: the debtor cannot be considered as having subjected himself to any risks that lie beyond the limits of foreseeability.^[4257]

(b) Hadley v. Baxendale

Pothier's views, as usual, were avidly received by the 19th-century English courts and formed the basis, in this instance, of the contemplation doctrine, as formulated in the celebrated decision of Hadley v. Baxendale: in cases of breach of contract such damages (apart from the "general damages") can be claimed

"as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as a probable result of the breach of it. "^{31were ultimately rendered superfluous with the advent, in the 19th century, of the "Differenz- theorie".34 Based on a misinterpretation of the Roman concept of "quod interest" ("what is in between"), it nevertheless had an immediate and lasting impact, for it satisfied the pandectists' desire for a clear conceptual formula, which appeared to reduce the problem to a simple mathematical operation without involving any value judgements.341 The man who so ingeniously read into the sources what suited contemporary legal science? It was Friedrich Mommsen, once again.342}

"⁷ Lavery & Co. Ltd. v.Jungheittrich 1931 AD 156 at 174 sq.; Wliitjieid v. Phillips 1957 (3) SA 318 (A) at 329D-E; Shatz Investments (Pty.) Ltd. v. Kalovymas\976 (2) SA 545 (A) at 550F- 551A. On "general" and "special" damages in English law.

Coing, p. 438. Scaccia exclaimed "haec materia est profundissima et longissima, et est obscura sicut alia, quae sit in corpore juris, et amplectitur mare amplissimum, in quo pauci sine periculo navigarunt et propter ejus subjectam materiam turbatur totus mundus" (cf. Endemann, Studien, vol. II, p. 244); Anton Fumeus likened anybody venturing into this field of law to Daedalus: "Qui de eo quod interest, pro iure civili seripserunt, mihi videntur optimo iure Dedali nominandi, struxerunt enim multis ambagibus inextricabiles vias, vel potius pervias" (cf. Wieling, Interesse und Privatstrafe, p. 4; cf. further the quotations on p. 2).

"⁴ Reproduced in Lange, Schadensersatz und Privatstrafe, p. 30. The most important of these—apart from the distinction of interesse circa rem and extra rem—was the threefold subdivision into interesse commune (market value of the res (concerned), interesse conventum (its agreed price) and interesse singulare (based on the atfectio of the particular plaintiff); it was derived from Paul. D. 9, 2, 33 pr. and Paul. D. 35, 2, 63 pr. For details, see Lange. Schadensersatz und Privatstrafe, pp. 22 sqq.; cf. also Wieling. Interesse und Privatstrafe, pp. 67 sqq.; Erasmus, (1975) 38 THRHR 14 sq. It was rejected earlier by Jacobus de Ravams, later by Molinaeus {Tractatus de eo quod interest, n. 12) and others, and it subsequently disappeared.

™ Cf. supra, p. 824.

'^Al For a criticism of the Differenztheorie cf, e.g. Heinrich Honseil. "Herkunft und Kritik des Interessebegriffs im Schadensersatzrecht", 1973 Juristische Schuhmg 69 sqq.; Wolfgang Grunsky, in: Münchener Kommentar, vol, II (2nd ed.. 1985), Vor § 249, n. 7.

⁵⁴² Interesse, op, cit., note 283, pp. 3 sqq.; the French humanist, Franciscus Hotomannus, had, however, already defined the concept of interest in very similar terms some centuries earlier; cf. Wieling, Interesse und Privatstrafe, p. 18 sq.