Practical lawyers are not usually overconcerned with bringing the law into a neat systematical order so that it appears as a logically consistent whole of legal rules and institutions.

For the writer of a textbook, especially if it is an elementary one, this is, however, essential; after all, he has to prevent his student readers from getting lost in a totally indigestible mass of casuistry.

Thus, significantly, it was Gaius who started subdividing the law of obligations in a rational manner. Other classical jurists, if they made any attempt at all,^[128] merely enumerated various ways in which obligations could arise. A similar attitude was displayed by them towards the whole of Roman private law: it was also not perceived to constitute an organized system.^[129] Abstract conceptualization was not taken beyond the various legal institutions which made up Roman private law, and in Quintus Mucins' and Sabinus' compilations—the latter was based on the former and provided, in turn, the cornerstone for the restatement of the interpretation of civil law in the great commentaries by Paulus and Ulpianus and Pomponius — these institutions were arranged in a "convenient leisurely fashion",^[130] dictated by associative thinking rather than methodical reflection. Quintus Mucins' lus Civile has been said to have laid "the foundation not merely of Roman but European jurisprudence"^{[131] [132]} and his main achievement, in the words of Pom- ponius, was: "ins civile primus constituit generatim in libros decern et octo redigendo.^1,138 But, however progressive his scheme was by comparative standards, it displays no interest in a logical structuring of the legal material.^[133]

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More on the topic Practical lawyers are not usually overconcerned with bringing the law into a neat systematical order so that it appears as a logically consistent whole of legal rules and institutions.:

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2. § 69 The legal institutions of Rome of the archaic and pre-classical epoch might well serve as the basis for a course in Roman law.
3. The boundaries of the subject: the legal order broadly conceived
4. After having treated, in the first two chapters, the problems of mandatory norms — rules and principles — and of power-conferring rules, purely con­stitutive rules and definitions, we will now set out to examine permissive sen­tences.
5. Legal rules and extra-legal restrictions
6. For the benefit of those who wish to delve deeper into the study of Roman law, and as a prelude to all textual criticism and research on Roman legal institutions, attention should be called to the scores of technical aids which facilitate study in the field.
7. Advocacy in the legal order during the Roman period receives plentiful illumination in the traditional literary sources -
8. The Roman lawyers and the law of lease
9. Legal rules and procedures supporting compliance with the Treaty
10. 2.2. Second exclusion: Power-conferring rules cannot adequately be under­stood in terms of definitions, conceptual rules, or qualifying dispositions
11. This chapter addresses the origin and developmentof Roman legal sources - that is, the methods and procedures for establishing new legally binding rules, standards, and norms.
12. Two practical suggestions
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