Correality and solidarity

This is exactly what happened, however, in the course of the 19th century. A distinction was drawn between (simple) solidarity^[684] and correality:^[685] the term "solidarity" was used to indicate two (or more) obligations directed to one and the same juristic end, but not identified, and thus extinguished only by solutio; correality, on the other hand, was taken to refer to the concurrence of two (or more) obligations which were objectively identified so as constructively to form one, the liability of correi falling away as soon as litis contestatio with one of them had taken place.

"Then there arise opinions and theories which can maintain their life only in the place where they received the same, to wit, in the lecturer's chair, but which, if they venture into the outside world, at once prove that they cannot bear the raw air of reality; opinions... in the highest degree learned, but also in the highest degree perverted—hot-house plants without sap and energy, bastards of logic and erudition with law, unsound lecture-room jurisprudence."¹⁰

It was pandectism at its worst.¹⁰² Today, such theorizing in terms of "solidarity" and "correality" should be avoided, not only for the reasons given by Jhering but also because it would be an entirely ahistorical enterprise. The Roman lawyers neither knew this terminol­ogy nor were they concerned with abstract analyses concerning the conceptual nature of the various cases of plurality of debtors.