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CONCLUSIONS: PURPLE-MERCHANT'S WIFE AND SISTER-IN-LAW

Why would Eulogios and his brethren, Tapia and other members of Patermouthis’ clan choose for their financial affairs the form of a fictitious sale, rather than an ordinary loan secured by an ordinary pledge, a transac­tion still very well attested in the later Byzantine papyri (even in the same archive, we find examples of a typical mortgage)?[498]

We may of course only speculate as to their intentions.

Obviously the creditor in our case is much better secured. My first guess was that when Constantine banned lex commissoria, obviously the lenders still wanted to have a strong security versus insolvent debtors, and thus they coined ficti­tious sales that dissimulated pledges. This may well have been so, but one has to observe that, notwithstanding the emperor’s prohibition, later repeated in the Theodosian and then Justinian’s Code (respectively, CTh.3.2.1 and C.8.34.3, 320 CE), the legal practice continued to include forfeiture clauses in the documents constituting pledges.[499] This usage is even more evident in some Coptic deeds, temporally closer to our documents.[500] In some other Coptic ostraka, the ownership of the pledged thing is openly transferred to the creditor and rests with him or her until the repayment.[501] So this may have not been a good enough reason to make the parties choose a fictitious sale over the conventional pledge.

Before an attempt at conclusion, let me have a look at just two instances, very late Greek and Coptic, of these ‘conventional’ pledges.

One of the first editions of papyri, P. Paris, offers under nos 20, 21, 21 bis and 22ter and on the following pages seven documents related to the same person, a purple-merchant Aurelios Pachymios, son of Psates.[502] P. Paris 21ter is a deed of sale concluded in Panopolis on 13 July 599 between the protagonist of the archive, Pachymes and his wife Aurelia Maria, on one side, and his brother-in-law Arsenios, on the other.[503] The couple acquire from their brother (-in-law) a third share in the house, formerly belonging to Kallinikos and Eugenia, the late parents of Arsenios and Maria, for 2 solidi.

Aurelia Maria already owns one third of the estate, and the remaining share rests with Aurelia Ioanna, the third sibling born to Kallinikos and Eugenia. Ioanna mortgages this share on 31 October 607 to her sister Maria, having received from her as a loan two thirds of a solidus, i.e. 15A keratia (SB I 5285.ll. 22-7). The house is perfectly described, its boundaries are set by the great holy church, Panopolitan road and the estate of the heirs of the late Timotheos. Ioanna undertakes on her own and her future successors’ behalf not to alienate, change anything within the house or further mortgage it.[504] Moreover, in lieu of interest, she allows her sister to use the house and to live in it.[505] So far, nothing strange: we have a typical antichretic loan in front of us.[506]

On the very next day Aurelia Maria rents the whole house to Theodoros, a purple-dyer, like her husband, for four gold keratia per year (SB I 5286). The object of rent is described as belonging to her: ‘the whole house belong­ing to you with the upper and lower part and with its rightly befalling to it’.[507] Aurelia Maria behaves as if she were the real owner of the house; furthermore, the antichresis terms allow her to live and to use the house but do not specify the right to let it. Karolien Geens suggests that Ioanna’s loan is a hidden sale.[508] I do not find this convincing. First of all, the price is way too low.[509] It is only the two thirds of a solidus as opposed to two solidi paid to their common brother seven years earlier for exactly same share of the house. Secondly, why would the parties want to hide a sale? In fact, in order to be able to sell the place further, Maria would have had to present the pur­chaser the deed confirming her property rights, and this she had not done. These two documents, I presume, prove something else: it seems that in these very late deeds the constitution of a pledge vested in the pledgee quasi owner-like rights, among them the right to dispose.[510]

Let us turn now to the practice of pledges in Coptic documents.

A typical deed constituting a pledge would transfer detention of the thing pledged, and include sale and forfeiture clauses[511] as well as a penalty clause, often set at three holokottinoi, to be paid should the pledgor take the things away. Such is also the case of a document that is of particular interest in this instance. P. KO 28 (Koptische Ostraka der Papyrussammlung) prima facie seems to be a pos­sessory pledge by which the debtor hands over to the creditor some arable land (Besitzpfand).[512] Yet, he also undertakes to do the field work and - which was particularly important - to take care of the canal system of the plot.[513] Who actually had the land plot then? And to whom did the revenue of the crops go?[514] We clearly see that the borders between ownership and pledge had become very murky.

What does it all lead to? Firstly, we may have observed that the form of the pledge in late Antique times did not really follow the pure pattern of the classical Roman law forms of pignus and hypotheca. The boundaries between property rights and the rights vested with the pledgee became less and less visible, and they became more and more alike. Secondly, in our examples, the family relations of Aurelia Tapia, the special character of the monastic communities, made for an important factor of trust between the parties that possibly induced the debtors to agree to what would otherwise be considered harsh conditions of their loan securities. This trust founda­tion, moreover, seems to have worked fine, notwithstanding the tempestu­ous litigations between Tapia and her son. In these contexts, such securities must have safeguarded not just the repayment of the money but possibly the personal relationship between the parties involved. And thirdly, also given the above, the economic reality of money buying and lending led people to search for more forms of securing debts. In each particular case, the interest of the creditor and debtor was weighted, in order to tailor the form of real security that suited them best.

Ordinary people do not follow the well estab­lished theoretical dogmatic legal patterns, they want to protect their transac­tions in the seemingly most secure way, and they sometimes tend to invent things that are not dreamt of in legal philosophy just to feel more protected.[515] Even today - in the time and realm of codified law of real securities - the parties would choose the Sicherungsübereignung as simply more secure than the traditional form of the pledge.[516] The security of credit comes before the dogmatic disgust towards this legal form (in the famous M. Salinger’s dictum referring to Sicherungsübereigung as the bastard child of the legal practice),[517] until eventually the elegant legal dogmatic surrenders to the practicality of the institution. It is doubtful therefore if Paul Oertmann’s prophecy, that ‘Fiducia geht und nimmer kehrt sie wieder’, will ever come true. Transfer of ownership as a security for credit seems to be and to have always been simply intrinsic to legal anthropology.[518]

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Source: Plessis P.J. du. (ed.). New Frontiers: Law and Society in the Roman World. Edinburgh University Press,2013. — 256 p.. 2013

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