CONCLUSION
If we are right to suppose that Roman law was not a science in the modern sense and that it was closely connected to rhetoric, then new fields of research open up. The accepted method of researching Roman law will change.
It is no longer necessary to (re)construct the system of Roman law as has been done over the past five centuries or to try to accommodate opinions of jurists that seem to deviate from the regular pattern. It is no longer necessary to try to explain why the same jurist had a different opinion in another, similar case. It is no longer necessary to keep Cicero out of the way.What remains is the notion that the Roman jurists reached a remarkably high level of sophistication in creating law. However, it will now be interesting to discover how they argued legal problems from both sides; in the Digest, there are a number of texts showing such discussions. It will be interesting to see whether so-called rhetorical sources can contribute to understanding the development of Roman law. Unfortunately, it will hardly be possible to assess whether the actual presentation of a point of view in a trial influenced the outcome: a bad actio could completely undermine a good legal argument, and vice versa.
It will be necessary to acquire some knowledge about the various rhetorical systems that were taught to young Romans belonging to the upper class, some of whom we now know as jurists. Here is a problem, for there is not much literature on classical rhetoric, particularly not on rhetoric in a legal context.[108] But a problem can be regarded as a challenge, and we hope this chapter may inspire scholars to take it up and study Roman law from a legal and rhetorical perspective.
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